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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the little-known phenomenological ethical theory of Max Scheler, 
discussed in his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values and The Nature of 
Sympathy, also bringing in various other complementary philosophers. It argues that Scheler’s 
theory, when supplemented with complementary ideas, is superior to those offered by 
contemporary analytic intuitionism and other meta-ethical theories. It argues that a theory of 
pluralist emotive intuitionism provides a better description of both our experience of ethical 
value and the logical requirements for the ethical knowledge presumed by that experience. 
This thesis places Scheler’s theory in the context of ethical intuitionism up until the present. It 
considers why intuitionism has been generally rejected, looking at outstanding philosophical 
questions facing ethical intuitionism and previous attempted answers, and discussing current 
theories of analytic ethical intuitionism and their flaws. It explains the significant elements of 
Scheler’s ethical theory and how it can be understood in its phenomenological context. To 
demonstrate how Scheler’s material intuitionism is better than current theories of rationalist 
intuitionism, and other meta-ethical alternatives, this thesis looks at two main groups of issues. 
Firstly, the epistemological issues raised by Scheler’s theory and how it offers a possible 
solution to the problem of ethical knowledge, along with a brief consideration of ontological 
issues. Secondly, normative issues raised by Scheler’s theory: major issues on normative 
judgement raised but not answered by Scheler’s theory and, following this, a chapter dedicated 
to Scheler’s theory of ‘persons’, particularly with reference to Emmanuel Levinas.  
It concludes that an adapted Scheleran theory of ethical intuitionism can be superior to 
contemporary theories. It explains how the fundamental features of ethical experience may be 
epistemologically and phenomenologically justified based on objective values. It provides better 
responses to standard problems raised against intuitionism while also providing a natural 
explanation for a wider range of moral phenomena than standard meta-ethical alternatives. This 
demonstrates its superior explanatory power and provides strong arguments for its value as an 
over-arching meta-ethical theory.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis advocates a meta-ethical theory based on that of Max Scheler, and informed by other 
complementary 19
th
 & 20
th
 century philosophers, arguing that it is superior to those offered by 
contemporary analytic ethical intuitionism and other meta-ethical theories. It argues that a 
theory of pluralist emotive intuitionism, like that of Scheler, provides a superior description of 
both our experience of ethical value and the logical requirements for the ethical knowledge 
presumed by that experience. It is motivated by a strong belief that Max Scheler’s theory has 
not received the awareness its merits, originality and scope deserve, and that it has great 
potential for being further developed and improved with insights from other philosophers if only 
it received greater academic attention. 
This thesis focuses on moral discussion and experience but places this discussion within a wider 
ethical framework of experience of value in beauty, holiness, love and other sources. It argues 
that phenomenology provides the best methodology for a close analysis of ethical experience, 
that this experience is given as objective, cognitive and affective, and that it is irreducibly 
pluralist in both basic principles and practical application.  
The thesis begins with a naïve description of the nature of ethical experience, and suggests the 
basic features of this experience unreflectively suggest a theory like ethical intuitionism. In 
chapter two it discusses the history of ethical intuitionism up until the present and considers the 
reasons why this theory has been generally rejected (though retaining some enthusiastic 
advocates). It looks at the outstanding philosophical questions facing ethical intuitionism and 
argues that contemporary rational intuitionism has developed convincing answers to some of 
these problems, while suggesting which others remain unanswered. It looks at the main current 
theories of analytic ethical intuitionism and outlines the principal flaws that have been identified 
in these theories. In chapter three it gives the chief exposition of the significant elements of 
Scheler’s ethical theory and how its core features of ethical values can be understood in the 
context of phenomenology and Husserl’s earlier phenomenology.  
This thesis is mainly concerned to argue that Max Scheler’s theory of material intuitionism is a 
superior theory to current theories of rationalist intuitionism, and is at least the equal of other 
meta-ethical alternatives. It demonstrates this by looking at two primary groups of issues raised 
by Scheler’s theory in order to explain and expand on what Scheler himself said. Firstly, in the 
fourth chapter it looks in detail at the epistemological issues raised by Scheler’s theory and how 
it offers a possible solution to the problem of ethical knowledge, along with a brief 
consideration of ontological issues. Secondly, in chapters five and six it looks at the main 
normative issues raised by Scheler’s theory. Chapter five looks at some major issues on 
12 
 
normative judgement raised but not answered by Scheler’s theory of ethical judgement. 
Following this, chapter six analyses Scheler’s theory of ‘persons’, particularly with reference to 
Emmanuel Levinas. An entire chapter is dedicated to the ethical significance of persons because 
Scheler considered his whole theory a ‘personalism’: his distinctive ideas about persons are at 
the core of his ethical vision. But, this can easily get submerged in the focus on the ideas about 
‘material values’ for which Scheler is best known.  
This thesis argues that ethical intuitionism can be strengthened not just by adopting and grafting 
on Scheler’s theory, but by applying ideas from other complementary 19th and 20th century 
philosophers to Scheler’s theory to enhance it further. It presents this as a positive theory of how 
the fundamental features of ethical experience may be epistemologically and 
phenomenologically justified based on objective values as the object-correlates of acts of 
intentional feeling and conation. It presents this theory as a superior theory of ethical 
intuitionism to that usually given in contemporary literature, combining the positive features of 
rational intuitionism and emotional sentimentalism. And it argues that this is able to provide 
better responses to standard problems raised against intuitionism (such as motivation, 
supervenience and emptiness) while also providing a natural explanation for a wider range of 
moral phenomena than the standard major meta-ethical alternatives.  
Throughout, this thesis considers the relationship of Scheler’s theory with the major meta-
ethical options generally considered (naturalism, non-natural realism, non-cognitivism, Kantian 
constructivism), and argues for the superiority and uniqueness of Scheler’s theory. It considers 
these alternatives both positively, showing how their better features can be derived equally well 
within Scheler’s material intuitionism, and negatively, arguing that each of them fails to clearly 
explain a range of phenomena that are key to human ethical experience that can be explained 
clearly within  material intuitionism. This demonstrates the explanatory power of an adapted 
Scheleran theory and provides a strong argument for its value as a meta-ethical theory.  
 
2. Pluralist Material Intuitionism 
The meta-ethical theory advanced in this thesis, based on that of Max Scheler, may be described 
as a pluralist material intuitionism. Scheler described his own theory as one of ‘emotional 
intuitionism’ or ‘material apriorism’1 and this thesis examines how that idea was and can be 
developed.   
In line with Scheler, this thesis particularly rejects the characterisation of ‘emotion’ and 
‘feeling’ generally as purely internal, subjective, non-directional feeling states.  Rather, it takes 
a view of our affective life as involving complicated intentional, conceptual syntheses of 
                                                     
1
 Scheler, M. Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. Translated by Manfred S. Frings. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 [1913-1916], p.xxiii 
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rational and non-rational content.  This affective and conative intentional life directly reveal 
distinct, ideal practical values, whose representation is defined in terms of affective and rational 
content, in a manner that can act as the basis of ethical knowledge, motivation and 
communication.  
This thesis bases its argument for this theory on the work of Scheler, Levinas, Husserl, 
Collingwood, Otto, and others. This is because of their importance to phenomenological theory, 
to the development of phenomenological ethics, or because (despite their differences), they 
share common features in discussing how a complex unity of reason and emotion in practical 
thought must motivate and underlie human practical choice. It also draws on contemporary and 
historical analytic intuitionists.  
I refer to ‘pluralist material intuitionism’ to both evoke Scheler’s original theory and make clear 
that this theory is being expanded and adapted. ‘Pluralist’, because one of the main strengths of 
this theory is the ability to provide a substantive explanation of a wider range of ethical 
phenomena than competing theories. ‘Material’ refers not to materialism or physical material 
but Scheler’s use of the German ‘material’, meaning content as opposed to form (in the Kantian 
sense), which has been often translated as non-formal to make this distinction clearer
23
.  This is 
always the meaning intended in this thesis in such phrases as ‘material intuition’ or ‘material 
intuitionism’.  I also often refer to Scheler’s theory, or a Scheleran theory where I mean a theory 
based on Scheler’s principles but adapted (and hopefully improved) in some areas. 
‘Intuition’ in this thesis refers to both ‘intuition’ in the Kantian sense of how cognition “relates 
immediately to [its] object”,4 and in the analytic sense referring to ‘initial intellectual 
impressions’.5 ‘Intuitionism’ is then the epistemological doctrine that we gain justified 
knowledge of distinctly ethical facts by direct intuition. This is distinguished from ‘empiricism’ 
where we gain ethical knowledge by sensory observation of purely physical, non-practical, non-
distinctively-ethical facts. It is also distinguished from ‘rationalism’ where we gain ethical 
knowledge through rational reflection and proof by consciousness, and these are not given to 
consciousness by any generative sensory faculty (whether intellectual, empirical, affective or 
otherwise). 
                                                     
2
 Ibid, p.xv 
3
 Scheler’s core concept of material values, is hence contrasted explicitly with Kant’s focus on the 
connection between the a priori and form of cognition of judgement. The degree to which Scheler’s 
accusations of ‘formalism’ against Kant are entirely justified is beyond the scope of this thesis, which 
largely focuses on Scheler’s positive theory of ethics. The relationship between the two philosophers is 
considered in more detail in chapter three, section eight ‘The Relation to Kant’s Ethics’. 
4
 Kant, I. (2007 [1781, 1787]). Critique of Pure Reason. (M. Weigelt, Trans.) London: Penguin Books 
Ltd, A19/B34. 
5
 I don’t wish to state these conceptions are necessarily identical or co-extensive but I argue they are 
sufficiently similar to justify referring to a single set of states as ‘intuitions’ that would fall in the 
intersection of the Kantian, Analytic and phenomenological definitions. 
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This theory bears similarities to both traditional rationalist intuitionism and moral 
sentimentalism but relies on neither methodologically, rather being based on phenomenological 
analysis of ethical experience, and placed within the phenomenological tradition. It argues for 
the objective nature of values, and the order among them, as the basis for a rational ethical 
theory, but takes no position on the metaphysical question of the nature of the reality of these 
values. Rather, it concentrates on the epistemological question of explaining the range of human 
ethical experience and how ethical knowledge and development may occur on that basis. 
Within this thesis a broad definition of the term ‘ethical’ is taken, in line with Scheler’s 
pluralism and his and other philosophers’ use of ‘ethics’ to refer to the full range of human 
experience of value, including aesthetic, moral, religious and other elements. In this usage it is 
broadly coextensive with axiology. I generally use ‘moral’ when specifically referring to 
questions of human conduct towards other beings in terms of good and evil, right and wrong, as 
is commonly the case. But I am not taking the border between the two to be precisely defined 
and I am aware that some writers use them as synonyms.   
The main work by Scheler that gives his ethical philosophy, and which is the focus of this 
thesis, is his Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values, first published in two 
separate parts in 1913 and 1916. This book is commonly referred to as the Formalismus, from 
the second word of the German title Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik, 
and I refer to it as Formalismus in this thesis and its footnotes. 
A distinction must be made between meta-ethical and normative theories. This is a distinction, 
respectively, between theories of the means and nature of ethical knowledge, and substantive 
theories of ethical content. This is of course already a common philosophical distinction but in 
ethical works themselves it is often fudged. That is, it is often assumed that certain substantive 
ethical and epistemological theories necessarily go together when this is not the case, and they 
are only customarily joined. For example, intuitionism since Moore, and in its contemporary 
manifestations, is usually taken to support a value pluralist ethical theory. But intuitionism itself 
could support utilitarianism (à la Sidgwick), or egoism or various other theories, and similar 
considerations apply to epistemological alternatives such as empiricism or constructivism. The 
same is true in the other direction: utilitarianism, for example, could be supported by 
empiricism, or intuitionism or mystical divine revelation. It is merely unusual for this to be the 
case. Kant and Scheler are examples of two other philosophers whose theories closely merged 
epistemological ‘meta-ethical’ and ethical ‘normative’ ideas and arguments.  
This thesis will be defending a theory that is both epistemological and normative, as is Scheler’s 
theory on which it is based. I address the meta-ethical and epistemological issues in this thesis 
primarily in chapters two to four, and look at central normative issues in chapters five and six, 
before returning to consider alternative theories in the final chapter.        
15 
 
 
3. A Naïve view of ‘Ethical Experience’ 
Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, Beauty, Holiness: these make up a huge part of what it means 
to be human: a thinking, rational and emotional being. From the rules of politeness in our small 
personal interactions with others, the struggles between good and bad guys that fill our 
entertainment, our personal choices as consumers, to our political discussions dominated by 
arguments about fairness, social justice and awareness of great moments of good and evil in our 
world. Ethical considerations make up a vast part of our mental landscape, our daily lives and 
our culture, and we all have a keen sense of right and wrong, even if we only deploy it in 
reference to the good we do and the wrong other people do to us. We also have an awareness of 
beauty in art, nature, other people; and many people also have an untutored appreciation for 
experiences of holiness. Ethical judgements and issues range from the almost entirely trivial to 
the most extraordinarily important issues in the world. 
Ethics is an immensely practical affair; as universal, commonplace, and feeling as fiercely real 
as the physical rocks and trees and other things of the world we live in. The way we 'work out' 
morality is also equally practical. We sense 'moral' value and right and wrong in the world 
around us. We don't uniformly reason it from first principles like abstract mathematics, and 
there appears to be no connection between how much you have studied ethics and how ethical 
you are, or your ability to appreciate or reproduce beauty, or other values. The most untutored 
or un-philosophical person can act with more moral insight, and even describe greater goodness, 
than the most wise of moral philosophers, if probably without the ability to articulate where 
these principles or insights come from. Ethical experience saturates our experience of the world. 
We experience all of human reality and society as valuable and structured in terms of ethical 
assumptions and this structure is widely felt and accessible to persons. And this experience can 
be as variegated and complex as any experience of merely physical reality.  
Ethical experience has particular structural features that distinguish it from other elements of 
human experience, whether that of physical objects or our inner sense. Morality is felt to be 
both universal and objective, to apply to everyone and not be under individual decision, to make 
demands upon the individual that they act or refrain from acting in certain ways and to have 
fundamental significance in relation to human life. Its demands are felt to over-ride non-moral 
urges and desires especially in committing certain actions and to have different heights or 
depths of moral importance for different actions. And it is experienced as something that can be 
discussed, argued over and of which opinions can be decisively true or false, and furthermore 
something that most people are innately equipped to at least possibly understand and discuss 
without the requirement for particular training or expertise. 
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Other areas of ethical experience such as aesthetic or religious value have their own distinct 
structural features that are widely taken to define their judgements and statements, and which 
are also held to be accessible and relevant to every person’s individual life, and impossible to 
summarise in simple, logical principles.  Another key structural feature, shared with moral 
experience, is that the ability to perceive, ‘create’ or ‘instantiate’ moral, religious and aesthetic 
value are taken to be,  to a limited degree, open to practical improvement through personal 
effort, and open to vast intellectual study. But, fundamentally, both of these are relatively 
irrelevant compared to the personal ability to ‘create’ or ‘instantiate’ these values whether in 
personal holiness, artistic ability or moral goodness. 
Despite this, too much reasoning about ethics approaches the subject at the level of abstract 
principles first and actual ethical experience second. From abstract first principles philosophers 
work out ethical systems and then apply them, fully formed, to real experience; often finding 
real experience a disappointment when it does not measure up to the neatness of theoretical 
vision. But this puts the cart before the horse. Ethics is different to abstract subjects such as 
mathematics that have some very particular features. We all understand very basic mathematical 
notions like space and number, but once we go into almost any detail very precise study is 
needed to go any further to understand the possibility and concepts of more advanced ideas. 
Almost no-one just trips over the ideas of group theory or set theory, or differential equations, 
unless they have them painstakingly explained. In complete contrast to this, one meets and 
experiences the ideas of good and evil everyday without the need for much explanation. These 
ideas are given and transparent in a way that experience of our ordinary world is, and 
experience of morality is, but mathematics, metaphysics, and scientific abstractions are not.  
There is no such connection with studying philosophical ethics and experiencing morality, or 
even knowing what is the moral thing to do. All we can say is that people who study ethics can 
have a better grip of the principles and 'laws' behind every-day moral awareness and decision 
making, but they are not necessarily any better at doing it. Every-day and immediate ethical 
experience is primary to our ethical awareness and practice and the theory that lies behind it is 
more like a scientific explanation for a phenomenon with which we are already familiar. In the 
ordinary living world we act, we live, we see, we hear, we feel, and do a whole host of other 
things entirely competently without understanding the theoretical physical principles behind 
them, and neither do we need to have their concept explained to us to experience them. 
Understanding physics doesn't make you a good walker, understanding optics doesn't make you 
see better, though in all these actions it may be applied on the margins to improve it. And there 
is the same fundamental relation between ethics and moral experience as there is between 
experience of the physical world and physics, chemistry, biology. 
This means that the reality of 'ethical experience' has to be at the centre of any investigation into 
morality, and rational ethical principles secondary to it. We can deny whether ethics has any 
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fundamental and essential metaphysical reality. We can argue over the details of our moral 
intuitions and experiences, like ten people giving their ten different eye witness accounts of the 
same car crash.  But we cannot deny the reality of that ethical experience, of the experience of 
value we 'see' in the world around us, of our intuitive reactions to new ethical situations and 
ideas. Nor, again, the different feelings and judgements that come through learning of great 
moral heroes or villains, or of the way people have morally acted in extreme situations. It forces 
itself on us as we go about our ordinary lives, whether we want it or not, and as such it bears a 
totally different relationship to us and our understanding than rationalist abstractions, like 
mathematics or much philosophy. This must then be the fundamental basis of any attempt to 
understand our concepts of meaning, good and value in the world in general, in the same way 
that our experience of the physical world must always lie at the basis of our scientific theories.  
We should not adopt a prescriptive approach that starts with a particular metaphysical bias and 
attempts to force our experience to conform to that, discarding bits where they do not fit, such 
as usually happens in theories as varied as traditional utilitarianism, non-cognitivism or 
Kantianism. Our approach must do justice to the messy, real nature of ethical experience. 
 Otherwise we risk whitewashing over the beauty, detail, richness and colour of the practical 
experience that makes up such a large part of our human life. Only such an approach can be a 
complete basis for any truly thorough attempt to understand the role morality plays in human 
existence.  Theories that are not built on this basis, despite their undoubted wisdom in this or 
that instance, should be generally rejected as insufficient. 
 
4. Intuitionism  
I argue that the above, although obviously a rather naïve view, is a fair description of the 
manner in which ethical experience forms a part of human life, unreflectively appears to human 
consciousness and is taken to justify judgements and actions on (for example)  moral or 
aesthetic grounds. I argue that ethical experience of this type naturally leads to a naïve theory of 
ethical intuitionism, and in fact that a considerable number of people, if questioned about their 
ethical commitments, would justify them in a manner that could only be described as a form of 
ethical intuitionism: they ‘just know’ certain things are right or wrong. And, of course, ethical 
intuitionism of a type has a long and respectable history in philosophy dating back at least to the 
time of Plato. 
I believe the reasoning behind this is simple. Most people understand clear ethical ideas, as well 
as those relating to other areas of human value, without any necessary ability to trace the roots 
or logic of this information. They also have clear preferences when asked to consider individual 
moral cases or dilemmas that they believe their mind is supplying to them. This provides clear 
cases of both what is referred to as ‘intuitions’ in areas of analytic philosophy and in Kant’s 
sense of something that relates cognition immediately to its object. Even if there are 
18 
 
fundamental principles underlying examples of correct moral reasoning, such as 
universalisability or utility, these are neither immediately apparent nor felt necessary for 
justification for personal action or ordinary reasoning on ethical topics.  Intuition, like 
perception, is taken as sufficient initial justification unless someone can then produce a good 
reason otherwise. 
Despite this, ethical intuitionism has fallen out of favour a number of times during its history, 
and today is widely criticised as a meta-ethical theory, especially among analytic philosophers.
6
 
However, it has enjoyed a small resurgence of support in the last two decades with a number of 
philosophers positing a contemporary form of intuitionism and giving defences against a range 
of traditional criticisms.
7
 I argue that this contemporary analytic intuitionism has made 
significant progress in defending intuitionism as a meta-ethical theory, but due to shortcomings 
in its approach is incapable of answering the remaining significant criticisms against it. Later in 
this thesis I will attempt to address these issues, using the tools provided by Scheler’s ethics and 
the work of complementary philosophers.  I now give a historical summary of the development 
of ethical intuitionism, in British empiricist and analytic philosophy, and then the arguments 
that have discredited it in the eyes of many philosophers. Following this I will discuss which of 
these arguments I believe contemporary intuitionism has developed convincing responses to and 
which I believe remain to be challenged and why.  
                                                     
6
 e.g. Liszka (2002), Jackson (2003), Blackburn (1993), Brandt (1996), Nowell-Smith (1954), Gibbard 
(1990), Hare (1961), etc 
7
 e.g. Stratton-Lake (2013),  Audi (2010), Huemer (2005), Shafer-Landau (2005), etc.    
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Chapter 2 - Analytic Intuitionism 
 
1. The Development of Analytic Intuitionism 
Modern analytic intuitionism owes its distant historical origins as an epistemological doctrine to 
the development of empiricist and rationalist epistemology in early modern philosophy of the 
16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries.  The idea that something must mediate knowledge between the external 
world and the mind, carried over into the sphere of ethics, gave the basis for the idea that some 
moral sense or rational intuition must be the specific basis for our moral knowledge. The initial 
motivation for this development was also a response to Hobbes, one of the earliest modern 
materialists and naturalists.  Before this, direct moral and metaphysical realism had been 
assumed and moral principles were deduced straight from metaphysical or theological principles 
in scholastic or Platonic philosophy.
8
 
This developed into British intuitionism that dominated the late 17
th
 and 18
th
 Century, with such 
philosophers as Hutcheson and Shaftesbury proposing empiricist (moral sense) and rationalist 
versions of the theory, taking their inspiration from Lockean empiricism and Cartesian 
rationalism respectively.
9
 These philosophers formulated early versions of various arguments 
relevant to later intuitionism, including the Is/Ought distinction, the logical independence of 
moral propositions, the naturalistic fallacy, analogies with mathematical intuition and the 
reliance on initial self-evident principles.
 10
 This early work was followed by David Hume and 
Adam Smith who proposed more complex varieties of empirical intuitionism based on a range 
of emotional affects rather than a single unique ‘moral sense’.  
This ‘sentimentalism’ lost ground in the early 19th Century to developments in Kantianism and 
later philosophers of German idealism.  19
th
 Century British ethics also became dominated by 
utilitarianism and other naturalist ethical philosophies, promoted by such philosophers as 
Bentham, Mill and later Sidgwick. But at the beginning of the 20
th
 century rationalist 
intuitionism enjoyed a brief renaissance motivated by the work of G.E.Moore.  Moore was 
believed to have successfully attacked the naturalist move of equating goodness with some 
particular natural properties, particularly through the ‘Open Question Argument’ but also by 
other methods.
11
  His system was doubly based on intuitions of value, which were foundational 
and could only be assessed in terms of their coherence, and a naturalist doctrine of ethical 
means and choice, in which means were to be rationally assessed on their effectiveness in 
achieving the intrinsic ends already intuitively identified.
12
 However, his intuitionism retained 
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strong links to the British utilitarianism that preceded it. He continued to argue for strict 
consequentialism in ethics, but on a more pluralistic value basis than that assumed by the earlier 
utilitarians, and denied their belief that hedonism or any other naturalist ethical theory could be 
empirically proven. 
Moore was widely considered to have been successful in debunking naturalism in ethics but his 
own intuitionist philosophy was not generally accepted for long. Early Analytic philosophy was 
dominated by positivism and scientism and Moore’s meta-ethics, with its belief in the non-
natural definition of goodness and its non-scientific intuition, was considered unacceptable. This 
led to the abandonment of cognitivism in ethics generally: Non-cognitivist theories, whether 
emotivism, prescriptivism, or optative alternatives dominated for decades within Analytic 
philosophy. But intuitionism was defended and elaborated through this period by some 
philosophers such as Pritchard
13
 and Ross
14, each of whom proposed slightly different ‘intuitive’ 
moral schemas, but agreed on the fundamental points of intuitionism. There was also a 
revitalisation of ‘virtue ethics’ in the 1960’s pursued by a few philosophers such as Anscombe 
and Geach.
15
  
Ethical intuitionism and moral objectivity more broadly came under further substantial attack in 
the 1970’s, especially through the work of Mackie16 and Blackburn17. They developed 
arguments against moral realism on the basis of supervenience, motivation, and ‘queerness’, in 
addition to traditional arguments from moral disagreement, against non-natural properties in 
general, and against the ‘emptiness’ of moral properties in explanation. More recently further 
arguments have emerged from an evolutionary account of moral intuition that claims our ethical 
intuition targets personal and social evolutionary advantage, and hence, there is no basis to 
assume it justifies any realist moral knowledge.
18
 
In the last two decades or so there has been a resurgence of interest in ethical intuitionism 
involving philosophers such as Huemer, Stratton-Lake and Audi.
19
  This contemporary analytic 
intuitionism has developed in response to Analytic attacks since Moore’s time and although 
there is significant variation among different philosophers it is possible to identify a core set of 
features that this contemporary theory shares. These in particular are that it is a form of direct, 
cognitive moral realism based on defeasible, rationalist, propositional intuition. 
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One of the leading features of contemporary intuitionism is that its emphases have been largely 
motivated in response to the meta-ethical debate with opposing naturalist, deontological and 
non-cognitive theories. This has meant that most of the emphasis of philosophers in 
contemporary intuitionism has been on structural questions: what features of intuitionism relate 
to key arguments and debates and how can this be defended at the meta-level. They have been 
less concerned about the content of intuitionism: how intuitions enters consciousness, what 
particular information it brings us, how we process this into moral principles, or how this should 
necessarily affect our everyday moral decision making and practical action.   
Related to this feature is the fact that contemporary intuitionism has largely followed Moorean 
intuitionism in being fundamentally rationalist, drawing its primary analogies from mathematics 
for example, rather than empirical in the manner of the sentimentalism that was widespread 
during the first great period of British intuitionism. Contemporary intuitionists seem happy to 
describe ethical intuitions as something like ‘initial intellectual impressions’ 20 rather than 
offering any explanation of how these intuitions may appear to consciousness, whether based on 
emotional empathy or some form or pure intuition à la Kant. 
Moorean intuitionism was also heavily rationalist and more concerned with meta-ethical 
structure features (as compared to meta-ethical alternatives), but Moore and also Ross and 
Pritchard were still interested in listing concrete ethical principles that they took as derived from 
their intuitionism. As fitting his consequentialism Moore gave examples of intrinsic goods that 
he believed to be the correct aims of moral pursuit
21
, and Ross and Pritchard, fitting their more 
deontological approach, gave examples of fundamental moral principles. Contemporary 
intuitionism on the other hand seems largely to leave the job of discussing moral principles to 
separate ‘every-day’ moral discussion, being itself concerned with defending intuitionism from 
a meta-ethical, epistemological perspective, and especially defending the reasonableness of 
objectivity and realism in ethics. 
The type of intuitions that contemporary intuitionism are based on are generally propositional 
intuitions, statements of moral truths such as ‘cruelty is wrong’ that are taken as basic and at 
least prima facie justificatory. This reflects the rationalist basis of this intuitionism as well as a 
general bias in analytic philosophy towards considering linguistic propositions as the only 
possible bearer of knowledge. A wider perspective of considering pictorial, sensory, 
imaginative, affective intuitive content is not taken. Intuition is characterised along the same 
lines as in reference to intuitions in analytic philosophy of mind, rather than, for example, the 
alternative Kantian sense of defining an intuition as an impression through which cognition 
relates immediately to its object
22
; and hence regarding ethical intuition itself as approximating 
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perceptual input. The exception to this has been some recent papers on the possibility of an 
‘affective intuitionism’ looking to emotion in a very similar way to that Scheler did.23 However, 
this seems to remain a relatively small current with recent analytic intuitionism itself, which 
itself is still a relatively small strand in meta-ethics in general.  
 
2. Objections 
In this section I outline various objections to historical and contemporary analytic intuitionism 
that have been prominent in the literature opposing intuitionism and have been discussed by 
intuitionists themselves. In the following section I then discuss counter-arguments that have 
been raised from within the analytic tradition. These objections are not completely distinct, as 
will be seen, but over-lap at various stages, so the divisions I make are more for convenience of 
understanding than reflecting absolute logical distinctions between each objection.
24
 
By Epistemological Commitment I mean situations where moral realism or intuitionism is 
discounted not on the basis of any specific argument against it but on the basis of positive 
commitment to incompatible epistemological or metaphysical ideas. This may take both moral 
and non-moral form.   
The moral examples that are most pertinent to analytic intuitionism are naturalism (or 
reductionism) and non-cognitivism (in line with its analytic biases Kantian deontology receives 
much less attention). Naturalism is the theory that the intrinsically good is some identifiable 
natural property or set of properties, such as pleasure, and opposes any metaphysical non-
naturalist theory of what is morally good. The most historically popular type of naturalism has 
been classical utilitarianism, which holds that human pleasure or preference (broadly defined) is 
identifiable with ‘The Good’. Non-cognitivism argues that moral statements are not judgements 
about some property, but neither true nor false (in their standard sense) statements with some 
non-rational force or function. This approach is generally negatively justified on the basis of the 
supposed implausibility of realist accounts. The most popular forms of non-cognitivism have 
been emotivism, prescriptivism or projectivism, which respectively argue that the main 
achievement of moral statements is either to express the emotional attitude of the person 
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towards the object in question, to prescribe a certain action regarding the object in question, or 
to project the person’s emotional attitude about an object onto it as a supposed property of it.  
These were the almost-orthodox meta-ethical theories in philosophy for periods of the 19
th
 and 
20
th
 centuries that intuitionists first had to rebut to gain a hearing for intuitionism. Philosophers 
are often convinced of the truth of one of these alternatives on its merits as a descriptive or 
prescriptive ethical theory and hence exclude intuitionism on that positive basis, though 
generally buttressed by some or other of the negative arguments described below.   
To give a non-moral example, logical positivism held the verification principle, that the only 
statements that are meaningful are those which can either be empirically demonstrated or are 
logical tautologies.
25
 This doctrine implies that intuitionism is epistemically incorrect and moral 
realism is metaphysically incorrect, but it was not formulated or accepted for any reasons 
particularly involving consideration of the nature of morality. It is arguably internally 
incoherent since it necessarily rests on a claim that is neither tautological nor empirically 
demonstrable. Regardless, logical positivism and similar ideas dominated in analytic philosophy 
in the period that Moorean intuitionism collapsed in popularity. Indeed, I consider it highly 
probable that the reason for this collapse was as much because it was not seen to fit with the 
assumptions of ideas such as logical positivism as due to any particularly devastating specific 
philosophical arguments against it. 
A related objection bears particularly against the non-natural properties that are often taken as 
revealed by intuitionism. This has become more popular in recent decades as the specific 
commitments of such philosophies as logical positivism have given way to a generalised 
analytic commitment to naturalism and physicalism in metaphysics.  In this environment where 
naturalism and physicalism are taken to be as good as proven independently it becomes largely 
sufficient to reject intuitionism on these grounds alone. In fact, various current defenders of 
moral realism (more generally) have focussed considerable effort on arguing that they can be 
made coherent with naturalism and hence should not fall foul of this objection.
26
 
The Argument from Moral Disagreement (or against Dogmatism) is used in an overlapping 
manner against moral realism and Intuitionism specifically. In its simplest form the argument 
simply contends that the sheer quantity and apparent intractability of moral disagreement would 
be unlikely if there were actually any objective moral facts that people were attempting to reach. 
More specifically it posits that a faculty of moral intuition, however defined, must be even less 
likely than moral realism generally because it posits a direct mechanism by which persons have 
access to moral truth and hence the one thing it should preclude is intractable and widespread 
moral disagreement. This is sometimes expressed as a criticism of the apparent dogmatism and 
                                                     
25
 Ayer, A.J. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1936. 
26
 E.g. Cornell Realism such as Brink, David. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
24 
 
infallibilism of intuitionism, whereby intuitionism is accused of depending on infallible or 
obviously self-evident moral ideas. The objection in this case is that these ideas leave no room 
for moral discussion, moral improvement or disagreement when such things are an omnipresent 
and significant part of our ethical experience. Empirically there just aren’t any universally held 
or apparently self-evident moral ideas.  
Metaphysical and Epistemological Queerness is the objection that for non-natural moral 
properties to exist they would be “queer” entities “of a very strange sort”. Metaphysically queer, 
meaning of a kind different to physical matter or psychological states, and epistemologically 
queer, meaning that because these properties are metaphysically unlike ordinary properties there 
would need to be some unique “queer” intuition to explain knowledge of them. Specifically, 
Mackie objects to the fact that moral properties are “authoritatively prescriptive”, they rationally 
have “to-be-pursued-ness somehow built into [them]” where this feature is shared by no non-
practical objects.  Real, non-natural moral properties are hence sufficiently different in type to 
natural properties we readily accept, and the epistemic means of their discovery so unexplained, 
that they would require a very high threshold of evidence and coherence to justify belief in 
them. And in light of other objections to a naïve description of them, such as the motivation and 
supervenience arguments, this level of evidence and coherence does not exist.
 27
  
The Motivation Argument is not specifically aimed at Intuitionism but generally at realist moral 
theories, of which intuitionism is one.  The argument is based on claiming that the features 
moral facts are recognised to have are logically incompatible with the psychology of human 
motivation. It is based on three premises. The 1st of which is known as the ‘Humean principle’ 
that factual beliefs alone are never sufficient for motivation, but that human motivation also 
requires desires. The 2nd premise is the Humean idea of the Belief/Desire gap, that beliefs are 
logically independent of desires such that no factual belief entails any desire. The 3rd premise is 
that for moral values to have the properties we ascribe to them they must be internally 
motivating, which means they intrinsically motivate us to act, independent of any further 
desires. Obviously premise 1 & 2 contradict premise 3, meaning that 1 & 2 cannot be true and 
there exist moral values as described in 3.
28
 
The Supervenience Argument can be articulated in a stronger and weaker form. In its weaker 
form it points to a supposed failure to explain how, if real moral properties exist, they are meant 
to 'supervene' on non-moral properties. If we make a moral judgment about a situation, that a 
theft was wrong, for example, then we are stating that there is something about the arrangement 
of the natural facts in this case, the objects and persons involved and what was done with them, 
that means that we are correct in judging the activity to be morally wrong. We are claiming that 
the moral property of this event, 'wrongness', supervenes on the natural facts, but, a non-natural 
                                                     
27
 Mackie, J.L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1977, p38-42. 
28
 Huemer, Michael. Ethical Intuitionism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, Ch.7 – Practical 
Reasons  
25 
 
realist claims, is separate from those facts. The objection’s stronger form, as originally given by 
Blackburn, rests on a disparity between two observations.  Firstly, intuitionists want to claim 
that no natural property entails any moral property, as argued against ethical naturalism.  
Secondly, Blackburn defines moral supervenience as the claim that the moral facts of any 
situation are fixed by the naturalistic facts, such that the moral facts change if and only if the 
natural facts change. So the moral facts are not entailed by any naturalistic facts, but they are 
logically fixed by the natural facts. Blackburn argues that moral realism can have no 
explanation of this whereas non-cognitivism can give a natural explanation for it.
29
 Both this 
argument and the motivation argument trade on the concept of the logical independence of 
natural and moral facts, classically described by Hume in the Is/Ought distinction, and which is 
itself a core tenet of non-naturalist moral realist philosophies such as intuitionism, attempting to 
turn this claim against non-natural moral realism itself. 
Emptiness is one of the main accusations against intuitionism and moral realism that has been 
raised in the last century. This takes two forms: firstly, that allegedly intuited non-natural moral 
properties add nothing to explanations of events and people's actions and hence are theoretically 
unnecessary. Secondly, that particular theories of intuitionism themselves fail to explain or 
predict the moral phenomena that make up our ethical experience more than just naïve 
reflection, and hence are unproductive even if we accept common-sense moral realism. This is a 
view commonly held by proponents of non-cognitivism or moral error theory.
30
 The first 
argument contends that specifically non-natural moral properties add nothing to an explanation 
of events. It can be seen to be connected to the motivation and supervenience arguments above. 
It holds, for example, that our sympathetic feelings alone are enough to explain our desire to 
reduce the suffering of others, and provide sufficient reason to do so, without needing the 
logical backstop of claiming that we do so because we pick up specific moral properties that 
rationally require it. Moral properties then become a hypothesis that adds no explanation, and 
can be discarded under Occam's razor. The second objection is less commonly stated, but I 
argue that it provides a significant subconscious reason for why intuitionism is not accepted as 
an meta-ethical theory, even if it coheres with the evidence available as well as any other theory. 
In the sciences a theory generally is needed to demonstrate superior explanatory power if it is to 
replace an older theory, and I believe that it is the relative failure of intuitionist theories to do so 
in ethical debates or concrete situations that largely explains its unpopularity.  It is not enough 
to be no worse than opposing theories, it is necessary to provide positive reasons to adopt a 
theory in terms of greater explanatory power. 
The Evolutionary Argument against intuited moral properties actually accepts the existence of 
moral intuitions of a certain sort, but argues that they can be evolutionarily explained in a 
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manner that does not point to any real, objective moral properties. This argument accepts the 
existence of moral intuitions and that they can be used in moral reasoning but contends that they 
originate from evolutionary psychological effects directed at promoting reproduction and 
survival among a human social community and not in a manner that would reliably pick out 
rational morally relevant facts. In other words, it is a form of ‘error’ theory. In this theory moral 
intuitions are the feeling-states that have evolved because they promote action that supports 
reproduction among human (and animal) social communities in the same way that the feelings 
of hunger encourage animals to eat and thus to survive long enough to reproduce. Particularly 
this argues that we are programmed to emotionally value other human beings on the basis of 
primarily visual recognition of similarity, the stronger the closer they are in terms of family, and 
to hold a general sense of fairness in dealings. These motivate us to act in co-ordination with 
other human beings to organise and balance our needs and responsibilities socially in order to 
promote the survival of the community as a whole.  The complexities of human moral 
behaviour and reasoning then emerges as an application of these basic motivating feelings, in 
the same way that the complexities of human cuisine emerge from basic motivational drives to 
avoid hunger and seek nutrition to preserve life and facilitate reproduction.
31
      
 
3. Some Met, Some Not. 
In this section I now go over some of the counter-arguments that have already been given to the 
objections outlined above, some by analytic intuitionists and some by other philosophers, on 
which analytic intuitionism can draw to defend its theory, and comment on which of these 
counter-arguments I think are stronger and which leave considerable work to be done. This is by 
no means a comprehensive survey but just an introduction to those objections and counter-
arguments which I have found particularly relevant, and with which I will be assuming 
acquaintance in the latter chapters of this thesis. 
In accordance with the features I have mentioned previously, contemporary intuitionism is at its 
strongest when arguing against the Epistemological Commitment to naturalism and non-
cognitivism. Intuitionist arguments are strong when discussing the damage non-cognitive 
accounts do to our natural moral discourse compared to straightforward realist, cognitive 
accounts. Traditional emotivist
32
 or prescriptivist
33
 theories deny that moral statements can be 
descriptive when prima facie they are simple descriptive statements and have always been 
considered both philosophically and popularly to be so and discussed as such, and when their 
grammatical semantics are such and they can be logically manipulated as such. Traditional non-
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cognitivism hence has an explanatory mountain to climb to replace the common-sense 
explanation of the role and function of moral language.  
It is highly likely that initial non-cognitivism was not motivated by even-handed considerations 
about the nature and function of moral language, but rather by epistemological commitment 
elsewhere.  Severe epistemological commitments like logical positivism required non-
cognitivism.  But logical positivism was internally inconsistent and naïve and was eventually 
abandoned by even its most famous advocates: "I suppose the most important [defect]...was that 
nearly all of it was false”, said A.J.Ayer in 197934. And without the theory of meaning of logical 
positivism, or something similar to it, there seems little reason to insist that moral language can 
be neither true nor false when it has been widely understood in this way since the dawn of 
human civilisation, though under a wide range of different guises.  
The fundamental implausibility of traditional non-cognitivism as a dogmatic statement has 
prompted the development of continually more sophisticated and generally steadily more 
‘quasi-realist’ and quasi-cognitivist versions of non-cognitivism such as those of Gibbard, 
Timmons and Blackburn
35
 that bear eloquent witness to the acceptance of the critique of non-
cognitivism even among its continued proponents. These forms of non-cognitivism bear less of 
the initial implausibility of traditional non-cognitivism by accepting large parts of the 
cognitivist elements of moral language as meaningful but adds the implausibility of attempting 
to marry cognitive language with a non-cognitive theory of what it means. There have been 
numerous complicated attempts to construct a theory of how this works, even to explain the 
‘apparent’ logical semantics of moral discussion by appeal to an equivalent non-cognitive 
‘logical semantics’ of attitudes and emotions.  But this merely introduces another dose of 
complication compared to the manner in which traditional cognitive accounts, of which 
intuitionism is one, simply explain our moral usage. This enterprise can only be motivated by a 
strong epistemological commitment that moral realism is false that must be justified elsewhere 
initially before non-cognitivism can be seen to be plausible.  
Even then however there is confusion around what exactly non-cognitive theories are stating if 
they are to be taken to be outlining a distinctive meta-ethical position.  Intuitionism can accept 
that moral statements both express emotions, attitudes and prescriptions and optatives as well as 
expressing beliefs and descriptive statements. Non-cognitivism also cannot define itself by 
claiming that moral statements and arguments attempt to make descriptive statements but fail 
due to the non-existence of moral facts, leaving only the expression of emotions, because that in 
itself would be a type of cognitivist error theory. 
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Contemporary intuitionism is also particularly strong when defending the independence of 
moral discourse from naturalist, reductive descriptions of ethics. The most well known 
statement of the independence of ethical and descriptive statements continues to be Hume’s 
remark that: 
“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with […] the author 
proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, […] when all of a sudden 
I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is 
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. 
This change is […] of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, 
expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed 
and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems 
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
which are entirely different from it.”36  
This Is/Ought dichotomy, sometimes known as Hume’s Law, can be formalised as the postulate 
that no evaluative or normative statement can be entailed from purely non-evaluative or non-
normative premises, but only from a set containing at least one evaluative or normative premise.  
Hume makes this statement without any particular proof or argument, and indeed almost as an 
afterthought at the end of a section of his A Treatise of Human Nature.  It has however been 
widely (though of course not universally) accepted ever since by philosophers and other readers 
from a wide variety of backgrounds, and this is a testament to its plausibility. This plausibility is 
in turn reflected in the basic differences in the vocabulary and grammar of purely descriptive 
and evaluative statements, such as that between indicatives and imperatives. Not because this 
proves anything in of itself, but because it demonstrates that Hume’s intuition is widely 
accepted and even diffused in the basis of our language. This difference is further expressed in 
such basic facts of philosophical history as the long, independent investigation into ‘the Good’ 
and ‘the True’ as separate subjects, the traditional distinction between theoretical and practical 
philosophy and the long history of popular and philosophical debate into the meaning of the 
subject. 
In this context Moore’s arguments in his Principia Ethica on the Naturalistic Fallacy can be 
seen as an extended defence and support of the intuition underlying Hume’s Law. Moore’s 
‘Open Question’ argument is often quoted, but he also gave three other connected arguments 
against various attempts to identify the meaning of ‘Good’, taken as the basic ethical predicate, 
with any naturalist feature. The open question argument is the postulate that there is no 
definition of ‘Good’ in natural terms that is clearly and obviously interchangeable with ‘Good’ 
in all evaluative sentences such that they become tautologous, and hence equivalent in meaning 
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with ‘Good’.37 Ethical claims about ‘the Good’ will always be synthetic claims, but this 
generates a burden of proof that any naturalist theory must meet to justify that synthetic link. 
His other arguments support the open question argument by bringing out the logical distinctions 
relevant to claiming a certain substance is good or the Good, which are often ignored in 
naturalist attempts to prove such a definition. These arguments make clear the hurdles that a 
naturalist theory would have to cross and by outlining how strong such a statement must 
actually be these arguments explain why the Open Question Argument is so plausible and 
difficult to counter.  
Firstly, he argues that for a naturalist theory, to take the example of hedonism, it would not be 
enough to prove that pleasure is good, because this does not preclude other things also being 
good; nor even that something is good if and only if it is accompanied by pleasure, because that 
only entails constant conjunction, not identity of substance.
38
 Secondly, he argues from the basis 
of the principle of ‘organic unity’, meaning that Goods can only be understood as organic 
wholes, and particularly that if various parts of a whole are seen to have no value on their own, 
but to have value when combined with some other part, it does not follow that all the value is 
contained in the other part. For example, a painting may be considered to have no value if it 
does not cause pleasure when perceived, but to have great value when it does cause pleasure, 
but this does not entail that the entirety of the value is in the pleasure, and not in the painting, 
and a fortiori it does not at all support any stronger claim that only pleasure can be valuable.
39
 
Thirdly, he argues that given any naturalistic feature, a world can be imagined that contains only 
that feature, but that no such world could be imagined that could not be plausibly further 
improved by adding other objects of our universe, thus refuting the suggestion that any such one 
property can be solely or analytically identified with the Good.
40
 
A more formal, algebraic argument in favour of the independence of ethical and descriptive 
statements was given by Toomas Karmo in 1988.  He gave a proof that no argument from (1) 
true, (2) purely non-evaluative premises (3) entails an (4) evaluative, (5) non-trivial conclusion. 
It runs thus: assume there are two types of statements, evaluative and non-evaluative. Given any 
‘mixed’ statement such as ‘Denmark is larger than France or all undertakers ought to be shot’ it 
is evaluative if its truth depends on the truth of an evaluative statement, and non-evaluative if it 
does not. Possible worlds are assumed then to consist of a pair, labelled (w & v) of non-
evaluative facts w, and a value system v. Finally, given any w and v and any statement then 
either (w&v)→S or (w&v)→ ¬S. 
The proof proceeds by reductio ad absurdum. Assume there is an argument satisfying 1-5, and 
S1 . . . Sn are its premises, with conclusion Sn+1. There is a possible world w and values systems 
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v1, v2 such that (w,v1) →Sn+1 and (w,v2)→ ¬Sn+1.  Since S1,…, Sn →Sn+1 this means that under v2, 
Si in S1,…,Sn is false. But since Sn+1 is evaluative and its truth has changed depending on the 
change of the truth of Si, by assumption Si itself must be evaluative. But this contradicts (2).  
Hence there can be no such argument.
41
 The credibility one gives this result will depend on 
whether one agrees with the simplified model given in the premises. I think that this model is 
simple but not simplistic and does justice to the issue.  
These arguments by no means provide incontrovertible proof as to the logical independence of 
ethical and non-evaluative statements nor the details of how or why this separation occurs.  But 
I believe they do provide strong support for this theory, and leave a serious burden of proof for 
any postulated naturalist theory to meet should it wish to repudiate Hume’s Law.  
Another area in which contemporary intuitionism is strong is in combatting the traditional 
charge of dogmatism and infallibility, a charge somewhat justified by certain intuitionist 
statements such as that of Samuel Clarke
42
, or Pritchard
43
. On this charge intuitionism claims the 
solution to all ethical problems to be an immediate appeal to universal, infallible, self-evident 
intuitions, which at a stroke rules out moral disagreement, moral improvement and moral 
discussion.  Contrary to this standard characterisation of Intuitionism, contemporary 
intuitionism tends to stress the fallible nature of intuitions in general. Contemporary intuitionists 
have been keen to stress that intuitions have justificatory force in the same sense that initial 
perception does, provisionally on rational analysis and clarification, and in a manner that can be 
assessed against other conflicting evidence, but that they do bear initial justificatory force for 
claims of knowledge on ethical matters.
44
  
Contemporary intuitionism does use a theory of self-evidence for intuitions. But this theory is 
disconnected from a traditional description of self-evidence as characterising ideas no rational 
person could disagree with, an empirical claim, instead referring by this term to an epistemic 
function of propositions being logically self-supporting.
45
 Another way of taking this is to 
describe intuitions as propositions about universals, where a correct understanding of the nature 
of the universal and its interconnections guarantees that the subject will have some correct 
intuitions about it.
46
 
By abandoning infallibilism, whether in defeasibility or self-evidence, and replacing it with a 
description of how rational intuitions may be critiqued, replaced and refined, contemporary 
                                                     
41
 Karmo, Toomas. "Some Valid (But no Sound) Arguments trivially span the 'Is-Ought' Gap." Mind 97 
(1988): 252-257 
42
 Clarke, Samuel. "'On Natural Religion'." Edited by L.A.Selby-Bigge. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
[1705] 1964, p6. 
43
 Pritchard, H.A. "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake." Mind, 1912: Vol.21. 
44
 Audi, Robert. The Good in the Right. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
Huemer, Michael. Ethical Intuitionism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Etc. 
45
 Bedke, M.S. "Ethical Intuitions: What they are, What they are not, and How they Justify." American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Forthcoming. 
46
 Huemer, Michael. Ethical Intuitionism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p122-127. 
31 
 
intuitionism avoids many of the traditional problems of dogmatism. These include providing a 
theory of moral disagreement and moral progress, achieved by weakening the claims made for 
ethical intuition while retaining their justificatory core and commitment to moral realism, and 
thus providing a basis for ethical knowledge. Cognitive biases, inadequate grasp of the relevant 
universals, and incomplete information about the subjects at hand can lead to incorrect 
inferences even when based on correct initial intuitions. Rational assessment of the coherence of 
intuitions and moral beliefs, and reference to external physical or metaphysical principles to 
contextualise intuitions can explain the possibility of moral improvement. Indeed at this point it 
can be argued that intuitionism is in a better position to explain moral progress and 
disagreement than alternative non-cognitive theories that must explain how determinate moral 
progress can occur, or moral disagreement even be described or explained when individuals 
have either literally nothing, or nothing but expressions of personal opinion, to discuss.  
In reference to the modern philosophical arguments against moral realism and intuitionism 
contemporary intuitionism has made variable progress. Against the charge of Metaphysical 
Queerness I believe contemporary intuitionism can mount a strong defence by pointing out the 
subjective nature of this accusation, the fact it tends to beg the question in favour of 
metaphysical naturalism, and that our universe and cognitive space are in fact widely taken to 
comprise of objects with a range of fundamental features. Mackie particularly objects to the idea 
moral properties must be intrinsically “authoritatively prescriptive”, and supervene on natural 
properties, combined with a general objection to the fact that objective values would contradict 
metaphysical naturalism/physicalism and epistemic empiricism.   
This is subjective in the sense that to many people nothing seems more every-day than the 
notion there are non-arbitrary, intrinsic practical reasons about what one ought to do as well as 
theoretical reasons about what things exist. It begs the question in favour of naturalism and 
empiricism because, when taken as a dogmatic metaphysical commitment naturalism is not a 
common and obvious consensus about the nature of reality.  Rather it is a particular, disputed, 
metaphysical hypothesis, to which a majority of the world’s population, including a great many 
highly educated and aware people, and indeed many philosophers, do not agree.
47
 The obvious 
example would be the existence of God, but even ignoring that there is no consensus even 
among non-religious philosophers, scientists or mathematicians that strict naturalism or 
physicalism is true: plenty of Platonists, Kantians, Thomists, and phenomenologists may wish to 
disagree, for a start. Even Mackie himself admitted that a fair counter-argument to metaphysical 
queerness would be to point out that many concepts such as “essence, number, diversity, 
solidity,…,power and causation”48 may themselves be unexplainable within the simple 
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empiricist  framework “of Locke and Hume” that Mackie wants to rely on. He offers no solution 
to this issue, but merely hopes one may become clear in the future.  
On the epistemological side I believe the accusation of queerness has been less thoroughly 
countered, precisely because of the rationalist bent of the analytic intuitionism and its 
unwillingness to discuss where our ethical intuitions come from and what makes them 
trustworthy. However, there do already exist some counter-arguments to Mackie's suggestion 
that moral awareness could only be by “some special faculty […] utterly different from our 
ordinary way of knowing anything else”49. This is only initially true if one assumes that all 
“ordinary” knowledge must come by simple empiricism. Kantian ‘practical reason’ and 
phenomenological ‘essential intuition’ are just two examples of coherent epistemological 
theories that can provide space for moral knowledge within their general theory without 
postulating some extra, otherwise unnecessary faculty. Analytic intuitionists have also given 
their own interpretations of moral intuition. Huemer, for example, describes intuitions as “initial 
intellectual appearances”, and places it within a general theory of our knowledge of universals 
and of abstract reason that broadly agrees with the manner in which Kantians and other non-
empiricist philosophers would justify moral knowledge, as one of various branches of a priori 
knowledge.
50
    
The Arguments from Supervenience and Motivation have both required a significant quantity of 
attention from intuitionists. Against the Argument from Motivation intuitionists have raised a 
number of objections that call into doubt various strong assumptions made in the argument’s 
premises, such as the Humean psychology underlying it and the conflation of normative and 
motivational reasons for action. Without these strong premises the argument is not valid and all 
of them can be reasonably disputed. 
Huemer suggests the motivation argument trades on confusion about different types of ‘reasons’ 
for actions in its 1
st
 and 3
rd
 premises.  Persons may have either motivational or normative 
reasons for action, where a motivational reason to eat would be something like hunger, and a 
normative reason not to eat would be something like the knowledge that one is fat and needs to 
diet. He agrees with Hume that beliefs do not provide motivational reasons for action (as in the 
1
st
 premise), but argues that our concept of a ‘moral belief’ only intuitively demands that belief 
provides us with normative reasons to act, not motivational ones, in which case there is no 
contradiction.
51
  The motivation argument is only intuitively plausible if one interprets the 
concept of a moral value as demanding ‘motivational’ internalism (in these terms), whereas if 
one accepts our definition of moral concepts as only demanding ‘normative’ internalism then 
the argument is no longer valid. Especially since, as Frank Snare has demonstrated, the 
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motivation argument is only valid if the 1
st
 or 3
rd
 premise holds as a necessary claim
52
 and the 
onus is certainly on the proponent of the motivation argument to demonstrate this.  
Another connected argument is that the entire point of moral judgements being independent, and 
indeed the entire motivation behind the queerness argument above, is that they are different 
from normal descriptive beliefs, which of course cannot be motivational. However, evaluative 
beliefs can be normatively motivational and should not be judged on the basis of an intuition 
that originates from consideration of generally non-evaluative beliefs. Some philosophers may 
wish to disagree with this, but in the absence of some persuasive argument otherwise there does 
not seem to be any good philosophical reason to accept their intuition on the subject to that 
outlined here.  
Even if one demands that normative reasons purely on their own cannot motivate, but that 
additional input is required to make them motivational, this input may then be absolutely 
minimal. A basic desire to honour the logical consequences of one’s beliefs would be sufficient 
to render moral beliefs motivating in general, just as a basic desire to be truthful is sufficient to 
motivate one to alter one’s beliefs on the basis of logic or argumentation. In turn this initial 
desire may necessarily come from a correct understanding of what it means to have normative 
reasons for something, just as the initial desire to believe what is true and supported by logic 
and argumentation itself arguably just follows from a correct understanding of what logic and 
argumentation actually are. I argue that this would be sufficient to undermine the Motivation 
Argument. 
A further argument may be aimed at the strict belief/desire gap that is necessary for the 
argument. Hume’s doctrine was a strong 18th Century psychological assumption that reasons 
and motivations were necessarily separate, hence his statement that “ ‘Tis not contrary to reason 
to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”53  This is because if 
beliefs and desires are totally separate then desires cannot be rationally assessed at this basic 
level, and hence it is nonsensical to say they are rational or irrational when reason has nothing to 
do with them.  But this is just not the case.  Desires can be rationally assessed as suitable or 
unsuitable, just as beliefs can be evaluative and hence arguably normatively motivating. 
Furthermore desires, once assessed as unsuitable or just plain wrong can be changed by rational 
effort. They are certainly more or less ‘sticky’ but they are not necessarily unaffectable by 
reason.
54
 While none of these criticisms alone fatally undermines the motivation argument they 
do steadily call into doubt the credibility of its premises. There has however been no seemingly 
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comprehensive rebuttal of the charges laid by the motivation argument, versions of which 
continue to enjoy a considerable amount of support with many non-cognitivist philosophers.  
The Argument from Supervenience has drawn somewhat less attention. This is probably due to 
the fact that whereas the argument from motivation itself relies on strong claims about the 
nature and motivational ability of moral and factual beliefs, the supervenience argument rather 
points to a supposed lacuna of explanation regarding the relation of moral to non-moral facts 
and hence requires a more difficult and more positive response to rebut. One possible response 
to Blackburn’s form of the argument is simply to deny supervenience as logically necessary. 
Blackburn claims it is “logically impossible”55 for “natural” and moral features to vary 
independently, that is, there is no possible world where the moral facts could be different given 
the same natural facts. This is a difficult claim given the possibility that ethical properties are 
multiply realisable. It’s surely the case that there are different possible worlds where different 
natural facts subtend the same moral properties, say one where certain natural facts are 
accompanied by a sense of a demand of duty or feeling of sympathy, and morally significant, 
and one where they don’t but other natural facts do. Hence the subtending property of 
supervenience does not hold with logically necessary force over all possible worlds but only 
nomologically within any one possible world. It is certainly conceivably so, given the very 
different theories about what is morally good in our world,
56
 and in the absence of any positive 
argument to support the very strong form of necessity Blackburn’s argument relies on, again, I 
argue that the burden of proof must remain with the non-cognitivist.   
Once supervenience in this very strong sense is denied, leaving one with only metaphysical or 
nomological supervenience within the actual world, then there is a clear explanation for the two 
statements Blackburn has outlined. To borrow a truth from the sciences, correlation, even 
perfect correlation, does not imply causation. Both the moral and natural facts about objects 
may be taken to be fixed by higher-level metaphysical facts about them, in which case the moral 
facts will not vary independently of the natural facts, because they are consequences of the 
higher level metaphysical facts, but still the natural facts will not entail the moral facts. 
A final approach to the supervenience problem is to appeal to ‘companions in guilt’, which 
means other examples of supervenience that are not taken as mysterious or indefensible. In 
particular Huemer gives the analogy of the concept of a ‘good’ move in chess. Given rules of 
chess are defined, then what counts as a ‘good’ move supervenes upon the arrangement of 
pieces. A ‘good’ move is rationally, indeed mathematically definable, and given that the rules 
                                                     
55
 Blackburn, Simon. "Moral Realism." In Morality & Moral Reasoning, edited by John Casey, 101-124. 
London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1971, p106. 
56
 Hills, Alison. "Oxford Faculty Page - Dr Alison Hills." Oxford Philosophy. May 10, 2013. 
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/11699/Supervenience_and_moral_realism.p
df (accessed May 10, 2013). 
35 
 
are (admittedly contingently defined) what is a good move follows necessarily.
57
  Another 
example would be the manner in which logical validity supervenes on the arrangement of 
logical symbols in a formal proposition. Again the truths revealed are objective and, given the 
definition of the symbols are set, follow necessarily. Supervenience is not taken to be a problem 
for formal logic, despite the fact that facts about logical validity are entirely different in type to 
facts about the arrangement of symbols. 
58
    
The approaches that have been taken, whether denying supervenience as a necessary claim, or 
drawing analogies to other examples of supervenience, have gone some way towards countering 
this objection but I do not believe they can be considered as decisive as they share the issue of 
the vagueness of the whole problem. 
I believe that contemporary analytic intuitionism poses a respectable challenge to opposing 
meta-ethical theories of moral nihilism, quasi-realism and reductionist naturalism. It has the 
advantage of doing less intrinsic damage to the naïve moral discourse and, by weakening its 
claims away from infallibility, I think it succeeds in providing a more natural fit and consistent 
explanation of various moral phenomena. These include belief in moral objectivity and duty and 
moral argument and discussion; but also moral disagreement, moral development, value 
pluralism and other features.  Against more recent philosophical arguments, such as those from 
supervenience and motivation, various philosophers have between them offered arguments that 
at least call into doubt all the objections raised, if somewhat unsystematically. Considerable 
work does remain, though, against these and other objections if moral realism and intuitionism 
is to demonstrate superiority to alternative viewpoints and not just hold its own. 
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4. Those Issues that Remain 
However, analytic intuitionism still has significant shortcomings that I believe can be largely 
explained by the analytic biases it has carried over from its wider background. It refuses to look 
into the content of ethical intuition, both in the ethical sense, of what is revealed by this 
intuition, and in the epistemological sense, of how this intuition comes about and in what sense 
it is given to human consciousness. This has a number of negative effects. 
The simplest problem with this is that it leaves ethical intuitionism still open to the one other 
main charge against it, that of Emptiness. Compared to the complexity of moral argument and 
discussion Moore’s intuitionism already seemed to add little to ethical debate in terms of any 
knowledge of, or insight into, the Good.  Contemporary intuitionism seems to have retreated 
even further from actually providing a taxonomy of the Good or insight into actual moral 
arguments that would demonstrate ethical intuitionism’s explanatory strength as a theory, 
though this is not to disparage the value of analytic intuitionism in mounting a robust defence of 
ethical realism and objective knowledge. One other argument that analytic intuitionists have so 
far made little progress in combating has been the recent Objection from Evolutionary theory. I 
believe this to be one of the stronger objections made against realist moral intuitionism, and one 
not thoroughly countered by current literature.   
As I said previously analytic intuitionism can draw on various interesting criticisms of the 
Motivation, Supervenience, Queerness and other arguments against moral realism I have 
outlined above, but these have largely been piecemeal and lacking a comprehensive approach. I 
suggest that this problem itself stems from the lack of interest in explaining the content of either 
intuition or intuitions themselves.  The scientific ideal is to explain properties and examples of 
phenomena from more fundamental theoretical properties in as naturally flowing a manner as 
possible. Because analytic intuitionism has no thorough theory about how intuition occurs or 
what it uniquely reveals it has no reserves from which to create a comprehensive response to 
arguments such as Supervenience and Motivation, both of which can be seen to be attempting to 
turn the independence of moral values (which intuitionism holds as one of its core tenets) 
against the realist position. It is not enough to cobble together counter-arguments to sceptical 
arguments, but rather a general alternative positive theory is required from which solutions will 
naturally flow. 
I argue that this lack of interest in fleshing out intuitionism beyond its relative meta-ethical 
commitments is self-reinforcing. Because it has no such interest it struggles to improve the 
credibility of its position, such as by answering the questions mentioned above. But I also think 
that it is biased against even trying because, due to its analytic origin, it would not like the kind 
of answers it would get. I argue that these answers must be broadly more along ‘sentimentalist’ 
lines but utilising phenomenological ideas of empathy, the constructed a priori, intuition in the 
Kantian, and ‘essential’ phenomenological sense, pictorial, and imaginative content to construct 
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the concepts that only in their end would result in propositions. The bias of simple analytic 
empiricism, against which contemporary analytic intuitionism has only partially rebelled, has 
left an unwillingness to accept content on this basis as epistemically significant or possibly 
truth-generating, and hence an unwillingness to look into it at all, that is logically and 
phenomenologically unjustified. Ironically among analytic meta-ethical theories it is quasi-
realism that has been almost willing to embrace this content but, I believe, due to similar 
epistemological biases, and a simplistic phenomenological account of the emotions, both refuses 
and is not capable of looking at it in terms of supporting actual knowledge. 
This shortcoming has led analytic intuitionism to only refer to a foreshortened list of moral 
issues and possibilities that it also shares with its analytic heritage.  Of particular note is its 
almost complete failure (the one exception being Audi
59
) to engage in a dialogue with the 
Kantian deontological tradition and moral, epistemological and metaphysical theories that 
derive from that, generally only considering itself in reference to non-cognitivism and reductive 
naturalism in ethics. Its bias towards propositional knowledge and disinclination to make 
normative statements about ethical value have also led it to take a very simplistic stance towards 
the variety of the Good, and to ignore the rich connections between moral and other human 
values that influence it whether love, aesthetics, religious consciousness, or the difficulties that 
simple conceptions of the Good may come into when faced in extreme moral situations where 
every-day moral rules break down. 
I argue that the shortcomings of analytic intuitionism that I have outlined above could be 
remedied by abandoning the analytic biases I have mentioned and attempting to expand the 
theory, and thus hope to systematise it in a constructive way. I suggest that it could do this by 
taking on material from the Continental tradition that has been more willing to investigate into 
these areas. Max Scheler’s work provides a pre-existing wealth of material that in many core 
features coincides with analytic intuitionism from Moore onwards, and also in terms of earlier 
British sentimentalism, but which goes far beyond it in some of the ways I have mentioned.  
The phenomenological tradition retains a degree of analytic thoroughness that could be claimed 
to be lacking in other areas of continental philosophy, and phenomenological ethics is strong in 
precisely these analyses of the non-propositional content of moral intuition and cognition (more 
generally) where analytic intuitionism is weak.  This material also bears significant overlap with 
analytic intuitionism’s historical arguments against reductive naturalism and other irrealist 
meta-ethics.  
This would further improve the potential for a synthesis between the two that would be able to 
fill in the theory of ethical intuitionism and provide resources to then go back and answer many 
of the questions I have mentioned above. This should improve the over-all credibility of the 
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theory as a meta-ethical alternative compared to moral nihilism, reductive naturalism or 
varieties of non-cognitivism. 
I argue that this is also true for contributions from a range of other modern continental 
philosophers who have advanced a better mixture of rationalist and empirical content in their 
philosophies of various forms of value realism and cognition. Between Scheler and Levinas the 
continental tradition arguably offers a richer analysis of a wider range of our intuitive grasp of 
the morally good, both in terms of persons and values, in the variety of ways that it appears to 
human consciousness than Moore or the other modern intuitionists. I argue that Husserl’s theory 
of universals provides a crucial resource for understanding the nature of ethical values, while 
Zahavi has much to offer about the complexity of the subjective-objective nature of moral 
discourse and the inter-subjective nature of objectivity.  And that Otto, through his work on the 
Holy has given an excellent template of the manner in which non-propositional intuitive content 
may be rationally schematised, debated and extended over time, better than that offered by the 
purely propositional view of intuition in the Analytic tradition. 
In the next chapter of this thesis I will begin this process with an exposition of Scheler’s theory 
of emotive a priori ethics. I will first discuss this theory on its own merits before arguing that 
Scheler’s phenomenological analysis does not have a number of the weaknesses current in 
analytic intuitionism and argue that it can be merged with an analytic intuitionism such as I have 
described above to give an over-all stronger positive theory.  I will describe various continuing 
weaknesses in Scheler’s theory and then go onto discuss the work of other continental 
philosophers, such as those I’ve mentioned above, and how they may add new perspectives on 
these issues that can further strengthen the theory as an over-all meta-ethical alternative. 
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5.  Contemporary Theories of Ethical Intuitionism. 
Having discussed the arguments against ethical intuitionism and moral realism in general, I am 
now going to discuss the current popular theories in terms of their positive explanation of what 
intuitionism is and how it works, and the criticism that has been recently made of this. This is 
not just for the sake of completeness but because I argue that an appreciation of the 
shortcomings identified in recent criticism, and the features that would be required to overcome 
them, illustrate the relative merits of Scheler's theory that I will be discussing hereafter. I will be 
looking at the theories of self-evident propositions, advocated by philosophers such as 
W.D.Ross
60
 and Robert Audi
61
; the theory of ‘perceptual intuitionism’, advocated by Audi62, 
McGrath
63
, Cullison
64
 and others; and the 'seemings' theory advocated particularly by Michael 
Huemer
65
, as these have been the most influential recent intuitionist theories.   
The first important contemporary theory of ethical intuitionism is that advocated by Robert 
Audi in his book The Good in the Right, as well as by various other philosophers.  Audi 
advocates basing ethical knowledge on our awareness of self-evident ethical propositions. These 
are a priori ethical statements that are epistemologically self-supporting, meaning that through 
proper understanding and reflection one can 'see' that they are true and be justified in believing 
them on that basis. Audi explicitly considers his theory to be an updated version of the theory of 
W.D.Ross advocated in The Right and the Good in 1930. For Audi moral knowledge is justified 
through 'adequate understanding' of self-evident moral propositions, particularly Ross' seven 
principles of ethics outlined in The Right and the Good. The intuition then (in this intuitionism) 
is the intuition that a certain self-evident proposition is true
66
. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter Audi advocates a relatively weak form of intuitive self-
evidence: Through full understanding and reflection on a self-evident proposition one gains 
justification for believing it to be true. One does not gain intuitive evidence either for whether 
the proposition itself is self-evident, or for whether it is necessary
67
; nor does this mean that the 
proposition must be epistemically basic (i.e. cannot be supported by inference or arguments), 
only that at that point one gains evidence for it without the use of inference or argument from 
other truths. It could also be separately known by inference or argument
68
. Neither is the 
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justification provided either infallible or indefeasible, it can be undermined by other arguments 
or intuitions from oneself or other individuals
69
. 
That only tells us what self-evidence intuitionism is not. It does not tell us what it is or how it 
works. Audi describes the method of gaining this justification as gaining a full, often reflective, 
understanding of the proposition in question. The depth of understanding necessary will vary 
with the complexity of the proposition, but one must have the precise proposition under 
discussion before one's mind
70
. Interestingly, Audi rejects the common 'perceptual' analogy of 
intuition in many cases because these intuitions of self-evidence are more like instances of close 
observation rather than a fleeting glance. Audi explicitly states that intuitions may both be 
immediately given in single moral examples and given on global, holistic acts of reflection on 
the totality of a situation
71
. He even argues that one should be able, perhaps with further 
thought, to give the 'ground' for any intuitively given duty in terms of the empirical 
circumstances, or to explain the particular premises and inferences that would separately justify 
the proposition
72
.  ‘Intuition’ in this model then seems to refer more to an act of cognitive 
judgement about an ethical proposition or situation, rather than an act of quasi-perceptual 
'intuitive' insight as intuition is often regarded. Audi and Ross focus on general moral 
propositions, like Ross' seven ethical duties and Audi's affirmation of the Categorical 
Imperative, but Audi claims that there can also be intuitive moral knowledge of particular 
cases
73
. However, he focuses his discussion on the more high level, general ethical statements. 
Audi's theory draws on analogous models of justification with reference to, on the one hand, the 
understanding of analytic propositions and the intuition of basic mathematical or logical truths, 
and, on the other hand, acts of conclusion drawn from holistic reflection on a subject in 
empirical cases. There has been strong criticism of applying this model to cases of substantive 
ethical propositions though, or, where this sort of judgement may occur, describing it as an 
intuition (defined in Audi's terms as a proposition that is non-inferentially taken to be true).  
The first criticism is based on the idea that ethical propositions (like Ross' seven principles) are 
just not the type of things that could feasibly be justified by understanding alone. Compare other 
analogous examples given: analytic propositions are self-justifying through a proper 
understanding of them because they are tautologies, non-substantive propositions that already 
contain the information they express in the terms used, such as 'all squares have four sides'. The 
same would be true for non-substantive ethical propositions such as: 'murder is wrongful 
killing', because that is just the definition of murder. Substantive ethical propositions, whether 
the utilitarian principle, or Ross' seven principles, or any other, are synthetic, which is elsewhere 
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universally taken to mean that they require a ground of justifying synthesis separate to 
themselves. It is not clear how this could possibly be provided by mere understanding, or even 
reflection, on global ethical principles. Unless we are dealing with analytic propositions 
something more is required than mere conceptual understanding of a proposition.
74
 This is even 
something that Audi partially seems to accept, with his statements about being able to supply 
the ground of an intuitively given moral duty, and reflecting on the holistic context of a 
proposition, but he does not apply this to his ideas about self-evidence. 
Basic mathematical or logical truths are commonly thought of as intuitively justified when taken 
as a priori truths of logic or mathematics but these truths are grounded in countless concrete 
examples that back-up the a priori intuition, such as perceptions of concrete triangles or 
squares, or empirical experiences of counting or adding physical objects. The intuitions back up 
the a priori case seemingly as a limit of, or at least supported by, these individual, demonstrable 
empirical cases. The closer a physical triangle gets to an ideal mathematical triangle the closer 
its properties get to those geometry ascribes to an ideal triangle. As such it seems credible to 
intuitively accept those properties as belonging to ideal triangles. But nowhere in The Good in 
the Right does Audi explain where the equivalent ethical details would come from. This is 
especially important given Audi's stated commitment to methodological particularism
75
, 
basically the idea that moral reasoning goes from specific to general cases. In a more recent 
article, Audi advocates perceptual intuitionism in specific cases, the ability to directly see moral 
properties such as injustice in a situation, in the same manner in which we can perceive 
complex, particular properties such as recognising someone's face, or seeing that someone is 
angry.
76
 This helps explain how general moral propositions may be justified self-evidently but 
only at the cost of increasing the theoretical commitment, seemingly placing the burden of 
originating moral knowledge from self-evidence onto specific moral perception. It also creates a 
further problem with regarding self-evidence as involving a kind of intuition at all.    
Robert Cowan argues that Audi seems to be left with describing something that is a type of 
inferential justification, merely a complex, holistic reflectional type and thus not strictly 
'intuitive' by Audi's own definition. If justification is gained by considering the complete context 
and reflecting on this and arriving at a judgement then surely that is a (holistic) inference from 
that context, albeit not a direct one of the form proposition A implies proposition B.
77
 Take, for 
example, the empirical analogies Audi uses: he talks about looking at a poem and through 
reflection judging whether the language sounds stilted.
78
 One may not be able to point to the 
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specific examples that together justify that judgement but I argue that case is still a form of 
inference from details even if those details are only expressed as a synthetic whole of the poem's 
overall form and structure. In the equivalent ethical case Audi's model seems to have no 
recourse to the equivalent ethical details of form and structure that justified the judgement 
unless in the form of a holistic inference. In that case by Audi's own definition self-evident 
judgement is not intuitive, even if this is the manner in which ethical knowledge is formed. 
This then brings us to the second theory I wish to discuss: perceptual intuitionism. Audi seems 
to rely on this theory as a source of moral knowledge about specific examples and, due to his 
methodological particularism, also as the genetic source of the general concepts that will then be 
epistemically confirmed through their own self-evidence. Audi, in common with other 
philosophers supportive of perceptual intuitionism, argues that moral perception occurs on the 
same basis as other perception of complex phenomenal properties. We can perceive that 
someone is angry, that a tree is a certain species, that a particular collection of features is a face 
we recognise, etc, despite the fact none of these properties are directly the objects of our 
phenomenal experience in the same primary and basic way shape and colour are. These, and 
other complex or even abstract properties, are perceived by those with the skill to do so through 
the direct recognition of certain structural features of each situation, which can be relatively 
simple such as the visible sight of cruelty in a husband slapping his wife, or in more complex 
cases such as the visual and auditory recognition of injustice in a kangaroo court room.
79
 
Sceptics of ethical perception are generally motivated by a commitment to the Is/Ought 
distinction and the belief that ethical perception would require the perception of uniquely ethical 
properties.  This is combined with the assumption that sensory perception is our only perception 
and that this is a purely natural, physical process, hence yielding only natural, physical 
properties. Thus, they argue, there can be no ethical perception. For ethical naturalists ethical 
perception is trivially obvious, because ethical properties are just natural properties, and 
everyone agrees that we have perception of natural properties, so this only becomes a 
contentious issue for those philosophers who wish to both support distinctively ethical 
properties and ethical perception. Despite the initial confidence of the previous paragraph Audi, 
Goldie, Cullison, McGrath and other perceptual intuitionists still struggle with this primary and 
intuitive objection to ethical perception, and end up recognising in their own arguments certain 
limitations to their theories. 
I argue they are correct to state that phenomenal-ethical perception definitely occurs. That 
means that people do have perceptual ethical experiences, in fact, extremely commonly. That 
much should be an uncontroversial fact. The difficult question is whether this could be 
accurately representing ethical properties, or is just a matter of psychological projection. Peter 
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Goldie argues that we have ethical perception that is phenomenologically non-inferential, i.e. 
ethical properties are phenomenally represented as immediately present rather than as a result of 
any conscious inference or judgement, but that gives no proof as to whether they are 
epistemically non-inferential, i.e. their contents provide direct, original justification for 
knowledge based on them
80
. Andrew Cullison defends a weak form of moral perception 
whereby we do not directly perceive moral properties, but we do "have perceptual knowledge 
that moral properties are instantiated" because we perceive the natural properties that are 
regularly correlated with moral properties
81
. Sarah McGrath begins her argument for moral 
perception by assuming the existence of moral knowledge and then arguing that non-perceptive 
sources cannot account for all of our moral knowledge, thus demonstrating that there must be a 
perceptual component.
82
  
While all these arguments posit (I believe correctly) that moral perception does occur, they all 
share a lack of confidence or positive argument for this perception being, what Robert Cowan 
calls, epistemically 'generative': the original source for information that can provide the initial 
input to moral knowledge.
83
 If they do not achieve that, but only project moral judgements and 
concepts that have already been internalised, then perception cannot form the basis for moral 
knowledge in general because the appeal would be circular. Alternatively, if moral perception is 
just a matter of conceptual recognition of certain complex patterns of non-moral properties, as 
Audi seems to argue, then this theory is reduced to a type of naturalism with the attendant 
problems with that view raised by Hume, Moore and others. What the non-naturalist moral 
perception view lacks in order to be generative is a description of what the content of 
epistemically generative moral perception would be if it is to base complex moral judgements 
on something other than purely natural, physical properties. In other words, what is the 
phenomenology of an ethical perception that distinguishes it from a physical non-moral 
perception? Only by answering this question will it be able to assess whether moral perception 
does have any original content. I believe that this problem is solved by Scheler's theory of 
ethical perception of values through intentional feeling because it provides the missing link 
between the strong intuition that we do have moral perception, the question of what content this 
perception could have, the relation to the physical non-moral properties of perception and the 
complex conceptual properties that form moral judgements.                    
The third main theory of contemporary analytic intuitionism is 'Seemings' theory, advocated by 
philosophers such as Michael Huemer and Philip Stratton-Lake
84
. Seemings theory argues that 
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all our knowledge and beliefs are fundamentally based on the way things mentally 'seem' to us. 
It perceptually seems to us that the sky is blue, through memory it seems to me that I am 
wearing a different shirt to yesterday, in introspection it seems that my thoughts and emotions 
are a certain way. Seemings theory argues that in addition to sensory, introspective and 
mnemonic seemings we also have intellectual seemings, that roughly correlate to the intellectual 
intuitions of mathematics and logic, both in the foundational sense and in the sense that it 
'seems' to us that any given argument is either decisive or sound or not. Along the same lines 
ethical intuitions are considered a type of intellectual seeming. The theory argues that all our 
evidence for statements about internal and external facts are ultimately seemings of one kind or 
another and we are otherwise blocked from access to the world. As such our ethical intuitions 
(or seemings) are of the same kind as other seemings, whether perceptual or mnemonic, that are 
taken as prima facie justifying evidence for our beliefs i.e. if one sees something one believes it 
unless presented with good evidence the sighting was a hallucination or illusion of some kind, 
and the same for one's memories or introspections. As such ethical intuitions should also be 
taken as prima facie justifying. Seemings theory claims that due to the fundamental similarity 
between ethical seemings and non-ethical seemings it is inconsistent to reject ethical seemings 
alone as all arguments that would disallow ethical seemings would also apply to non-ethical 
seemings and introduce a general scepticism that is not accepted.
85
 
Michael Huemer also introduces two supporting arguments for this view. He bases the 
epistemology in a realist theory of universals: "the existence of universals is a trivial truth"
86
, 
under which the possession of a rigorous concept defining a universal necessarily produces at 
least some correct intuitions about that universal.  Accurate ethical seemings are thus the 
product of possession of the concepts of Goodness, Justice, etc. This view would seem to beg 
the question to some degree. Fictional concepts, such as that of the Unicorn, will presumably 
also generate intellectual seemings under this theory. Huemer advances a Moorean counter-
argument to this. Ethical seemings are not wavering or un-common, they do not come with an 
awareness of their falsity as seemings about known fictional characters will do. Our core ethical 
seemings, such as that of the evil of unjustified murder or, to take a historical example, of such 
an event as the Holocaust, are strong, consistent and represent themselves as both true and 
important
87
. Moore argued that the common-sense truth of one's physical body, or the external 
world, should be accepted because the immediate evidence for that existence is more plausible 
and compelling than the complex idealist arguments advanced to discredit it
88
. So, on the same 
basis, our immediate awareness of the evil of the Holocaust and the value of human life is a 
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more plausible and compelling truth than the complex irrealist arguments advanced to discredit 
it. 
Just as self-evidence theory appeals to largely uncontroversial examples of self-evident 
propositions in other areas of knowledge (whether logical, mathematical or analytical) Seemings 
theory fundamentally argues on the basis of an innocence by association strategy with other, 
generally accepted seemings. Robert Cowan and Michael Bedke have in turn advanced similar 
arguments against Seemings theory as those discussed above. They mainly aim to drive a wedge 
between ethical seemings and other generally non-controversial seemings by demonstrating that 
it is possible to distinguish between types of seemings on the basis of relevant internal epistemic 
properties rather than ad hoc scepticism. This then undermines the necessary innocence by 
association enjoyed by ethical seemings. 
Bedke claims an initial difference between types of seemings is that for some seemings, such as 
visual perception, the seeming is defined by the content of the experience, e.g., if it seems that 
one sees a tree that is because one's visual content itself contains a tree. Intellectual seemings 
are different however.  One can hold a logical argument before one's mind and it can seem true, 
whereas one can also hold the same argument before one's mind without it seeming true. It does 
not seem true because one's intellectual content contains truthfulness, whatever that would 
mean. The seeming attitude for intellectual seemings appears to be an addition to the object 
being considered, not contained in the content of what is being considered.
89
  
Bedke further argues that among intellectual seemings we can also distinguish two types.  The 
first type involves those where the seeming-ness stems from conceptual competence with the 
ideas involved, from those where there is merely a felt phenomenological appropriateness to the 
seeming. That is seems true that triangles have three sides is based on competent awareness of 
the definition of a triangle. Once one understands the proof of a mathematical theorem then it 
seems true due to one's competence with the logical structure of the proof. If before one 
understood the proof it also seemed true, then one had a positive seeming, but it was not based 
on conceptual competence, rather, Bedke argues, it could only consist of the proposition 
carrying a certain phenomenological state of feeling true, rather than being directly based on 
some accepted conceptual competence.
90
 
Bedke argues that if ethical seemings justify then it can only be through this third, weaker sense 
of propositional attitude, whereby the seeming merely phenomenologically felt true, and not in 
terms of conceptual competence or because one's ethical intuitions contain the truths involved. 
These distinctions mirror the previous examples given relating to self-evidence theory. Analytic 
propositions are concept-competence driven intuitions and simple sensory perceptive intuitions 
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are trivially content-based intuitions. Mathematical and logical intuitions are a more complex 
example, but the direct intuition of the properties of triangles or arithmetic intuition consist of a 
mix of content-based intuitions, such as a triangle having three sides (when imagined 
geometrically) and concept-competence based intuitions in axiomatic mathematical cases and 
logical examples, such as where theorems are derived from mathematical axioms.  
These arguments undermine the 'innocence by association' of ethical seemings by emphasising 
differences between them relevant to the bases on which they may claim to be justificatory. 
However, they cannot undermine the basic Moorean plausibility of our intrinsic realist moral 
sentiments. Without cognitive, realist ethical standards our political arguments, our legal 
arguments, our historical interpretations, our view of education, our religious arguments, all 
make no sense. Our ethical truths are not things that can be simply excised from our human 
experience, a redundant philosophical hypothesis; they are core to our whole range of social 
organisation. As such the Moorean argument that the evil of the Holocaust is a more salient and 
convincing fact than queries about the justificatory status of ethical seemings compared to 
concept-competence based (or other) seemings must carry weight. These sceptical arguments 
only render the status of ethical seemings unproven, once the support of related, accepted 
seemings has been removed, but the burden of proof must surely lay on sceptics, due to the 
consistency, strength and plausibility of core ethical seemings. It is still plausible to regard 
ethical seemings as the basis of a standard realm of ethical knowledge despite remaining 
foundational questions, in the same way that sensory seemings and intellectual seemings found 
areas of empirical and rational knowledge despite remaining sceptical questions regarding the 
foundational basis of those areas. 
In order to undermine the plausibility of ethical seemings in general it would be necessary to 
demonstrate a basis for ethical seemings in general that was actively morally irrelevant. Of all 
the important contemporary arguments against moral realism only the evolutionary argument 
seems to do this. By presenting a plausible complete alternative origin for the entire range of 
human ethical seemings this theory threatens to shift the burden of proof back onto ethical 
realists and intuitionists. To re-establish the plausibility of intuitionism and moral realism we 
must provide a description of what is the nature of these intuitions and their phenomenology. 
This must positively demonstrate an objective ethical basis that does not primarily rely on 
innocence by association with other, unproblematic cognitive areas, as well as preferably 
answering the other outstanding issues previously mentioned in this section. This thesis argues 
that a theory based on Scheler's phenomenological theory of material a priori ethics provides 
this positive account of the basis of ethical knowledge that neither contemporary self-evidence, 
current theories of perceptual intuitionism or seemings theories can provide, while also giving a 
more detailed and wide-ranging explanation of ethical phenomena than evolutionary or other 
theories.  
47 
 
  
 
Chapter 3 – Scheler’s Ethics 
 
1. Phenomenology 
In this chapter I give an overview of the main ideas of Scheler’s ethics and begin to explain their 
application to current questions in ethics. I examine these ideas further in terms of their 
epistemology, ontology, and normative implications in chapters four, five and six. At the end of 
this chapter I also briefly consider the relation of Scheler to Kant’s theory. Scheler took Kant’s 
theory as his starting point and inspiration and throughout this chapter I contrast Scheler’s 
theory and Kant’s at key points. 
This thesis is primarily based in the phenomenological school of philosophy of which Max 
Scheler was an early prominent member, and the phenomenological method is absolutely 
central to understanding his ethical theory. I also argue that the phenomenological method is 
particularly suitable for ethical investigation in general, as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Therefore, before I begin the explanation of the core features of Scheler's theory, I will now 
briefly explain why I believe this to be the case, and what phenomenological doctrines are 
particularly important to Scheler's philosophy, and hence any theory developed from it.  
The phenomenological method originated with Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations of 
1900 and 1901
91
.  Husserl sought to produce a genuinely fundamental philosophical analysis. 
He aimed to concentrate on the immediately given phenomenal content of human experience by 
abstracting all content from experience that represents any scientific, philosophical or naïve 
theory or inference. This is because while all such content of an experience may be doubted, the 
existence of the phenomenal content of the experience itself is beyond doubt.
92
 For Husserl all 
mediate content must then be phenomenologically understood from this initial immediate 
content of consciousness. His phenomenology attempts an analysis of the mind and experienced 
world from the first person perspective in an attempt to understand the basic constitution of that 
world from that individual human subjective position. Furthermore, Husserl argued that since 
each person views the world solely through the perspective of individual subjectivity, to abstract 
from that subjectivity is to erase the fundamental source of human knowledge.
93
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Husserl’s methodological starting point for this process was two core concepts. Firstly, the 
concept of intentionality: the recognition that human consciousness is the consciousness of an 
object: one sees something, one hears something, one remembers something. An object is 
always intended. This demonstrates an intimate connection between mental action and the 
objects of the external world and the mind, and demonstrates that mental content and 
phenomenal experience are fundamentally and inseparably linked. Thus a fundamental analysis 
of human mental action and phenomenal experience requires an analysis of those mental 
intentional acts that link the two.
94
 The second core concept is the phenomenological reduction 
that occurs through epoché. Epoché is the subtraction of all theoretical and inferential content 
from experience. All theoretical inference must be bracketed, whether scientific, philosophical 
or naïve, everything that we cognitively layer onto the immediately given content of external 
and internal experience, in order to leave the core phenomenal content. He was not advocating 
scepticism of scientific or philosophical knowledge, but rather attempting to lay these to one 
side to analyse the most basic question of how we build our everyday world from phenomenal 
consciousness, which all such knowledge presupposes. The epoché in turn makes possible the 
phenomenological reduction to and exclusive focus on only that content left un-bracketed.
95
 
Scheler himself credited Husserl with the invention of the phenomenological method that he 
used, but apart from that he almost never referred to Husserl in his work and certainly saw 
himself as an independent thinker, rather than as a student of Husserl in the manner Martin 
Heidegger or Edith Stein were.
96
 Practically, he followed the outline of phenomenology 
described above. But he was not concerned with the details of the phenomenological method in 
the way Husserl was and almost never mentioned or defined either the phenomenological 
reduction, intentionality, essential intuition, horizonality or other key methodological concepts.  
The focus of his phenomenology was also totally different. Whereas Husserl focussed on the 
phenomenological basis of theoretical cognition, Scheler primarily focussed on human practical 
(moral and emotional) life.
97
 He was a realist phenomenologist who had no interest in Husserl's 
later theories of transcendental phenomenological idealism and criticised Husserl for continuing 
the phenomenological reduction until only the transcendental ego remained as real
98
. 
The key phenomenological concept for Scheler's own phenomenology is essential intuition. 
Like Husserl he argued that the phenomenological method revealed that we experience reality 
not as a confusion of sense-data that is stitched together by consciousness, as empiricists and 
Kant believed in different ways, but as a plethora of material objects and essences that we 
directly access, and can clarify through the phenomenological method.
99
 In both theoretical and 
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practical cognition we have direct intuitive access to these essences and the prime 
phenomenological task is then to closely, qualitatively analyse and describe them and their 
interrelations and how these constitute our world. Scheler argued that we have both intuitive 
access to the every-day world through ordinary experience, and intuitive access to essences 
through phenomenological experience, and this doctrine is absolutely key to his ethical 
epistemology.
100
 The core concept of Scheler's ethics is that of material values: they are how 
good and evil manifest and they are how Scheler's material ethics transcends the limits placed 
by Kant's arguments of the Critique of Practical Reason (which Scheler considered the peak of 
philosophical ethics before his own work).
101
 And, they are textbook examples of 
phenomenologically intuited essences. Scheler argues that the un-reflexive experience of these 
values (and other essences) is common even to children and animals but they and their 
interrelations only become clear through phenomenological analysis.
102
 
I argue that phenomenology as pioneered by Husserl and practised by Scheler is uniquely suited 
to analysing the nature of ethical experience and obligation. The phenomenological method is 
superior to both purely empiricist and rationalist approaches to ethics because of the elements of 
both that it combines. Empiricist approaches to ethics will always struggle with the fact that 
ethical statements are widely taken to be universal, necessary, a priori statements based on 
'empirical' evidence that is nowhere near sufficiently universal or conclusive to justify such 
statements about the nature of value e.g. utilitarianism. Rationalist approaches, such as 
Kantianism, will also struggle with the nature of ethical experience as I described in my naïve 
sketch in chapter one: an experience that is not based originally on deduction from any logical 
principles, but rather has the nature and force of immediate experience, which only later works 
back to theory. Ethics is as fundamentally practical (in both the ordinary and philosophical 
sense) as any philosophical subject can be, and I argue it only enters consciousness in the 
experience of other persons and objects as valuable. Regardless of the questions about the 
metaphysical status of values or human free will, practically we are inescapably agents, and so 
ethical analysis has no choice but to precede on that basis. If ethics is to be both a priori and 
universal but also grounded in the realisations of personal experience then neither of these 
methodological approaches will be suitable. Phenomenology, on the other hand, has a doctrine 
of the substantive a priori that neither ends up denying its existence, as much empiricism often 
does, nor bases it in the independent action of rational minds. Rather, it bases it in the intrinsic 
rational ordering revealed in the detailed structure of phenomenal experience of reality by 
phenomenological analysis. 
I argue that ethical experience of value provides an even more natural ground for applying the 
phenomenological method than the constitution of physical experience. Without the ability to 
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quantify our experience in terms of measurement in space and time (as we do with our physical 
experience) we can only analyse our ethical intuition and experience through considering its 
structural properties. This is both in relation to our own immediate experience of these essences 
i.e. values and their interconnections, and the manner we constitute and schematise that 
experience into the partially rationalistic concepts of our ordinary life, e.g. evil, courage, beauty. 
Phenomenological qualitative analysis is particularly designed for bringing essences to clarity 
and contrasting their structure. Consequently it offers the most thorough source of data from 
which to build a fruitful analysis of moral experience in all its individual richness. Furthermore, 
to argue negatively, phenomenology of theoretical experience and judgements will always 
struggle to abstract to the phenomenologically relevant detail of experience from the 
overwhelming torrent of ordinary perceptual information. Practical phenomenology, although it 
has to deal with a weight of existing moral commitments that are often held with great 
emotional strength, does not have to abstract from the same quantity of contingent perceptual 
information. This should make the phenomenological task relatively easier and clearer in ethics.             
 
2. Essences and the A priori 
The central epistemological commitment of Scheler's ethics is to the phenomenological intuition 
of essences. This doctrine is connected to, but distinct from, Husserl's phenomenological theory 
of universals as ideal objects and I believe that both need to be considered together to get a clear 
idea of the epistemological commitments that Scheler's theory takes on. This is because 
although Scheler argues that not all essences are universals, many are, particularly various 
essences relevant to ethics, and Husserl himself devoted considerably more detail to describing 
the phenomenological method, in this regard, than Scheler himself. 
Husserl's theory of universals is opposed to both metaphysical and epistemological realism 
about universals and to conceptualist and extreme nominalism. For Husserl, universals are 
objective existent entities, but ones that have a purely ideal existence.
103
  They are the objects 
signified by the intentional acts of thought that are the content of our minds. When we think of a 
triangle we cannot imagine or draw an abstract triangle that is not-scalene, not-isosceles, not-
equilateral but it can be the object and meaning of our thought (or drawing). It exists ideally in 
the way that logical or mathematical objects exist, and are intended by each notation or symbol 
that represents them. It is this same way one can represent and prove a logical truth with mere 
marks on a page.  
He contrasted this strongly with the epistemological realism of Locke and the metaphysical 
realism of Plato, both of which generate paradoxes by explaining universals as real objects. 
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Locke argued that universals existed as ‘general ideas’ that formed the real contents of the 
mind.
104
 Husserl argued that even a real, existent, external object cannot be conceived as part of 
the act that thinks it i.e. the picture in our mind we imagine that represents the universal object. 
On the contrary, just as the real, external object is (as the language suggests) the meaning 
intended by specific thought and not the thought itself, so in general or ideal thought the 
universal is the object but not the content of the universal thought in one’s mind. The universal 
is the ideal object meant and intended by that thought, just as the real object is the object meant 
by certain particular thoughts.
105
 By this means one can, entirely consistently, have before one’s 
mind triangularity as such, and logically consider that, even though if we have a corresponding 
image before one’s mind it cannot be a general triangle but must be equilateral, isosceles or 
scalene. 
There can be both particular real objects (a table) and particular ideal objects (the number 2). 
There can also be universals based on either of these forms of real or ideal objects e.g. the 
universal of tables, or integers, respectively. All of these types are existent in the ordinary sense 
that they are indispensible to thought of the phenomenal world. All can have true statements 
predicated upon them and all can be brought to givenness in intuition whether through ordinary 
sensory perception, categorial or essential intuition. Real particulars themselves are mysterious 
without universals because universals and essences are key to both distinguishing and grouping 
together particulars on the basis of 'alikeness' and to the use of basic logic (the idea of 'All X' or 
'An X').
106
  
Nominalist theories historically rejected universals in an exaggerated response to Locke's 
internal realism of 'general ideas' in the mind, or earlier Platonic and Aristotelian external 
realism. However, this reflected a false dichotomy. They failed to realise that universals are 
correctly the intended meaning of thought-acts not the acts themselves. Nominalist theories 
correctly see the Lockean or Platonic ideas as a confused notion. However, like Lockean 
'realism', they fail to distinguish the intending mental act from the intended ideal object meant 
by it, and the combination of these two ideas leads them to, incorrectly, reject universals 
entirely. This leaves them only able to interpret general thinking in terms of psychological-
causal explanations of how universals are recognised through abstraction from individual 
objects, but without any theory of the logical object of general thought.
107
 The correct response 
is to turn to the Husserlian alternative to both external and mental ‘realism’ about universals and 
the nominalist theories that discard universals entirely. 
Husserl first argued in his Logical Investigations not only that universals exist in a perfectly 
respectable sense, albeit ideally, but they become the objects of knowledge as the intending 
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mental acts towards them are fulfilled in intuition, particularly categorial and essential intuition. 
We can detach essences from passive sensuous intuition by actively concentrating on specific 
properties the object instantiates.  These can be recognised as essences that can then be fulfilled 
both in particular objects: 'This Red', 'That Red' that I see on particular objects in front of me, or 
removed from those objects as universals: 'Red' i.e. as properties that could be instantiated 
exactly the same in other particular objects. While the experience of the basic real particular that 
one is observing remains an "overreaching act of identification [brings] all such single acts of 
abstraction into one synthesis"
108
 and through this "objects of Sort A become present to 
us"
109(meaning as the essence ‘Sort A’) in addition to the perception of the particular that 
remains subsidiary. Universals or ideas can be perceived analogically in an image drawn to aid 
understanding but if "the consciousness of mere analogy"
110
 vanishes we have direct perception 
of the universal.   
These considerations apply to both the theoretical essences that Husserl was mainly concerned 
with and the practical ethical essences that Scheler is concerned with, as Scheler put it, "on the 
basis of a far-reaching analogy for values and willing"
111
 with the theoretical. Fundamentally, 
Scheler’s practical essences are not either universals or particulars just as Husserl argued that 
theoretical essences such as ‘Red’ can be given as ‘Red’ in general, or ‘This Red’ or ‘That Red’ 
particularly. In both cases the essence is experienced as an essence once brought to givenness 
through the phenomenological process of clarification. This applies to all essences just as a 
colour can be brought to givenness on a particular object as a particular shade, or just as a 
‘universal’ quale of that colour before the mind.112 
Like Husserl, Scheler argues that essences are directly intuited through "phenomenological 
experience"
113
. All propositions and truths must be connected to an intuition of "facts 
themselves"
114
. A posteriori statements must be connected to ordinary perceptual experience; a 
priori truths must be connected to essential facts given in phenomenological experience. This is 
the manner in which we access essences and thus gain a priori knowledge. It is only 
phenomenologically clarified experience "that exhibits as a fact of intuitive content what is 
already contained in natural [experience]"
115
 but is usually hidden, namely a priori intuition of 
the essences that fundamentally constitute our experienced world. (Here ‘natural’ means 
experience that has not been phenomenologically purified.) This a priori content is not to be 
identified primarily with those truths that do not depend on any particular empirical 
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experiences, as in the Kantian definition, but rather "those ideal units of meaning and those 
propositions that are self-given by way of an immediate intuitive content"
116
.  
Scheler claims that the ideal object of essences that is immediately given in this manner through 
phenomenological experience cannot be given as a more or less accurate model or observation; 
rather it is either given truthfully or not given. The a priori truth of essences is independent of 
the quantity of observation or description and is not dependent on propositions but "belongs 
wholly to the 'given' and the sphere of facts"
117
. The a priori intuition is a form of non-
inductive, direct experience that is distinguished from the a posteriori, inductive experience that 
is usually what is referred to by empiricism. Indeed, "it is a criterion of the essentialness of a 
given content that it must already be intuited in an attempt to observe it"
118
, because it is the 
basic stuff of cognition that is always present, but is merely hidden and confused in pre-
reduction consciousness. Phenomenological experience of essences yields facts directly and 
immediately without any sign, symbol or picture. In phenomenological experience alone there is 
"no separation between what is meant and what is given"
119
. These two points are connected. In 
ordinary experience everything is overlaid with posited symbolism and inference and it is 
precisely this content that separates what is given from what is meant in that experience. The 
phenomenological reduction by stripping away that content gives us access again to the 
essences that underlie it.    
What is important about these essences for Scheler is not any particular ontological opinion 
about their role in fundamental reality, but the epistemological and phenomenological assertion 
that they are an unavoidable and indispensable part of our cognition of phenomenal reality. The 
doctrine of a priori truth that comes from this also fundamentally differs from the conception, 
broadly held by both British empiricists and Kant, that a priori truth is an ordering inflicted by 
the rational mind onto the chaos of sensation, by one method or another.  On the contrary, for 
Scheler the general 'chaos' of sense-data is a damaging myth, and the a priori ordering of both 
the natural and moral world is something given in the immediacy of intuition as an "objective 
structure"
120
. This structure then requires examination and clarification through the 
phenomenological method, not invention through some synthetic activity of human reason. 
Scheler strongly criticises both empiricist sensualism and Kantian constructivist approaches to 
the a priori in general and particularly in ethics
121
.   
These epistemological doctrines, when applied to the ethical realm, will be the fundamental 
basis of his positive description of an ethics of values, his defence of the objectivity and 
material nature of that ethics, and his criticism of both empiricist and rationalist alternatives. All 
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these doctrines reappear throughout this thesis, though generally implicitly, as they underlie all 
Scheler’s arguments and statements about values. Through this chapter and the next chapter (on 
epistemology) I go into the specific details of how value essences are perceived as practical 
essences.  For now I merely hope to have made clear what is being referred to in my following 
explanation of Scheler's ethics.          
 
3. Values 
Scheler's ethics places morality squarely within a larger view of the experience of value. Where 
other ethical theories argue that practical reasons, or sentiments, or pleasure and pain, or prima 
facie duties are the fundamental building blocks of ethics
122
, for Scheler this central role is taken 
by values. These values range across the whole range of human practical experience and some 
are experienced even by children and animals.
123
 Values can be identified as part of the wider 
family of phenomenologically recognisable ideal essences.  They are the affective, practical side 
of this family and are indispensable to practical cognition (as essences in general are to 
cognition in general) and form the basis of rational understanding of ethics.  These values are 
experienced as embodied in objects but through phenomenological reflection can be brought to 
givenness separately from any object, and can then become the basis of an a priori ethical 
theory. 
When I consider a piece of food, for instance, I look at it as a thing and I can think about it 
theoretically as having a certain size and shape, of consisting of certain chemicals that I know 
my body can usefully digest. Through remembering various feelings and experiences my brain 
represents it as being likely to be sweet or savoury, and through feelings of hunger pushes me to 
eat it. But those feelings of hunger do not push me to eat it on the basis of its size or shape or 
chemical composition, or even, fundamentally, on the basis of its taste, but on the basis of it 
being recognised as ‘food’.  What is this recognition of food-ness?  Scheler argues it cannot be 
broken down into any theoretical or even feeling statement but can only be accurately described 
as a recognition of the object bearing a certain valuable essence, in this case that of 'food' or 
‘nourishment’.124 This designation cannot be nailed down to any particular physical facts about 
the object or even feeling facts but is clear none the less. One could even clearly imagine a 
different animal for which, due to differing body chemistry, entirely different objects are food, 
but that regardless this essence of ‘nourishment’ remains the same and entirely recognisable. Of 
course this is not the sole story of any item, it will also have at least the agreeable values of 
sweetness and savouriness that dictate precisely how alluring it appears to me, but these are 
secondary and dependent on the original recognition of it as food. 
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Values, like that of ‘food’, cannot be defined in terms of physical properties, but also cannot be 
defined in terms of internal feeling states either.  The feeling states of hunger or the experience 
of a certain taste does not define 'food', rather these are the subjective states whose object is the 
essence, food. One can recognise food, and eat, without any sense of hunger, and without 
appreciating its sensuous taste. In the previous discussion of Husserl's theoretical universals the 
object of universal thought was not the thought but the ideal object intended by that thought, the 
ideal universal. So in this case the value is the object of the intentional feeling responses, the 
ideal essence, but not the feelings states themselves. The difference in the practical sphere is 
that this representation occurs largely through affective and conative material rather than in 
theoretical outer or inner sense, as is the case with theoretical essences. This is the basis for 
Scheler's arguments for the objectivity of value ethics that are explained later in this chapter and 
the next, particularly in section 4.7, titled ‘the objectivity of ethical knowledge’.  
Values cover the whole range of human practical experience. At the basic level there are the 
modalities of 'agreeable' values, 'vital' values, 'mental/spiritual' values and 'holy' values.
125
 These 
different modalities are always naturally experienced through bearers, but can be brought to 
immediate and separate givenness through phenomenological reflection. They are attached to a 
whole range of different possible bearers, particularly the ‘agreeable’ to things, the ‘vital’ to 
living beings, and the ‘moral’ to persons.126 They are not just attached to objects either, but also 
acts and interconnections.
127
 Within each of these modalities there are numerous distinguishable 
individual values that cover every element of human practical reason. Examples of these basic 
categories would be the agreeable value of comfort, the vital value of health, the spiritual value 
of beauty, and the holy value of faith. Scheler's vision of our ethical world is one richly 
drenched with different values that we are all used to dealing with and experiencing on a daily 
basis but which, like theoretical universals and essences, only reveal their particular, precise 
nature after a process of phenomenological clarification. The values Scheler refers to are the 
practical essences like nourishment, or courage, or beauty that we all commonly are aware of 
and interact with, and as such are commonly referred to in ethical theories besides his own.  
What Scheler adds is the thorough phenomenological analysis of these values that alone can 
accurately clarify their nature and relations.  
This seeming embarrassment of riches when it comes to essences in Scheler's ethics is actually, 
I argue, a great source of strength. This pluralism makes it a more thorough and adaptable 
ethical theory, reflecting the richness of the human experience of value in its varying forms. It 
also provides the next part of the argument for the objectivity of an ethics based on values. The 
recognition of qualitative variation among values themselves means it is possible to describe a 
rational ordering among values based on their structural features, as clarified in 
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phenomenological analysis. This mirrors one of the key means by which we recognise external 
physical reality as objective despite the subjectivity of individual perceptive experience.  That is 
the ability to make rational statements about physical reality that are independently assessable 
by other elements of physical reality, as well as on an intersubjective personal basis. We 
measure a length with a wooden ruler as 1m, walk out of the room, come back in and then 
measure the object on a totally separate basis with a tape measure and it is still 1m. In other 
words its length is objective, it has a structured and stable relation to other objects that does not 
alter wildly dependent on our experience of it.  Statements about the qualitative relation of 
values, what Scheler refers to as their a priori ordering, can play the same role in demonstrating 
the 'objectivity' of value-relations and hence their use as a foundation of an objective ethics.  
Values are always given in ordinary experience through the objects, acts or persons that bear 
them, referred to quite naturally as their 'bearers'. Scheler argues that we experience objects 
always as a combination of 'good' and 'thing' where the thing-ness of the object is its physical, 
theoretical profile and the good-ness of the object is its practical dimension of instantiating a 
certain value, as valuable.
128
 Objects are naturally experienced as a unity of these two 
perspectives and only through reflection are the value nature of objects and their theoretical 
nature distinguished. All objects are experienced as goods, as bearers of values, whether 
physical or mental acts, persons, things, conations or feelings.  But values do not yet appear 
clearly in goods. “A good is related to value-qualities as a thing is to the qualities that fulfil its 
properties.”129 It is only phenomenological reflection on the value-complex given in the good 
that allows the values themselves to be brought to immediate givenness, just as this is possible 
with the theoretical essences of physical things. Values, once clarified, can then begin to be 
analysed and compared in terms of structure and just how qualitatively valuable they actually 
are, which can then form the basis for an a priori and objective ethics in the manner I briefly 
described, and consider further in chapter four.    
 
4. Value Perception 
Scheler argues that values are accessible for persons through two main affective mechanisms. 
These provide direct, intuitive access to the content of values in a manner that combines what is 
usually considered both reason and sentiments. Values are not accessed as empirical, physical 
facts, or through an a priori rational intuition of uniquely ‘moral’ properties. Rather they are 
accessed through intentional, affective intuition of the ‘goods’ of phenomenal experience that is 
then clarified through phenomenological reflection to reveal the values hidden within.  
                                                     
128
 Ibid, p22. 
129
 Ibid, p20. 
57 
 
The two affective mechanisms through which we access values are ‘conation’ and ‘intentional 
feeling’, and through these two we are constantly in contact with material values that guide our 
practical cognition, our willing, our wishing, our choosing, and how we experience reality as 
valuable.
130
 They differ somewhat in terms of their relation to those values though, while neither 
intentional feeling nor conations are constitutive or foundational of values. They are means 
through which values and their respective heights are revealed to us in experience. (The ‘height’ 
of a value is the qualitative measure of the intensity of its value, and whether it should be 
preferred above or below other values. This concept will be explained in section five of this 
chapter and in chapter five.) Scheler takes his inspiration for these ideas from Pascal's concept 
of the “Ordre du Coeur” or ‘order of the heart’, defined by Pascal’s statement that "The Heart 
has its reasons of which Reason knows nothing"
131
. Scheler interprets this to mean that there is 
an a priori ordering in practical reason, based on feeling and striving, that is totally separate 
from the rational ordering of theoretical reason. Scheler criticises traditional ethics for believing 
that morality must be either rational and absolute, or emotional and empirical. He claims this is 
a false dichotomy and instead phenomenology reveals, through intentional feeling and conation, 
an ethics that is "emotional and absolute".
132
 
Scheler describes values as "clearly feelable phenomena",
133
 but in a particular and unique sense 
of 'feeling' i.e. intentional feeling. Intentional feeling can best be understood by distinguishing it 
from non-intentional feeling-states. Such feeling-states largely follow the traditional empiricist 
or Kantian conception of feelings. Feeling-states, particularly sensory bodily feelings, are purely 
internal and have no direction outside the self, nor do they present themselves as such. They are 
generally spatially extended over an area of the body, like touch or taste or pain, and whether 
mental attention is directed at the feeling itself or not does not fundamentally alter its state, 
though it may lessen or increase its vividness in consciousness. They are given and accepted as 
subjective, restricted to a single person and often highly transitory. They form a continuous 
manifold of sensations that cover a huge range of types. The lack of direction outside 
themselves is their defining characteristic. If I have a headache and concentrate on my pain, the 
only thing that is given is the pain itself, if that pain disappears, then that feeling-state is just 
gone.
134
 
Intentional feelings are very different to this. They are feelings that are intentionally directed, 
with values as their constant objects, whether of the agreeable, vital, mental or holy. In 
phenomenological reflection these feelings are identifiable as intrinsically relating to objects of 
feeling that are not identical with the feeling itself, rather these feelings are the manner in which 
we perceive these objects i.e. values, in the same manner that through vision physical objects 
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are represented as fundamentally separate from the act of seeing that sees them. An example is 
the perception of beauty in a sunset or painting. Certainly the perception is carried and 
accompanied by unique feelings, but these feelings are not themselves beauty, rather they have 
as their object the value, Beauty, borne by the sunset or painting itself. Intentional feelings vary 
widely depending on the value they are aimed at. They are ‘least’ intentional when aimed at 
agreeable values, such as those relating to the body, of sensory pleasure or food. They are 
‘more’ intentional135 when dealing with vital values relating to the living being, such as health 
or vigour, more again in mental or spiritual values and most in values of holiness.  In each of 
these levels the feeling is given more and more as representing a value as its object that is 
independent of and separate to the feeling itself. Also, the revealing of that value becomes more 
and more responsive to, and capable of, being disrupted by the mental attention being directed 
at the feeling of the value rather than the value itself. For higher values any attempt to do this 
immediately detaches the person from the value itself. If one attends to the feelings that indicate 
the beauty of a sunset, one is dealing with a totally different object to that beauty itself, and 
hence one loses sight of it. The perception is disrupted, whereas whether or not one attends to a 
feeling-state it is unaffected because it entirely refers to itself.
136
 
Feeling-states and intentional feeling are two areas of affective experience. These are highly 
variegated at both levels and both concepts should be distinguished from the common 
conception of emotions. In Scheler's view emotions, as we usually refer to them, would be a 
limited type of intentional feelings, as they are usually externally directed and contain an 
immediate representation of the value of the object. Common emotions themselves would not 
exhaust the range of intentional feeling though.  Rather identifiable, distinct emotions would be 
one particular subset of the wide range of intentional feeling, much of which will not have a 
clear definition and common name. Another different form of affective experience would be the 
feelings that support empathy, sympathy and emotional identification and have as their objects 
not values directly, but rather the thought and feeling of other persons, living beings or 
communities, and through which we gain access and knowledge of other persons.       
"Values are given first of all in feeling"
137
 and this is the primary method by which value 
perception occurs but not the only one. Through conation values themselves, or features of 
values such as their particular 'height', may be revealed, and any conative movement always has 
values as its logical basis. Conation is a rarely used term for the aspect of the mind directed to 
change and action: impulse, drive, mental striving, volition and will in the broadest sense, 
whether conscious or unconscious.  It is contrasted with the affective, feeling based faculty of 
the mind and theoretical reason. Will is the most commonly referred to form of conation in 
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general usage, but Scheler regards ‘will’ as a relatively advanced and particular form of 
conation whereas the entire faculty is a much broader and more basic area of human function.
138
 
Basic examples of conations would be the subconscious impulses that drive us to choose 
between certain objects, whether members of a group on entering a room, food choices on a 
menu, or the differing goals we seek to complete at the start of a day. The subconscious impulse 
that drags us towards something of beauty, or which drives us away from an act that we know is 
wrong, reveals value even in the absence of clear feeling, or clear understanding of why we are 
doing it. 
Scheler argues that it is an essential connection that every value accessible through conation 
must be accessible through feeling but no converse relationship holds: there are values 
accessible through feeling that could never be realised by any personal conation, for example 
"the sublimity of the nocturnal sky and the stars" or “the morally valuable personality of a 
human being”.139 Conation is still a common and important means by which values are revealed 
and affect human experience. Neither intentional feeling nor conation are constitutive of values, 
they are rather both methods by which the objective values may be brought to subjective clarity 
e.g. the joy we feel when someone enters the room who we weren't aware we cared for until that 
moment.
140
 
Whereas 'will' always has as its object some pictorial representation as its 'purpose', conation in 
general only has a 'goal' that requires no such representation but must essentially have some 
scale of a value as its object. (By pictorial representation I mean some actual explicit theoretical 
objects that are represented as the object of that will.) For conation the value-goal can be 
implicitly given in the most basic conation, or given clearly in value terms but without any 
picture-content attached, or with a pictorially represented purpose as in cases of 'will', but it 
always still has the fundamental value-goal founding the impulse. Scheler argues that an 
immediate connection to a value is necessary for conation, but that picture-content is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for conation. The fact that picture-content is not required for conation, 
though it is for will, is demonstrated by the uncountable occasions when we feel conative 
impulses that do lack this content, and are driven towards something that can be clear in terms 
of its value while lacking clear pictorial image. This can be either low-value conations such as 
the impulse towards food, without any clear image of any particular food, or it can be a very 
high-value conation, such as the impulse towards union with God, and dwelling in Heaven, that 
is overwhelming in value terms even when no clear vision of God, or Heaven, may be at all 
possible in this life. The fact that even acts of will must have value-content as their fundamental 
driving force is shown by the fact that the driving impulse can be just as strong in instances of 
conation that lack any pictorial content, or have only a confused picture-content while the value 
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is entirely clear. However, pictorial content on its own overwhelmingly lacks any conative 
impulse except in those cases where a strong perception of value simultaneously occurs.
141
 
 
5. Value Preferment 
One will note that up until now there has been no mention of ‘Good & Evil’ or moral choice in 
Scheler's ethical theory.  We have discussed ‘goods’ i.e. valuable objects, but not the distinctly 
moral Good & Evil. Confusingly, these are two non-identical uses of ‘Good’ in Scheler’s ethics.  
There is ‘The Good’ that we can experience, which is broadly all possible or actual goods i.e. 
valuable objects, instantiating all positive values, and there is also ‘Good’ that is the specifically 
personal, moral value revealed, as I’m about to describe, in people preferring higher values over 
lower ones.  
This is because Scheler argues that ‘Good & Evil’ as concepts only make sense in reference to 
the ethical realm of existing individual values.
142
 Moral theories that leap directly to the issue of 
personal moral choices without taking stock of the manner in which cognition of value occurs 
will always give only a foreshortened theoretical description of ethics. It is most likely they will 
be giving an incorrect view of ethics precisely because they fail to take into account the great 
detail of value cognition that precedes moral choice and hence misrepresent this basic material. 
Theories of morality such as Kantianism that state that normative oughts, the commanding or 
prohibiting of acts, are the entirety of ethics make the further mistake of not ignoring but 
actively denying the existence of the majority of ethical cognition that involves no sense of an 
immediate normative command. 
In the cases of values we have discussed so far there has been consideration of only one 
particular value and so there has been no possibility for ethical choice. Ethical choice occurs 
when multiple different values are given in a single situation as providing alternatives for acts. 
To give an example: I was once walking home with my girlfriend at the time; on this particular 
day that involved pushing her in her wheelchair a mile uphill in the pouring rain. The rain had 
just come on suddenly and pushing someone in a wheelchair you have little ability to hurry, so 
we were resigned to getting increasingly cold and wet for the next 20 minutes. I was about to 
cross the road when we were overtaken by a young Asian lady I did not know walking under an 
umbrella. The young lady gave us one glance, thrust the umbrella into my hand and marched off 
across the road and through the rain before I could respond at all. 
Anyone at all could recognise that experience, despite its relative triviality, as an act of 
profound goodness. Scheler argues that this immediate awareness cannot be reduced to any 
calculus of expected outcomes of happiness or other metric, nor any internal view of the mental 
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process of the lady who helped us, but is immediately apparent on the apprehension of the 
choice made between values in that instant. She sacrificed her own comfort to prioritise the 
comfort of struggling strangers, even though she had no bond of friendship or other link to us, 
and even though we could be thought responsible for our own fate by failing to prepare for 
autumn English weather. Her act instantiated the values of kindness and generosity and Scheler 
would argue that it is in the immediate apprehension of these personal values, the sacrifice and 
service to others, as qualitatively higher than the purely agreeable value of her own comfort that 
the recognition of the goodness of her action appears.
143
 
Scheler argues that moral 'Good' appears specifically and only in the preferment of higher 
positive values over lower positive (or just negative) values and ‘Evil’ in the preferment of 
lower values over higher ones. They do not appear independently at any point as a direct feature 
of objects, whether things, acts or persons. Objects are intuited as more or less positively or 
negatively valuable i.e. as goods, but that does not constitute ‘Good or Evil’ in the specifically 
moral sense. 'Good' and 'Evil' are specifically values of persons and no other objects because 
only persons are capable of preferment among values. Scheler flatly rejects Kant’s view that 
only the ‘will’ can be good. What we will is rather dependent on our ethical cognition and 
especially our value preference. This means it is a good person who has a good will, rather than 
the other way round. This does not mean that 'Good' or 'Evil' can be defined in terms of persons.  
Like all values they are "clearly feelable" essences that can only be known through experience 
and any attempts to essentially define them in terms of non-evaluative physical characteristics 
are doomed to failure. It merely means that persons and their acts alone are essentially the 
bearers of these uniquely moral values. They are the unique moral values revealed through 
value preferment, whereas all other values are non-moral ethical values revealed through a wide 
range of bearers.
144
  
Preferment among values does not just happen in terms of active moments of choice among 
acts, as in the example I described, but is a constant and largely implicit process of cognition 
that occurs in all recognition of values. Whenever a value is intentionally recognised through 
conation or feeling it is immediately either preferred to or placed after other known values in 
terms of 'height' i.e. qualitative intensity of value. This mental act does not occur directly 
through feeling or conation, it is a distinct form of value cognition whereby "the height of the 
value is 'given', by virtue of its essence, only in the act of preferring"
145
.  But this does not 
constitute the absolute height of the value because that exists objectively in the essence of the 
values themselves.
146
 As such value preferment can go wrong, and indeed systematic incorrect 
                                                     
143
 Ibid, p27. 
144
 Ibid, p28. 
145
 Ibid, p87. 
146
 I am aware that the concept of value height itself may be considered contentious by some. There is 
insufficient space to consider this problem here but I dedicate my 5
th
 chapter to considering some of the 
62 
 
preferment, or value-deception as Scheler calls it, would be the core failing of moral cognition 
and the most fundamental driver of moral failure (to which phenomena like ‘weakness of will’ 
would be secondary).
147
 The near automatic and invisible act of cognition should be considered 
the default way in which value preferment occurs, separately to any external actions or choices. 
It can also occur spontaneously when faced with a choice or conation that brings to 
consciousness at that moment values that had never before been perceived or ranked. Usually, 
though, preferment does not occur in an act of choice, but rather previous acts of preferment 
themselves dictate the moral choices that we can or will make when certain situations arise.  
Preferment is importantly different to choice, in a similar way to the previous distinction 
between 'will' and the more fundamental and broad conation. Choice between things, persons or 
acts is always based on underlying preferment among values, but choice implies an act in 
conation or conscious thought based on perceptually represented objects. I choose to see one 
movie over another, even if I cannot give distinct reasons for my decision.  But that choice itself 
is only possible because I have already made preferment among certain values, and in 
complicated goods among certain complexes of values, that immediately guides my choice.
148
 It 
is possible to talk of preferring among goods, such as "I prefer roses to carnations" that refers to 
no act of choice, even an imagined one, though it does then act as the basis for any particular 
choice. Preferment is a near automatic act of value-cognition that is only revealed through 
implicit conative acts and consciously through choice. 
Preferment among values does not necessarily require the presence of more than one value 
either. In the cognition of a certain value it may be given as 'high' without the values that it is 
higher than being clearly given in intuition. A value may also be given as though there could be 
certain values that were higher than it, even if those values are not clear. Also, the act of 
preferment is not purely dependent on the giving of values in feeling or conation; rather the 
preferring itself shapes and is shaped by those values that are accessible to the person in feeling 
through the mechanism just described. In the process of preferring or placing after the person 
intuits the 'space' occupied by other values in the ranking of values and from that opens the 
possibilities of these values being directly identified and clarified in feeling.
149
 
Values are originally revealed and clarified through conation and intentional feeling. They are 
'ranked' through the emotional act of preferment that also provides space for the identification of 
new values within the areas already disclosed by feeling. Beyond any of these elements are the 
acts of Love and Hate. Scheler does not consider love and hate just to be emotions, or modes of 
valuation, or the perception of values.  Rather loving and hating are the "highest level of our 
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intentional emotive life"
150
.  Love is the most intentional, object directed of emotional states, the 
most distant from the self-referential and contained nature of feeling-states. Love of any person 
is a movement towards the highest possible value in that person, a revealing of their value-
potential that is indifferent to whether these are values they already instantiate. Love as such has 
the unique role of revealing radically new areas of value previously un-encountered. Love 
primarily applies to human persons but can also apply to all bearers of higher values such as 
nature, art, knowledge or God
151
.   
Acts of preferment allow discovery of neighbouring values by containing references to the 
spaces in the value structure they may occupy. But love acts "as a pioneer and guide",
152
 going 
ahead of feeling and preferment in flashes of creative insight that reveal whole new territories of 
values as yet unimagined. Whereas, for example, the phenomenological method relies on 
analysing experience that is already given, and so can clarify, but is not radically creative. Love 
opens up these new realms to be thoroughly 'mapped' in acts of feeling, conation and preferment 
and so widens the ethical possibilities and potential for that person to heights of value 
previously un-thought. Conation and intentional feeling, preferment, and love all then have vital 
roles in "circumscribing" our wider ethical awareness, and hence both our specific moral 
choices and the whole universe of such choices that are a practical possibility for us.
153
   
Hate, on the other hand, has an analogous but opposite role and effect.  In hate positive values 
are actively closed off and withdrawn from all possibility of perception or cognition. The world 
of positive values the person can experience is thus more deeply and widely impoverished the 
deeper the hate is and the farther it stretches. In doing so it also hides its own action so the 
person does not realise how impoverished they are. They can lose all sight of those values to the 
point of becoming totally unaware of what they no longer have access to. It can only possibly be 
right to hate disvalues themselves, to hate evil as such, never to hate positive goods or values, 
though it is doubtlessly seductive to do so because goods are easier to identify than specific 
negative values.  
Scheler sharply distinguishes the wider layers of moral intuition and moral cognition from the 
more specific areas of moral comportment and ethics as a field of study. All persons have moral 
intuition and cognition for moral knowledge, but only ethicists require ethics "by which, 
obviously, no human being becomes 'good'"
154
. Actually being ‘good’ is a matter of one’s love, 
one’s value insight in feeling and conation and the strength of one’s will. Philosophical ethics 
may help one in a small way, but in the same limited way that a knowledge of the science of 
sport may help make one a better rugby player. Scheler richly distinguishes differing areas of 
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ethical experience without which he argues we can have only a confused view of ethical 
knowledge and practice. On the side of values he further distinguishes various levels at which 
we must both distinguish and consider the inter-relation between our awareness of values and 
our actual moral actions: in terms of 'Ethos', 'Ethics', 'Morals', 'Practical Morality' and 'Mores 
and Customs'.
155
 I believe this richness of description to be a great strength of Scheler's ethics 
because it gives the breadth and flexibility to both include the insights of other theories within it 
and to surpass them in terms of the range of ethical experience it clarifies. 
Value preferment is the core concept of moral ordering in Scheler's ethics. I have presented it in 
simple terms here for brevity but the questions it raises are central to a proper assessment of 
Scheler's ethics. Value preferment can occur between values of different modalities (Agreeable 
Vital, Spiritual, Holy) but also occurs between all values within modalities. In concrete 
situations choice will often not be based on simple preferments between two values but between 
complexes of values instantiated in goods. There is also a second axis of importance of value in 
addition to the modalities among pure values. Among bearers Scheler argues for a clear 
hierarchy of values of Persons (which can be individual or collective) as the highest values, over 
the values of Acts, over values of Things.
156
This then raises questions as to how this interacts 
with the modalities previously identified. A further issue appears when dealing with 'quantities'.  
Value preferment is a profoundly qualitative theory of ethical decision making, but how does 
this cope with quantitative ethical questions, such as whether one should save one life or five? 
Moral dilemmas could involve all of these issues in one single piece of decision making. These 
questions are so important that I dedicate chapter five of this thesis to beginning to provide 
answers to some of them. 
 
6. Oughts 
Scheler argues that value preferment is the fundamental basis on which moral and ethical choice 
occurs. But this fact only becomes apparent in phenomenological reflection on these issues. 
This is because most people do not consciously think of ethical issues in terms of pure values or 
even value complexes, which are the objects between which preferment occurs. Rather they 
think in terms of the goods and objects of the ordinary world and in ethics often in terms of 
propositions relating to these objects, whether through commands, norms, laws or other 
formulations of statements about what one ought or ought not do. 
These moral 'oughts' or ‘ought nots’ are not merely equivalent to value statements for Scheler. 
Unlike in theories based on moral propositions like Kantianism or Ross’ intuitionism, it is value 
cognition that founds the ethical and moral ought, and only in a restricted range of cases. There 
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are numerous acts of value perception and cognition that cannot be rendered into a moral ought 
as usually considered.
157
 For example, when one states that a person is good or a landscape 
beautiful that is an ethical statement but it does not necessarily imply any duty or particular 
thing that I ought to do. He also argues that value cognition is  essentially independent of these 
normative 'oughts' because pure value cognition itself is indifferent to the question of whether 
the values intuited and cognised are done so through currently existing bearers or not.
158
 Values 
perceived and cognised through fictional examples are as clear as those intuited through real, 
immediately present bearers, but they cannot produce any immediate moral obligation. 
There is however a sense in which value cognition is intrinsically connected to 'oughts' but this 
is different to the sense of the moral normative ought of duty: the ought that says ‘I ought to do 
this’. He distinguishes between this normative ought and the ‘ideal ought’.  The normative 
ought states that 'I ought to do this' whereas the ideal ought states that 'this ought to be'.  It is a 
sense of pro-attitude, or an ought-to-care about the thing rather than a moral ought of particular 
action. In this second sense all values essentially found an ought of this type based on the 
following simple axioms: positive values ought to be, negative values ought not to be.
159
 The 
ideal ought differs from cognition of pure values because it is intrinsically concerned with the 
existence or non-existence of values. It entails that those values ought to be instantiated in 
goods but does not necessarily turn into the normative ought of an immediate moral command.  
For example, if a friend asks me to drive them to hospital because they have injured themselves 
I ought to do so. This is an immediate normative ought. When I consider the image of the new 
heaven & new earth in Revelations when God "will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will 
be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away"
160
: 
this too is given as something that ought to be but not that I ought to do now. Indeed, such an 
interpretation is meaningless because, in the Christian view, it is impossible for any human 
being by their own power alone to create this vision: it is only possible for God. Ideal oughts 
also exist in relation to the past, the present and the future, as well as to categories, like that of 
Revelations, that may be thought to exist outside time entirely.
161
  I can say that the Atlantic 
slave trade should not have existed but obviously this does not, on its own, generate any moral 
obligation upon me, though it may parallel moral obligations relating to present day situations 
of equivalent values. 
Ideal oughts can be further distinguished from normative oughts because multiple ideal oughts 
can be simultaneously true, though only one normative (all-things-considered) ought can. This 
is because ideal oughts are based on value preferments, the cognition of some currently absent 
good as higher than that currently existing. This difference in height generates the ideal ought. 
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But multiple different values can be higher in different degrees than those currently instantiated. 
Each of these generates a legitimate ideal ought compared to the present situation. I can say 
"extreme poverty ought to be eliminated" and I can say "moderate poverty ought to be 
eliminated" without any issue because they are not exclusive goals, one is just a higher goal than 
the other.  But in normative terms I am in particular circumstances with particular resources and 
hence must face one single, all-things-considered, normative ought relating to this situation i.e. 
what specific thing I ought to do to progress towards these goals.    
Kant famously argued that "You can, for you ought!", that we cannot say we ought to do 
something unless we can do it.
162
 Scheler argues that this is correct only in relation to normative 
oughts. There is an entirely legitimate sense, the ideal ought, in which we can use ‘ought’ 
regardless of our personal ability to act because all ‘ought’ is justified originally by value 
cognition.
163
 Normative oughts, on the other hand, relate to the action possibly taken by 
individual persons in relation to real goods rather than general statements about goods based on 
value preference. This depends not only on the external situation itself, but on the state of the 
will, feeling, conation and value cognition of the individual person involved for whom the 
normative ought may be occur. Different persons may have different skills and capabilities and 
awareness of the values involved and so face different normative oughts.
164
 This is not to say 
that normative oughts and ideal oughts are unrelated. They are intensely related. All normative 
oughts originate from ideal oughts, which themselves are apprehended in value cognition. All 
normative oughts are based on ideal oughts incarnated into specific circumstances. Scheler also 
says that all normative oughts are equivalent to a precise class of ideal oughts, "every duty is 
also an ideal ought-to-be of an act of the will".
165
 But normative oughts are unique in that they 
are given only to an individual in their specific circumstances and vary according to that 
difference, whereas ideal oughts hold generally because they are defined primarily by a priori 
value insight.  
Despite the fact that every value founds an ideal ought Scheler argued against any idea that the 
ought in either of its forms can be the equal or original basis of ethics: “The ought can never 
itself determine what positive values are”.166 Phenomenologically we experience perception and 
cognition of values and from these derive ideal and then normative oughts. This can be seen in 
situations like the apprehension of beauty, or the innate value of persons. These perceptions 
give us an ideal ought with regard to them but this potential derives from the original 
perception. In experiencing a work of art we immediately sense the beauty of the object and 
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from this derive that it ought to exist. We do not immediately sense that the object ought to exist 
and from this derive it must be beautiful. The logical and phenomenal priority remains with the 
perception of value. Hegel argued that any philosophy that based ethics in oughts meant that 
any good once accomplished becomes ethically indifferent because it can no longer be an 
ought.
167
 But we have clear experiences of the goodness of our successes after they have been 
achieved. God created the world "and saw that it was good",
168
 and this statement is not 
mysterious in any way. We have, hopefully, all had similar experiences that require no 
justification in reference to some related ought. 
As well as certain earlier theories such as Kantianism and Ross’ intuitionism, this Scheleran 
theory also contradicts T.M.Scanlon’s ‘Buck-Passing’ account of values. Scanlon’s theory 
eliminates substantial values by re-defining them.  In this theory “to call something valuable is 
to say that it has other properties that provide reasons for behaving in certain ways with respect 
to it.”169 Or, more simply, properties of the object directly produce 'oughts' relating to the object, 
and to say something is good is merely to say it produces these oughts. Thus, we can still use 
terms like good, but they are purely nominal and refer to no substantive features. 
The problems with this are clear from Scheler's own arguments about the origin of the 'ought', 
arguments shared almost exactly in recent debate on Scanlon’s theory by others170. The first 
problem is phenomenological.  Values are felt and experienced in many different ways and 
forms through sensation, affect and conation. They are certainly phenomenologically 
substantive, and psychologically motivating and hence cannot be defined away as mere nominal 
terms. The value component of a situation can be clear to us without the precise combination of 
physical properties that instantiate that value being clear to us at all. Or without being able to 
propositionally form any 'reason' the value gives us. Children and even animals experience 
(relatively low) values and act upon them, but in an entirely non-propositional, qualitative 
register. We can experience the value directly and have that motivate us. It is clear that 
something being heroic, noble, kind, courageous provides a reason to do it, but I doubt anyone 
could exactly explain what properties an action must have to give me reason to do it that 
matches those values, certainly not without just mentioning some other values.  
The sheer diversity of values also means we need to understand the nuances of the values and of 
the relations between values to understand ethics, even, as Scheler says, when abstracted 
entirely from the goods they appear in. We can consider values separately to any particular 
object through which they are experienced, as was demonstrated as far back as Plato’s 
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magnificent portrayal of sight of ‘The Good’ alone in the Symposium.171 And although all values 
tautologically give us reasons to value them, this can be sensed in the abstract value itself i.e. it 
would be good for this value to be instantiated in whatever objects. There is no necessary 
connection between the value giving us reasons to value it and the properties of the object that 
instantiates the value, although as a matter of fact all consciousness of values will originate in 
certain 'objects' before they can be abstracted. But these objects are not necessarily even things, 
they can be acts, or emotions or relations, or any of a large number of other possible states.
172
       
It is easily possible, however, to see the motivation behind this kind of theory. A Scheleran 
could agree with Scanlon's that something is good if it has properties that provide reasons to act 
positively towards it. Yes, that is the case, as long as one understands that those properties are 
the values instantiated by the object, not mere physical properties on their own which we could 
never recognise without the prior experience of the value. Scheler's theory is a more complete 
theory of our experience of values, it implies Scanlon's description of values, and goes beyond it 
by rejecting its reductionism, in the same way it can account for the features emotivism 
describes in ethics but goes far beyond it. The Scheleran also of course accepts that there is a 
rational connection between something's properties and whether it is good or not. Values are not 
arbitrary or subjective and hence do have specific logical connections to certain properties.  For 
example, the fact a person is considered physically beautiful can be based on certain facts about 
our biology as a species and the relation of certain physical facts to fitness to reproduction, etc.  
But it is not from knowledge of those facts that someone is valued as beautiful, rather we go 
from the immediate knowledge of what beauty is and what it means to us and from that 
investigate the, often extremely diverse, physical properties that accompany this reality. 
There is an intermediate layer of ethical statements that occupy the middle ground between the 
normative and ideal oughts in Scheler's theory. This is the layer of norms, commands, maxims, 
laws and other guiding social ethical principles. These general ethical propositions are also the 
main content of certain ethical theories, such as the self-evident duties that underlie analytic 
intuitionist theories such as W.D.Ross
173
 or the Categorical Imperatives produced by a theory 
such as Kant's
174
.  These principles are not exactly ideal oughts because they do not relate 
directly to values and what should be regardless of present existence. Nor are they normative 
oughts because they are not individual instances of duty. They are rather general principles that 
operate as social normative oughts in order to require particular ethical behaviour. They are 
                                                     
171
 Plato. Symposium. Translated by C.J. Rowe. Oxford: Aris and Phillips Classical Texts, 1998, 211-212 
172
 However, this only speaks to the phenomenological role of values in our cognition. It does not 
eliminate the possibility that our experience of values, and reliance on that experience, is just a cover for 
the kind of fundamental metaphysical reality about values that Scanlon suggests. Unfortunately, this sort 
of metaphysical question just cannot be determined at the phenomenal level at this stage.    
173
Ross, W.D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930. 
174
Kant, Immanuel. 1997 [1788]. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: 
Cambridge   University Press. 
69 
 
useful in as far as they reflect accurate perception and cognition of values, but they are 
secondary to the direct perception and cognition of values and it is always possible that they 
will be overturned by greater insight into values. This is because they are both too specific, not 
being clearly related to value insights as ideal oughts are, and not specific enough, in not 
relating to the specific goods and circumstances that normative oughts relate to. They occupy a 
vague middle ground between these two determiners of moral oughts.  
Not only can existing norms be replaced by norms derived from more profound value insight, 
they can be circumvented entirely in ordinary ethical conduct. Scheler argues that commands, 
for example, only have force in order to counter some contrary conation within us. We only 
need to be told not to steal if we have an urge to take that which is not ours in the first place. If 
we have a value insight and conation in the same direction as that insight that convicts us to the 
extent we have no contrary urge, we have no need of the command. Because of the material 
nature of our experiences of values our inclination can follow the insight of value perception 
(contrary to Kant), of which conations are one form, and in this case obliterates all need for 
norms or commands or normative oughts in general.
175
 In terms of ethical knowledge and action 
all such norms, commandments or maxims are thus profoundly secondary to personal and social 
value awareness, as socially and heuristically useful though they may be as guides either to 
specific actions or to developing personal virtue.             
As we move from value cognition to ideal oughts to normative oughts we move into more 
concrete and familiar territory. Why then have such a complicated system, why not eliminate 
one or more of these categories? The answer is that they are both usefully and 
phenomenologically distinct. For example, each refers to very different objects: value cognition 
to pure values, ideal oughts to complexes of goods, and normative oughts to individual acts. 
They allow us to conceptualise the different stages of ethical experience and reasoning 
separately and thus construct a more complete ethical theory without losing the detail of each 
section as required. Collapsing these and other important distinctions can only lead to paradox 
as crucial distinctions are blurred. Particularly, ethical theories often conflate the distinction 
between ideal and normative oughts entirely. This leads to confusions, primarily involving 
moving too simply directly from general ideal oughts to assuming specific normative demands. 
Means are thus sacrificed to ends without taking sufficient care of how multiple different value-
facts, and hence multiple ideal oughts, may determine the specific normative oughts for specific 
persons. In the 20
th
 century great suffering was caused by those who sought to directly create 
paradises on earth, whether political and secular or religious, on the basis of ethical visions that 
may have been positive, but which were not directly achievable (if at all), and which caused 
great harm and injustice in their pursuit. 
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7. Persons 
In this penultimate section of my overview of Max Scheler's ethics I look at his doctrines of the 
‘person’.  Scheler placed great importance on the idea of ‘persons’, what defines a ‘person’ and 
the unique role of individual ‘persons’ within ethics. His main work Formalism in Ethics and 
Non-formal Ethics of Values is subtitled 'A New Attempt towards the Foundation of an Ethical 
Personalism' and a large section of the book is given over entirely to a phenomenological 
analysis of what defines 'personhood' compared to other philosophical definitions.
176
 Scheler's 
ethics is objective but still contains a unique and active role for individual persons in a number 
of important ways. I extend this important analysis further through a dialogue with Emmanuel 
Levinas in chapter six.   
Scheler argues that someone cannot be defined as a 'person' either by possessing a soul, or an 
ego, or a rational mind, or by belonging to the human species. Rather the personhood of 
someone is based on them being the subject, the author, of intentional acts that are 
understandable as chosen by that person.
177
 Not all humans are necessarily persons, and not all 
persons are necessarily human. The acts of non-persons are causally explainable but not 
understandable as acts informed by both theoretical and practical cognition i.e. ethical insight 
and judgement. A ‘person’ acts because they have weighed up the options and made a choice 
(though one doubtlessly based on sub-conscious acts of preferment), the ‘lunatic’ or an animal 
acts because his madness or his instincts mechanically compel him.  
Scheler chooses this definition to emphasise that personhood, as opposed to the ‘self’ or the 
soul, is based on being a creative and responsible moral agent, and it is this that connects to the 
highest values. The personhood of someone is sharply distinguished from their soul or ego or 
lived body because all those elements of an individual can be thematised as objects but their 
nature as a person can never be fully known as an object. The person is the "concrete unity of all 
possible acts",
178
 "the immediately co-experienced unity of experiencing";
179
 the subject 
understood as responsible for those acts and hence can never be an object in the sense of being a 
thing because he "exists solely in the pursuance of his acts".
180
 Whereas all objects, and 
especially all things, can in principle be fully known even if not in practice, the person has "a 
sphere of absolute personal privacy, which can never be given to us".
181
 This does not mean the 
intuition of the person is given as (negatively) lacking some element, rather it means that the 
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person is given positively as having a part of himself that is fundamentally and absolutely 
inaccessible to any outside intentional act, as fortressed from any possible epistemic invasion.  
The individual person can be considered from two perspectives based on the manner in which 
he is known. Those elements of a person that are defined and co-experienced through his 
relationships with other persons are his 'social person'. This includes all elements defined by his 
culture, his profession, his nationality, religion, class and every means by which he is known or 
defined by public features. But he also has an 'intimate person'. This is his "peculiar self-being" 
(and self value) "which towers above this whole and in which he knows himself alone",
182
 the 
unique perspective we all have on ourselves. Within this level there is also a distinction to be 
made. Each individual person has an absolutely intimate core that is knowable only to himself 
in solitude but also has relatively intimate levels. These levels become revealed only through 
love. The social means of relationship reveal the other by some, in principle, public features in 
terms of attributes and qualities. In love the person is revealed unitarily as a person by “joining 
in the performance of his acts” of love; "we must love what he loves and love it with him".183 
Only thus do we penetrate to part of the intimate personality of the person. This understanding 
transcends our purely external knowledge of the person because it is driven by direct intuition of 
them as person, not as object. For example, the only one who understands the person Jesus is his 
disciple. However many facts someone knows about the ‘historical’ Jesus one who does not 
enter into his acts of love cannot know him as a person and the same applies to all persons. But 
yet through Love the person is clearly and intimately revealed (as far as ultimately possible) 
despite any or all differences of culture, place or time.
184
 But there is still a limit as to how far 
this perception can penetrate. There is always still an absolutely intimate core to a person that is 
positively beyond all knowing except to them. Each individual stands together with other 
persons both publicly as a social person and privately with some others as a relatively intimate 
person, but is known and valued (or disvalued) in absolute solitude beyond that in a manner 
they can never entirely share. 
The person cannot be understood as a thing, but it is also not known purely empirically or a 
posteriori at all. Scheler argues that essence as such transcends the concepts of universals or 
particulars and founds both of these types of entities. It is only when the essence is referred as 
the essence of something that it becomes definitely either particular or universal. There is in fact 
a unique value-essence of each individual person that defines them uniquely as themselves. This 
is a value-essence "whose objective essence and value-content contain a reference to an 
individual person"
185
 and defines the good that he is and the good he is capable of fulfilling. The 
ideal ought that is based in the insight of the good of that person is thus only precisely for that 
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person and is experienced as their "calling" or vocation and the complete possible fullness of 
this value essence is revealed only through "the full understanding of the person based on 
love".
186
 This love can either be self-love or the love of another person who sees in me, and thus 
reveals to me, a potential value that I could not see in myself. Thus there is a unique place 
within the moral universe, a unique 'call' of "actions, deeds, and works" for each individual 
person based on their unique value essence in addition to general goods and responsibilities.
187
 
This value essence is the good-in-itself-for-me in broad ethical terms and we can either fulfil 
this essence by carrying out the oughts derived from it or not. But our current moral status, 
whether we are a good or evil person, is not defined by this. This too is experienced as an 
essence of a person: their 'moral tenor'. The moral tenor can be thought of as our basic moral 
disposition but it is not an average of our acts but rather an essence of our person that can be 
given in intuition. The difference is that our moral tenor is given as enduring and constant 
despite any individual act or intention we have in a particular instance. We may know someone 
to be a good person and thus seek the reason for an apparently evil act they commit. Scheler 
distinguishes the moral tenor in particular from 'character', which he takes to be an empirically 
developed picture of a person, rather than an intuitively given essence of their nature. Moral 
Tenor is revealed to us by a person's moral actions, feelings, gestures or other features but it can 
be revealed entirely through one single instance that shows them as either good or bad. The 
moral tenor is not fixed permanently, it can change over time through a process of profound 
moral conversion or development, but it is not transitory and does not change necessarily 
through any one act.
188
 
The moral tenor is important because it is the level, tied to us as persons, between our ordering 
of value preferment and our intentions and actions. It is defined by our value insight and 
preferment and then in turn constrains what intentions, purposes and deeds are possible for one 
to experience: it delineates a "material a priori field for the formation of [our] possible 
intentions"
189
 limited by the value insight that underlies the moral tenor. But it is not just a 
shorthand for our value insight, it is an essence given directly in intuition as fundamentally part 
of someone when considered as a person. It has its own values as well, and these moral values 
permeate our intentions up until they are instantiated in their own fulfilled act-values, and hence 
the moral tenor is visible in our intuition of those intentions, feelings, gestures, etc. 
For Scheler the person is the centre of all the most ethical values and acts. As discussed 
previously Good and Evil are values that can only be properly attached to the being of persons, 
because they alone can prefer among values. Persons alone have the higher capacity to reveal 
infinite further realms of value through love, the highest, most intentional ethical act. The 
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highest levels of value modality are also connected essentially to persons. Scheler states that 
holiness is always "directed towards persons [...] no matter what content [...] of personhood is 
implied".  Holiness is "by essential necessity, a 'value of the person'".
190
 By this he means that 
unlike lower values holiness always refers back to some person, however obliquely. A holy 
book such as the Qur'an or Guru Granth Sahib is only holy in so far as it refers back to God, the 
Person of Persons.  Scheler also connects the next level of values, that of the mental or the 
spirit, with the self and mind. Whereas the ‘agreeable’ applies only to things, the ‘vital’ to living 
beings, these higher moral values also are visible solely to persons and refer back to them, albeit 
possibly obliquely. 
191
 This is in addition to the unique individual personal value essence 
discussed just before. 
Persons are not just important in general because the highest values are essentially attached to 
persons but each person is important because of the role they may have in revealing values. 
Each individual person has a unique value essence and a unique complex of oughts or 'call' 
related to it, not only across their whole life but in each particular moment and opportunity. 
Each person has historically unique nuances of values given for them in each particular time and 
place that pass away in that historical-moral moment if not grasped, ‘preferred’ and acted 
upon.
192
 This drives Scheler's value-personalism, the doctrine that the value of any society is 
primarily defined by the extent to which it offers space for individuals to realise their highest 
possible values, and which is opposed to value-collectivism, where the value of the individual is 
primarily measured by their contribution to a community, however defined. No general 
community or group can possibly replace the unique role of individual persons in realising 
values, among various reasons because the community lacks the faculties of affective and 
conative value insight, and the fundamental privacy and uniqueness of the individual person.
193
 
This point can be further illuminated through two examples. Not only can unique individual 
values be given to one person at a particular historical moment, but universal values can also be 
given first to one person at a historical moment. Through particular acts of love a certain special 
person can perceive values hitherto unglimpsed in value insight by any person and thus enlarge 
the moral horizon of all humanity.
194
 On a more mundane level, Scheler opposed the idea of 
eugenics, the application of science to breed a 'better' human, which was popular in his time, 
because he argued no scientific process or method of determination could replace the role of 
sexual love as the highest insight into vital values in the selection of partners.
195
 To think 
otherwise was to ignore the essential nature of values and of persons in preference for an 
entirely value-less empirical process. Again, the role of individual value-insight is fundamental. 
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What follows from the unique value-nature of individuals is the existence of unique ideal and 
normative oughts for individual persons. Kant was entirely wrong not only to argue that 
universality must be the fundamental feature of morality, but also to argue that it must be a 
fundamental feature of morality. There are unique moral oughts that apply only to single 
individuals that are still objective because they are still based in insight of objective value 
essences.
196
 There are two senses in which oughts may differ between persons that must be 
distinguished. Firstly, persons may be capable of experiencing different oughts because they 
currently have different levels of value insight, and hence experience different ideal and 
normative oughts. For a person cannot experience a duty relating to a value he has no insight of. 
Secondly, even assuming full value insight different persons should experience difference 
oughts based on the unique nature of their personal value essence and all the details of their 
capabilities. These mean there are unique bits of good for each person to do and unique nuances 
of value for them to reveal while still being truly and objectively ethical. 
While all the highest values a person can realise are values of the person, and particularly those 
revealed in his own value essence, this does not mean that the person's own value should be his 
intentional object, in fact, precisely the opposite. It is in being directed beyond himself at others, 
and those goods and values external to himself, that a person enhances the values that define 
him. The personhood of someone cannot be understood as an object because it only exists in his 
creative ownership of his actions. This means attempts by the person to take as his object his 
own sense that he is good or evil must fail, Scheler argues, and lead only to misplaced personal 
pride or selfishness, which he labels as ‘Pharisaism’.197  A person should of course hope and 
aim to improve himself, to be better, but he cannot do so by doing things because they will 
make him good. He can and must judge what things are good and do them.  His attention must 
be outside his own person. Great saints (religious or secular) are characterised by giving no 
thought to their own goodness and position but great thought to what must be done, and hence 
they achieve goodness. 
One of the reasons for this is that those values that are highest are least open to immediate 
influence by the will. This becomes harder as one moves from low levels of values to the 
higher. Values of the useful and agreeable, where values such as ‘comfort’ are simple and 
concrete, can be achieved by simple acts of the will. Vital values are, so to speak, dispersed over 
our whole physical and psychic being and are hence less improvable by acts of will. Among the 
spiritual values this is extremely difficult, and among the Holy it is entirely impossible. One can 
never act to make oneself more holy (or have my own holiness as the object my will), one can 
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only act to embrace God and others because that is the right thing to do and so become more 
holy. And values of persons, as the highest values, share in this difficulty.
198
 
Individual moral action and cognition must be considered separately in order to understand how 
individual freedom interacts with our relation to objective values. Kant only recognised one 
type of autonomy or heteronomy, that of the will. Scheler argues that the difference between 
moral cognition and moral comportment allows the distinction to be made between autonomy of 
cognition and autonomy of the will. Heteronomy in the first case corresponds to action without 
moral insight, mere blind whim; in the second case it corresponds to our acting according to 
someone else's will. It is the autonomy of insight that is morally relevant not that of the will. We 
can act of our own free choice but unless this is guided by prior value insight it is just capricious 
whim.  We can act according to the will of another person, but if we do that because we 
intuitively recognise the ethical value and authority of the source of that command then we act 
with autonomous cognition, and rightly, though with heteronomy of will.
199
 However, if one 
does follow some command or suggestion of a good deed without any insight what is lost is the 
moral relevance to that person. The act itself is still good or evil but its nature cannot be 
attributed to that person as autonomous. This means, in a moral community of agents, guilt and 
merit cannot be entirely individualised but are shared, to a degree, by all.  As I influence and am 
influenced by the community around me I am actively co-responsible for all the acts that occur 
within it. The community as a whole has a collective guilt or merit that cannot be reduced to the 
sum of that of its individual members. We have real moral solidarity with those around us that 
we must always take into account, in addition to our unique ethical call.
200
 
The individuality of the ethical call places an especial importance on individual ethical insight 
as the source of moral knowledge and action. It follows that ethics as a philosophical discipline 
can never give a complete guide to action. Individual wisdom and moral insight in values will 
always trump systematic and structural description in the relevant places. "Ethics can never 
replace individual conscience, nor should it."
201
 Ethics rather has a separate descriptive task of 
understanding values and their essential interrelations, their rankings and the general 
conclusions that come from this, while always being aware of the limits of that theorising. This 
is partially because just telling someone what is good or evil cannot alone make them good. 
They must also see it for themselves. 
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8. The Relation to Kant’s Ethics.  
At various points in this chapter I referred to crucial differences between Scheler’s ethics and 
Kant’s, which Scheler used as a basis for his own ethics, even if only to establish a contrast.  
This, hence, seems a good place to sum up the differences Scheler saw between them that 
motivated his ethics, before moving on to the final summary of this chapter. 
The first question to address is that of the accuracy of Scheler’s reading of Kant. Scheler is 
concerned with the overall spirit of Kant’s theory much more than specific textual details. As 
such, to a limited degree, his target is his own interpretation of the core implications and 
commitments of Kant’s theory rather than the full detail of Kant’s theory. It could be argued 
that Scheler’s reading is not precisely accurate, or unsurpassably charitable. To a limited degree 
this does not matter, if Scheler and Kant agreed more than Scheler thought then that is good, 
and ‘Scheler’s Kant’ still exists as a hypothetical position that contrasts with the positions 
Scheler is positively advocating. However, I think Scheler’s critique of Kant is largely accurate 
to the overall sense and implication of Kant’s theory, as far as is generally possible in any work 
as concerned as the Formalismus is with presenting its own broad theory and considering a wide 
range of influences and alternatives, rather than close textual analysis of another work.
202
  
Scheler did not consider his work to be "anti-Kantian” but to "go beyond Kant"203. Kant was the 
foundation on which Scheler built, though admittedly by rejecting wholesale Kant's final 
conclusions. Scheler agrees with much of what Kant says in the Critique of Practical Reason 
but feels that his arguments step from peak to peak missing the true nature of the terrain in 
between where the substantive content of objective ethics can be clearly found. Particularly, he 
agrees with much of Kant’s arguments against previous ethical theories while believing Kant 
missed the clear positive space possible for a priori ethics and thus produced a foreshoretened 
theory of what is possible in ethics. Foremost, Scheler accepted Kant's demonstration that ethics 
could not be built on pursuing empirical goods and purposes but believed he was totally wrong 
to deduce general formalism in ethics from this. 
Kant was concerned that any ethics of goods or purposes could only be based on the desire of 
the agent for pleasure, and driven by no other source, and hence be a matter of contingent self-
interest and in no way a ‘Law’. This stemmed from his pure psychology that divided reason 
strictly into the pure and empirical, where the empirical in practical thinking was related to 
material objects that could affect our sensual feeling of pleasure (admittedly of different forms) 
alone. For Kant, pure practical reason must then mean reason judging without any material 
content at all i.e. formally. And the form of a ‘Law’ for Kant is that it applies universally, and so 
universalisability must be the complete principle of the practical law. This fits in with his 
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general view of the a priori as the formal structure of experience that pervades his conclusion in 
each of the three Critiques: whether relating to pure reason, practical reason or judgements of 
beauty.
 204
  
But Scheler argued this created a false dichotomy based on the limitations of his theory of 
feeling and of reason. Scheler argues that a priori material values exist and are encountered 
neither in purely empirical desires, or pleasure, nor in pure, which always for Kant means 
formal, reason. They lie on a different axis outside this division entirely. Kant had no thought 
that the a priori conditions of experience could be present in a priori but material essences 
encountered in intuition and clarified through theoretical and practical phenomenology (with, 
perhaps, the exception of his view of pure intuition in the first Critique). Scheler argued that 
Reason is always embodied and the lawfulness of theoretical and practical truth is present in the 
experience not just in the action of a pure mind. These values are experienced separately from 
mere goods and contingent empirical purposes driven by pleasure and the mere form of correct 
judgement.  The formulation Kant demands of the accurate use of reason in the first critique as 
necessarily involving both concepts and intuition holds equally for practical reason.
205
 Indeed, 
ironically, his ethics of practical reason arguably betrays in its conclusions a pietistic, protestant 
spirit both in its original form and in the mutated one in which it became the basis of the 
austere, individualist enlightenment ethos. Scheler's ethic is comparatively broad and baroque in 
its structures and catholic in its resemblance and inspiration.  
Scheler was more right about the good though, which Kant almost entirely deletes as an a priori 
body of ethical experience and knowledge. The conclusions of Kant's practical philosophy have 
always been the hardest part of his ethics to follow, even among people who must appreciate the 
beauty and rigour of his argument, e.g. the lie to a murderer. But these conclusions follow 
entirely logically from the mistakes in defining his space of possible options, itself taken, as 
Scheler correctly says, from the traditional philosophical distinction between sensibility and 
reason. Once this has been ejected there is not sufficiently good reason to eject the truth we all 
know: that the Good is clear and visible to us in more than a perfect will, but in actions, 
emotions, and insights, among many other moments, such as of hope, love, courage, kindness, 
etc. Even just considering the ‘will’, Kant starts from arguing that the only true good thing can 
be a good will
206
, and combines this with his argument that the practical reason’s ‘Law’ can 
only be a formal principle. This forms his conclusion that the only good is defined by a will 
following a law because it has the form of law.
207
 Now, most people would accept that a good 
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will is important, but I argue it makes more sense to interpret this as a will that is driven by 
awareness of what is good i.e. true insight into a priori material values.  
Scheler also criticised all theories that made ‘Oughts’ the main basis of ethics, and specifically 
'Assessment' theories (held by men such as Herbart and Brentano).
 208
 These theories claim that 
what makes a correct moral judgement is not that we judge in conformity with the moral facts of 
the matter. Rather, that we judge with the correct form a situation that in itself has no intrinsic 
value, and thus by the fact it conforms to a certain form of judgement we know it contains a 
moral obligation. Although Scheler used a different term this largely coincides with the modern 
school of constructivism derived from Kant: Christine Korsgaard defined constructivism as the 
idea "there are answers to moral questions because there are correct procedures for arriving at 
them".
209
 While it is true for ethical judgements to be correct they must follow a correct 
methodology, this is true of all judgement, but is always insufficient to dictate the result, 
whether by universalisability or by other criteria. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition. 
The correct logical method must be followed, but logic is a methodology, a 'garbage in, garbage 
out' system, and without the correct input of ethical facts cannot produce any useful results.  
It is also incorrect to state that universal ethical insight requires any judgement at all, certainly 
not in terms of a universal rule determined by reason alone.
210
 There are moments of evidentiary 
ethical insight where even previously entirely unseen values flash out, which rely on no 
judgement at all, and can correctly and accurately motivate moral acts and justify moral 
knowledge without any hint of a rational law or correct form of judgement. Nor, as Scheler said, 
could such a system explain the sheer range of connected ethical and moral values, instantiated 
as they are in myriad different ways that cannot be restricted to the form of judgements or 
imperatives e.g. persons, emotions, dispositions, etc. Any constructivism must presume the 
values that are the necessary material on which such judgements must be made. The correct 
form of judgement or law-making has a role, but one that requires it to be applied to correctly 
identified values, which can themselves arguably be known  a priori. Indeed, the motivation for 
constructivist theories often seems to be to retain a realist, cognitive approach to ethics without 
having to commit to uniquely practical facts. This approach is unnecessary, however, because 
value-facts, from the agreeable to the spiritual, are a clear and well-attested element of our 
experience, regardless of what ultimate metaphysical reality they may possess.         
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9. Summary 
That brings this overview of Max Scheler's ethical philosophy to an end.  Before I move on I am 
going to briefly summarise what I see to be its main points. Then in the next chapter I look in 
further detail at Scheler’s ethical epistemology, with reference to current discussion of affective 
intuitionism, and demonstrating a framework of ethical knowledge. In the two chapters after 
that I look at some of the main normative issues raised in Scheler’s theory of values and ethical 
choice, particularly in chapter six his idea of ‘Persons’. For brevity's sake I have restricted 
myself in this chapter to what I believe are the fundamental features of Scheler's ethics, ignoring 
particularly his extensive non-ethical analysis of the phenomenological concept of the Person in 
the Formalismus. 
The most well known and important part of Scheler's philosophy is its focus on values: for 
Scheler material values essences are the basic facts of all our practical reason in the same way 
that physical facts are the basis of all our theoretical reason. Values ultimately inform all our 
ethical thinking. They are not in any way mysterious entities. For Scheler they are a 
fundamental part of all practical reason, even that of animals, and he considers them to be a near 
constant part of all our experiences and accessed in ways that are intensely familiar: through 
object directed feeling and conation. It is only the attempt to clarify them phenomenologically 
as pure values, abstracted from the goods in which they are instantiated, that they become 
something that may seem unfamiliar. But Scheler's theory places moral and ethical thinking 
fluidly within the entirety of human practical experience and motivation. Scheler is aware that 
his theory is radical but he argues that actually ethical thinking has always taken place in terms 
of values. This fact has just never before been presented clearly due to, what he calls, historical 
philosophical prejudice against the idea of an emotional a priori, and the lack of the 
phenomenological method, the vital means to clear away the fog of confusion that has 
surrounded philosophical ethics. 
Scheler's philosophy is generous in the detail and richness with which it paints human ethical 
life, particularly in the sheer quantity of essences and essential relations it describes. This stands 
in stark contrast with many historical ethical philosophies that have attempted to reduce ethical 
life to as few principles or mechanisms as possible. For Scheler these efforts substantially miss 
the point.  Human ethical life is richly complex and interconnected and so attempts to render it 
in any one simple term will inevitably be not just simple but simplistic. Scheler believes that all 
such over-simplified theories will inevitably end in paradoxes they cannot explain when they 
come up against actual human ethical experience, such as utilitarianism suggesting the murder 
of innocents if sufficient pleasure should be derived from it, or Kant demanding one tells the 
truth to murderers. There is always the risk that any complex ethical theory will merely end up 
losing clarity and philosophical rigour through its complexity. But Scheler's philosophy is not 
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just arbitrarily complicated but intensely detailed in each of its analyses, a mark of his 
phenomenological background, and this helps maintain the rigour of his theory at both the broad 
level and that of individual features. 
Scheler supports this richness of description with his focus on the importance of direct ethical 
insight. He argues that a priori ethical intuition is as significant a part of human experience as 
theoretical perception. Ethical knowledge is not based in judgement or acts of the will but in 
direct ethical perception and cognition that exists prior to any ethical action, to the extent of 
shaping our possible experience of obligation. This opens the possibility of accurate ethical 
knowledge being a part of everyday ethical life while separating this individual normative 
ethical knowledge qualitatively from that which forms the content of philosophical ethics and 
from that of social moral norms and rules. It allows him to explain a wide range of value 
statements within the same ethical framework, while separating out their distinct features in 
detailed phenomenological analysis: such as that between ideal and normative oughts, between 
the personal value essence and the moral tenor, among many other examples.  
This focus on insight leads to Scheler's emphasis on the individuality of ethical obligation and 
the central role of persons in ethics.  For Scheler this is both itself a matter of direct ethical 
intuition and a natural corollary of the richness and complexity that he finds in the entirety of 
human ethical experience. Just as different elements of ethical cognition and motivation bear 
qualitative differences, so do different levels of pure values, and so do different individual 
ethical calls. The qualitative uniqueness of the ethical call goes hand-in-hand with the 
uniqueness and importance of persons within his ethical framework. The highest levels of 
values are accessible only to individual persons and because insight is a function of individual 
persons they always have the potential to override the ethical knowledge of their society with 
deeper ethical knowledge. 
Finally, Scheler combines a belief in the diversity and individuality of ethics with a constant 
commitment to the objectivity of individual ethical insight and philosophical ethical knowledge. 
He argues that "material a priorism" can give both the rigorous knowledge offered by rationalist 
ethical philosophies and the connection to the complicated nature of emotional life offered by 
empiricist or sentimentalist theories. His unique ethical epistemology combines the objectivity 
of values but the relative subjectivity or goods and norms. The very pluralism and diversity of 
his analyses would seem to suggest a subjective ethics but the detail he displays counters this 
interpretation, as he attempts to ground that pluralism in the objective phenomenology of actual 
ethical experience. The epistemological claim that underlies this objectivity is that Scheler alone 
has isolated the true ethical facts of experience in material values essences that alone can ground 
a truly, accurately, objective and complete theory of human ethical experience in all its rich 
complexity.   
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Chapter 4 – Epistemology (and Ontology) 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the major attractions of Scheler's ethical theory is that it offers a new approach to the 
problem of ethical knowledge.  Such a theory raises questions about the nuts and bolts of the 
epistemology, questions that Scheler does not give a great deal of time to. This is partially 
because most of the Formalismus discusses the way his theory relates to ethical alternatives, not 
epistemological ones, and partially because they involve meta-ethical questions that were not 
considered important in Scheler’s time. In this chapter I go into more detail about these 
epistemological issues to boost the argument that a Scheleran intuitionism provides the elements 
necessary for ethical knowledge better than other major theories.  In particular I talk specifically  
about the nature of ‘values’, feeling’s role in cognition, the conceptualisability and schematism 
of ethical intuition of values, and fallibilism and infallibilism in an ethical intuitionism.  Finally 
I summarise the argument that this theory better provides the elements necessary for ethical 
knowledge and the arguments, already hinted at, for the objectivity of this knowledge. I finish 
with a note on the ontological issues raised by Scheler’s theory.  I argue that this theory answers 
the charge of epistemological queerness, discussed in chapter two, raised against objective 
ethics in general. It does this by explaining how ethical knowledge draws on uncontroversial 
rational and sentimental sources, and by placing it organically within our affective, conative, 
practical rational faculties. 
A theory of objective ethical knowledge requires a number of elements. It must identify 
independent material ethical facts, it must demonstrate how persons reliably access these facts, 
this must then be expressible in particular judgements and decisions, and finally it must be 
socially dispersible as knowledge. I believe that the failure of many alternative ethical theories 
can be substantially traced to their failure to meet these requirements. Some theories such as 
Kantianism, non-cognitivism or error theory deny there are any independent ethical facts 
relevant to ethical knowledge to be grasped, others such as ethical naturalism and Moorean 
intuitionism incorrectly describe the nature of these facts and, from that, how we gain access to 
them. I argue that Scheleran affective intuitionism comes closer than any of these theories to 
correctly describing these elements of ethical knowledge.  
Most traditional ethical theories can be divided into two types. Rationalist theories state we use 
empirical or abstract reason to derive ethical propositions that are hence justified as knowledge 
but are divorced from our emotional motivations
211
. And sentimentalist theories state that ethics 
is based on acts of feeling or emotional attachment, which hence cannot be counted as 
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knowledge, but are obviously psychologically motivating
212
. Scheler rejects these two options as 
a fundamentally false dichotomy. Ethics can be both based on affective states and constitute 
rational knowledge. This is because objective ordering and lawfulness is not only present in 
theoretical reason but is also present in acts of "intuition, feeling, striving, loving and hating" 
and hence these can be made both "exact and evident" to produce genuine "moral decisions and 
laws"
213
. Philosophers have often neglected this possibility because they have been committed 
to the ancient and early modern dualism between reason and sensibility, between thought and 
matter, and between spirit and flesh where, roughly, the first term is privileged over the second. 
However, this simplistic view of human faculties and psychology is refuted by an even-handed 
examination, and particularly a phenomenological examination of those faculties. Scheler 
describes this with a phrase borrowed from Pascal: the 'Ordre du Coeur', the order of the heart, 
or in more concrete term, the objective a priori ordering and interconnections among the values 
perceived through intentional feeling and conation, as described in the previous chapter. 
Scheler’s theory was set out in his 1913-1916 Formalismus and was unique at that time and for 
decades after.  However, in the last twenty years a group of philosophers have emerged 
advocating an affective intuitionism in ethics that mirrors many elements of Scheler’s theory214. 
However, the virtue of Scheler’s work, as well as preceding most of this literature by several 
decades, is that it is more comprehensive than these more recent efforts: not only giving a 
detailed analysis of how value intuition occurs and relates to feeling, but also discussing the 
different types of values and their interrelations, the way values relates to persons, and how 
affective intuitionism relates to a range of other major ethical schools.  Although it can cause 
confusion, Scheler’s strength lies in its breadth, in the range of results he produces in concrete 
ethics, and in the range of his influences.  Scheler draws not only on the philosophical history of 
Europe, but also its religious history including men such as Martin Luther and St Francis of 
Assisi, and on figures as wide-ranging as Buddha, Freud, Muhammad, Goethe, Lao Tzu, and 
Darwin.
215
 The result is a broader view of ethics that better encompasses the real human 
experience of value in love, religion, aesthetics and literature, and is the more convincing 
because of it. I suggest that not only is Scheler’s ethics the most impressive and convincing 
affective intuitionism available, but also is better than the other intuitionist theories I discussed 
in chapter two because it offers a more complete and productive explanation of ethical 
knowledge, as is presented in this chapter. 
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2. Values 
A comprehensive ethical theory of rational-affective intuitionism alone would be enough to 
constitute a bold philosophical manifesto, but it is not the crucial element of the theory. Even 
given the above it is not feelings, even intentional feelings, that Scheler identifies as the 
elements of ethical knowledge. Even though our affective life is not the blind, order-less mess 
that it is often portrayed as, it is still intrinsically subject-related and hence unsuitable to be the 
basis of ethical judgements and knowledge. It is not the intentional feeling but rather the 
intended objects of our affective life, the practical values of the agreeable, the vital, the mental 
and the holy, that form, ultimately, the content of ethical knowledge
216
. The 'facts' that ground 
that knowledge are always, at their basis, facts about values and their interconnections, and 
these, as the objects of, but not identical to, our intentional feeling and conation are separate 
from any individual’s experiences and, hence, objective in the most literal sense as well as the 
more usual definition.  
These values are identified by our feelings but their material content and identifiable features 
are a complex mixture of affective, conative and rational content. In defining a value, for 
example, ‘justice’ or ‘health’, there is both a 'feeling' content that defines the sense of the value 
itself, and rational properties of the value that can be expressed in theoretical propositions. In 
other words, justice and health both are correlated with recognisable phenomenological feelings 
in which they become intuitively accessible; we know what being healthy feels like, and we 
know what justice feels like, and it is from this basic affective content that we try to grasp these 
contents in propositional terms. But, these values are still expressible in rational concepts. One 
can say that justice is balanced and proportionate, giving each one his due, or, people are 
healthy when their body is properly functioning, and agree or disagree on the appropriateness of 
these descriptions. They have a dual rational-affective nature that both has an immediately 
understandable practical hold over us and a body of ordered interconnections between them that 
forms the basis of rational ethical knowledge. Indeed, I argue that these are necessary features 
for any accurate theory of morality and ethical epistemology. Ethical notions are neither purely 
rational nor non-rationally sentimental, but combine elements of both throughout. The ordering 
among values is independent of the subjectivity of feelings about values, and the transient goods 
we recognise as valuable; both in the sense that they are not ontologically dependent on 
individual subjective feelings and valuations and in the sense that differing feeling states can 
provide access and occur as a response to the same intuited values.  The ordering of values is 
thus both affectively based and one level detached from the subjectivity of personal feeling. We 
are far more in agreement about the nature of justice and its relation to other pure values than 
whether particular laws or actions are just, i.e. instantiations of that value.     
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As argued earlier, values, for example the value defining our experience of something as 
‘nourishing’, cannot be defined in terms of physical properties, but also they are not certain 
feeling-states either, though they are represented directly through intentional feeling.  The 
feeling of hunger, or the experience of a certain satisfying taste, do not define my sense of the 
essence ‘food’; rather these are fallible subjective states whose object is that essence that is 
instantiated in all things I recognise as food. One can recognise something as nourishing as 
such, and eat, without any sense of hunger, and without appreciating the sensuous taste of the 
food. The values are the ideal meaning-contents that are the objects of intentional feeling, but 
they are not those feelings themselves, they are distinct and separate from them. The value is not 
our subjective feelings or emotions in the same way that physical objects are represented 
directly through our visual experiences of colours and shapes, but are not these subjective 
sensations. This applies to basic values of goods, like but also equally to more abstract ethical 
values such as ‘freedom’, and indeed all essences that have a primarily practical meaning. They 
are defined through, but are not equivalent to, affective states mixed with propositional content.  
Also, the content of my thought of a value is not the value itself in the same way that theoretical 
essences are the object of theoretical universal thought, not the acts of thinking themselves, nor 
our mental image of the object (if any). Consider the example of colours: my understanding of 
red is dependent on retrieving an experience of a shade of red that represents ‘Red’, but is not 
‘Red’ because Red is an ideal universal. However, I can still reason correctly about the essence 
‘Red’ that is my intentional object. The connection is very close but the distinction is vital, 
phenomenologically, and logically. It means we can separate the value as a logical meaning-
object from the feeling it is felt through and predicate and argue about it rationally in a state of 
justified knowledge stemming from the original intuition.  
Values are the proper entities referred to as the 'formal objects' of the emotions in some recent 
work on affective intuitionism by philosophers such as Teroni, Mulligan and others
217
.  What 
distinguishes Scheleran intuitionism from various recent theories of affective intuitionism is the 
degree to which it emphasises this point that our awareness of values themselves, the formal 
objects of emotion, is at the same time constituted by affective content but not identical to acts 
of subjective feeling, emotion and striving.  The result of this is that objectivity obtains among 
the ideal values and the interconnection between values, independently of the subjectivity and 
changing nature of our emotional and feeling-states, and our empirical experience of values 
through feeling. This independence of values from specific feeling-states is further 
demonstrated by the fact that I can relate to the same value through different emotions.  
Depending on what type of person I am envy and admiration can both be feeling-responses 
through which I perceive someone’s virtue. Values cannot be correctly conceived as just our 
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emotions interpreted as objects e.g. shame/shameful.  There is no one-to-one correspondence 
between emotions and values
218
, and neither does there need to be. 
On a brief side note: this results in a duality in ethics similar to that described by Moore in the 
Principia Ethica between the first principles of ethics: what is good, which is a matter of 
intuition, and the secondary principles: how do we achieve the good, which is more of an 
empirical question about means and methods.
219
 In the same way the first, a priori, question of 
the height of values and their interconnections can be separated from the second, more 
empirical, question of what goods actually do instantiate these values and to what degrees, 
though both are matters of direct value insight. However, there is a crucial difference. Moore's 
intuition of value is often accused of being arbitrary and bearing little difference to a purely 
subjective assertion of value.  Indeed, it is this that historically motivated the development of 
non-cognitivist theories in early 20th Century Britain. Scheler's theory, alternatively, does not 
merely assert the value of objects simpliciter but analyses the different qualitative forms of 
different values such as the agreeable values of taste, the vital, the beautiful and the ways these 
relate to different acts of feeling and pleasure. It also establishes criteria to analyse the height of 
the values separate from the mere assertion, and to relate it to these different levels of feeling 
and conation, and these commonly understood categories of aesthetics, thus arguing for their 
position in a manner that does not resort purely to assertion, or the sheer hope of consensus.  
Why do we have access to moral values? We have access to moral values because, more 
basically than their role in specifically moral thinking, values in general are an essential element 
of all our practical decision making. They are the objects of practical thinking through which we 
take on practical choices and projects. Scheler advocates a fundamental unity in terms of the 
process of reasoning between moral and non-moral experiences of value. Values are, in fact, 
such a ubiquitous part of our mental life that we generally do not even notice them, or confuse 
them with elements of particular emotions or general subjective feelings. Even animals and 
small children almost certainly experience values, at least the values of the agreeable and vital 
that are necessary for the maintenance and propagation of life. Conceived in this way it is also 
easy to see how specifically moral discussion and reasoning should emerge out of general 
practical reasoning as an intensification and specialisation of this wider cognitive area. The 
question about what duties we have towards people arises from the question of what we should 
do generally, not in the ethical sense but in the sense of our own self-interest and preservation. 
In the same way that our gifts of rational discrimination allow us, with training, to gain 
advanced scientific or mathematical knowledge, so the development of our affective faculty 
allows us to develop finer moral, spiritual and aesthetic discriminations that reveal more of the 
width and depth of the realm of values. This allows us to undergo ethical progress in all areas of 
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human life.  All intrinsically rely on values that are rational-affective ideal objects, but that 
cover a wide range and that have an immense range of different details in their phenomenology 
and properties 
One of the core advantages of basing ethics on an affective access to values is the fact that 
'values' as a category are sufficiently neutral, and the affective and conative faculties through 
which we access them sufficiently broadly based in our cognitive make-up, to do justice to the 
breadth and detail of our ethical experience. Alternative ethical theories inevitably limit the 
range of objects that can have ethical significance.  It is not just actions, or maxims, or acts 
under our own control, that can have ethical significance. As Scheler correctly identifies ethical 
significance applies to acts, functions, reactions, emotions, objects, propositions, collective 
social entities, individuals, relations, preferences, conations, assessments, features of character, 
pleasures, etc
220
. And many of these categories come in a range of shades like the possible 
variation of colour or music, the precise individual variations of which can be temporally and 
personally unique. But this is not some baroque philosophical extravagance, it correctly 
replicates the messiness and diversity that is apparent in actual ethical experience, rather than 
arbitrarily restricting ethical relevance to acts of will, or pleasure, or preferences, or 
propositions, or human emotions alone. The oscillations that have bedevilled ethics: between 
rationalism and sentimentalism, between means and ends, between deontology and teleology, 
can then be approached afresh in the realisation that in none of these cases does the answer lie 
entirely on one side or the other, but that there is the possibility to integrate all these elements of 
our ethical experience into a coherent theoretical structure. 
A distinct value is a particular form of the worth of something, in the multiple dimensions 
possible in our practical life. This concept can hence be usefully applied to all aspects of our 
practical life which we can identify in our attention. This means value ethics does not pre-judge 
that value is to be found everywhere, or what form it must take, but is open to it being found 
anywhere, which I believe must be the correct approach to a genuinely open ethics that does not 
seek to prejudice its conclusions. This is not just trivially so because the idea is empty either. 
Husserl's theory of essences as the ideal meaning-objects of acts of thought can be naturally 
applied to practical thought, and coheres well with Scheler's own comments about values as the 
objects of our affective and conative faculties, as I discussed in the previous chapter. 
Phenomenological theory, developed by Husserl and Scheler,
221
 also explains how values can be 
brought to givenness on their own, through the goods that bear them but not just as nominal 
abstractions from properties held by this or that selection of goods. This, importantly, frees a 
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theory of values from the dependence on transitory goods or feeling-states that Kant (and 
Scheler) recognised as destructive of an objective a priori ethics.
222
 
It is possible for us to access this information because of the interlinked complexity of affective 
and conative life and the way we express emotion in and through all these elements of our 
life.
223
 This gives us the ability to make surprisingly fine distinctions of values attaching to a 
wide range of objects.  In comparison, some critics of affective intuitionism have argued that we 
cannot perceive values because we can feel ‘contradictory’ emotions to the same events, such as 
feeling happiness and unhappiness towards a colleague who has received a promotion
224
.  But of 
course this dramatically under-estimates the complexity of feeling and of values.  Numerous 
goods will contain complexes of positive and negative values of many different sorts that can be 
separated in reflection. One may be aesthetically attracted to someone, or something (say a film 
or painting), while being repulsed by their moral character, or vice versa. Happiness and 
unhappiness themselves are too basic terms, they are, taken properly, genera whose species can 
vary independently: there is the pleasantness of an agreeable taste, the happiness of a vital sense 
of health, the joy of an appreciation of musical beauty and the bliss of a moment of religious or 
spiritual contact, and all their negative mirror-images.
225
 However, even if we narrow down to 
the individual case where we may perceive a value and its precise opposite in a situation there is 
not necessarily a problem due to the way values are defined relatively to one another. I may see 
an option as dangerous, but as less dangerous than the surrounding options and so, relatively, a 
source of safety. The lesser disvalue is preferred and hence, as Scheler described, the judgement 
is good, even though absolutely both are negative values.  When we look closely at our ethical 
experience, and consider it in terms of the precise nature and height of the values revealed, the 
sense of contradiction vanishes and it becomes clear that we are dealing with a complicated 
ordering among values that cannot be properly explained in more simplistic terms.   
There can be, though, a sort of contradiction in the ethical experience, but this just confirms, 
rather than degrades, the analogy between affective perception and ordinary sensory perception.  
That can be the contradiction between the information presented by feeling, and the person’s 
belief about the situation (or indeed, the true reality of the situation), e.g. when suspended in a 
cable car one can feel fear, while believing oneself to be perfectly safe. As Sabine Doring 
argues, this is entirely analogous to more familiar sensory perception. Our eyes present the 
world as a certain way, but we can believe or know it is another for whatever reason, whether 
some form of cognitive illusion such as the Muller-Lyer illusion, some clever piece of scenery, 
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or a ‘trick of the light’226.  In the ethical case and the physical case this decision to believe 
otherwise is never arbitrary though, but based on previous background experience and 
connected reasoning of the same type, whether ethical or physical respectively.  Our affective 
experience does not dictate beliefs but it does provide evidence for them of a uniquely ethical 
type, while we retain the ability to rationally critique and evaluate that same experience. It acts 
as a justification, not as a desire, or as some unconscious influence.  This feature is, hence, 
important to establishing affective experience as a route to ethical knowledge.  
 
3. Feeling’s Role in Cognition 
How can feeling be a source of knowledge of values, given the common traditional view of 
emotion as irrational? The common traditional negative philosophical view of emotion 
(epistemologically speaking)
227
, and the affective faculty more widely, is effectively bankrupt. 
Our 'feelings', in the widest sense, are not an irrational force attempting to prejudice us in the 
direction of pre-existing and uncontrollable personal desires, as portrayed in numerous 
historical discussions of ethics such as Kant’s. They are an essential part of our rational faculties 
that do a significant part of the processing of our relationship with external reality, especially in 
terms of our practical life: our choices, our ranking of priorities, our value-significant beliefs 
about the external world, our relationships with other people, our personal projects. They are 
certainly less flexible than our powers of thought but in compensation more deeply rooted in our 
psychology and arguably more powerful for that. Our affective motivations and judgements, 
whether those of trust, hunger, gratitude, etc, act as more stable and deep-rooted elements than 
the more transient and lightly rooted judgements of thought, but essentially do the same job. 
Persons who do not have feelings or emotions, or have substantially reduced or repressed 
emotions, are not rationally superior to ordinary human beings in terms of their practical 
decisions or theoretical beliefs. They often suffer problems ranging up to being profoundly 
crippled and unable to prioritise and function in society in various different ways.
228
 This is 
certainly not to say that our feeling or emotion is infallible or even necessarily information-
carrying, but then neither are our sensory experiences or processes of thought. 
It is worth considering how, in reality, our cognition differs from the traditional dichotomy of 
sense and reason identified by Scheler. In reality very little of cognition falls simply on one side 
or another. Looking at the elements identified by Huemer, Bedke, etc as seemings: sensory 
perception, introspection, logical judgements and decisions
229
;  we see that all these elements 
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take the form of qualitative, intuitive content that can be expressed in propositional terms but 
originally and fundamentally are qualitative contents each with a distinctive phenomenology. 
This is true of our cognitive functions as well as our affective ones. The ‘feeling’ that an 
argument seems to hold or a body of evidence seems convincing is in reality a unique type of 
feeling that we, sometimes correctly, associate with arguments and evidence.  Individual 
emotions and sympathetic recognitions of emotions in others also have the same basic structure 
and rely on a non-propositional content that can then be tied down and articulated by logical 
statements but are not such statements originally. These statements are complex schematisations 
of the original intuitive content. Nor, alternatively, are almost all of these elements entirely free 
of propositional, conceptual components. Emotions, even entirely subjective personal sensations 
such as hunger or pain, carry a basic and most primitive form of rationality as they are 
intrinsically meaningful for us. Analogues to thought, inference and (rough) deduction can all 
occur below the mental level of the propositional concepts and language that have been 
traditionally identified with rationality. Human beings did not begin to reason when they 
developed the ability to talk, animals ‘reason’ (though admittedly at a limited level) and even 
rational adult humans will regularly take decisions (such as what to eat for lunch), adopt 
attitudes (e.g. they ‘instinctively’ approve of an idea), or complete a hundred other cognitive 
tasks in an entirely qualitative register below the level of language and the use of clear 
denotative terms or propositions.        
In the same way sensory intuitions also involve cognition. As Husserl and other 
phenomenologists argue we do not consciously perceive the shapes and colours that are 
primordially present in our visual field but rather perceive complete objects that are already 
laden with cognitive, conceptual meaning.  The same is true of the information of our other 
senses, and as Collingwood and Kant argue
230
 our minds are constantly adjusting the raw 
information we receive through our senses to produce a somewhat coherent picture well below 
the level of conscious inference. As Kant said, concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind
231
, but in reality we almost never experience anything that does not 
involve some combination of both intuition and concept except, possibly, in a tiny minority of 
cases of pure, meaningless sensation or entirely abstract mathematical or logical inferences. As 
Scheler said, the same is also true of our affective intuitions. ‘Lawfulness’ is intrinsic to our 
emotions and our wider affective experiences, but this is not surprising as all our intuition is 
structured (and vice versa our rational inference is only possible through the material of 
intuition). 
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Scheler describes the 'lawfulness' of our affective faculties as though it came from some entirely 
separate psychological source to our 'logical', theoretical faculties: "there is an eternal and 
absolute lawfulness of feeling, loving and hating which is as absolute as that of pure logic, but 
which is not reducible to intellectual lawfulness"
232
. But he never clearly identifies the manner 
in which the objective orderliness of feeling differs fundamentally in kind from the rationality 
of thought and sensory perception.  I suggest that it would be better to take the type of theory 
outlined by Collingwood in his The Principles of Art, whereby conceptual, logical thought and 
feeling do not occur as discrete, separable faculties but are experienced together as elements of a 
single cognitive continuum in one stream of experience
233
. In other words, all the relevant 
experiences contain greater or lesser elements of clear conceptual thought and non-conceptual 
feeling content together in one intentional experience.  Some experience will be more purely 
logical and conceptually clear, some more qualitative, affective and non-conceptual.  But almost 
all experience in persons will contain both elements, and most everyday experience contains 
substantial quantities of both elements. For example, on a walk one day I am confronted by an 
angry dog: I have a sensory intuition of the dog and its manner.  I make rational inferences 
recognising the dog and other elements of the scene; I have the emotional intuition of the anger 
of the dog, the danger I am in and feel the fear this motivates and I make further rational 
inferences about these sensory and emotional facts such as the wisdom of backing away slowly. 
It is not that there is a 'lawfulness' of feeling separate to 'logical' lawfulness of thought but rather 
that rationality richly applies to our ethical intuition as well as our sensory intuition. This helps 
to explain the nature of our experience of values: they will contain a rational, conceptual 
element, a material element given through intentional feeling, and connection to various 
external sensory images. In the same way a theoretical proposition will contain a purely 
denotative, conceptual element, a content taken from sensory intuition, and an emotional 
colouring that only together constitute the full significance of the proposition to cognition. What 
fundamentally differs is the proportion and direction of the nature of the practical or theoretical 
proposition, value or concept. 
It is important to remember that 'feeling' in this context does not just refer to what is commonly 
called 'emotion'. In the manner Scheler uses it, and the way I am using it, it has a broader 
meaning referring to the entirety of our affective faculty, of which emotions (as the term is often 
used) are a subset.  The term emotion normally refers to a limited list of recognised states: 
anger, pride, love, gratitude, contempt, joy, disappointment, etc. But taken at face value this 
represents only a portion of our affective life. The feeling of hunger is a feeling, but it is not 
emotion.  The sense of intuitively recognising something as a courageous act is a feeling, but it 
is not an emotion. The sense of recognising a proof as valid in mathematics is a feeling, but it is 
not necessarily an emotion.  The emotions, as they are generally recognised, refer to a 
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particularly significant, well-recognised and widely discussed subset of subject-based affective 
states. Values are also, hence, not emotions because values are ideal objects represented through 
feeling.  They are not subjective feeling-states. Of course what any particular person is feeling 
at any particular moment is probably also not just one of the widely recognised emotions 
because our internal life is much more complicated and richer than that.  We may be feeling a 
complex combination of various different emotions forming a unique mixture, or our internal 
and external sense may be dominated by some feeling that is not an emotion at all.  And it is not 
just emotions but also the full range of possible affective states that have the potential to both 
point to values in acts of intentional-feeling and be the material that constitutes our 
representation of values. Of course one could already use emotion in this wider sense, and that 
would not be wrong. I just wish to clarify the breadth of the phenomena I am referring to.  
In chapter two I discussed the problem of motivation that has been raised in reference to moral 
realism.
234
 I argued that although powerful attacks had been made on the strong Humean 
principles required for the argument to work, it would be better for an ethical theory to have 
ethical motivation follow naturally from the theory. Scheler’s theory does this because ethical 
values are accessed through affective or conative experiences that are intrinsically practically 
motivating. They are experienced through these feelings and conations but they are not these 
subjective feelings. They are rather ideal, logical objects that can be experienced through a 
variety of differing feelings and conations, and can, after their experience, be brought to mind 
without needing those feelings and conations to be externally triggered again. They are never 
just sentimental and affectively motivating either, but have their own ordering and ‘lawfulness’. 
They are typically fused with rational and propositional content that makes them the basis of 
beliefs and knowledge: ‘reason’ does not just mean theoretical reason. Values are not physical, 
natural objects but through their instantiation with bearers they are closely tied, metaphysically 
and phenomenologically to natural objects.  
The argument, as I outlined it in chapter two, is flawed in each of its premises and concepts. 
Theoretical beliefs are not sufficient for motivation but practical beliefs are as long as they are 
connected to genuine value awareness and insight. Only where they are parroted without any 
insight in feeling and conation to the values involved are they possibly lacking in motivating 
power. Our desires, or more accurately put, our motivating feeling and conation, is not an 
irrational force to which we are merely subject, rather it defines our beliefs and is shaped by our 
own beliefs, choices, experiences and will. And finally, while practical beliefs taken in abstract 
are of course not themselves immediately psychologically motivating, intuitively grasped values 
most certainly are by the mechanisms already described at length in this thesis. This means that 
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practical beliefs are just not comparable to theoretical beliefs in the way Hume and others want 
to compare them and so the motivation argument collapses.   
It is apparent that persons can use ethical statements and reason about values without currently 
or necessarily ever having had the relevant feeling or conation to understand them. It is possible 
that the necessary feeling can be communicated to them, but if this has not happened or only 
happened partially, they will discuss the rational, propositional content of the value and so quite 
probably misunderstand it to some degree. This is how people can understand and use moral 
truths in a logical sense without being motivationally moved by them. It is also possible for 
someone to affirm an ethical truth and act logically to respond to it without in any way being 
'motivationally moved' by that truth itself, but rather act as a response to their commitment to 
being consistent to their beliefs. Finally, it is possible to act out of a burst of emotion towards or 
against something in question without being at all able to rationally explicate the principles 
involved in rational or propositional form, but still act justifiedly and correctly. Of course in 
most cases people will grasp both the propositional and emotional content of their values, and 
will act on them as long as these are not overwhelmed by other motivations. Indeed, one can go 
from not understanding a value, to experiencing it through feeling and hence understanding it, 
to losing affective connection to it but still rationally affirming the value as a concept, and using 
it in discussion without being motivated over it. It is further possible, at some later date, that one 
could re-engage emotionally with that value and thus regain the true understanding and 
motivational force of it. The affective and conceptual aspects of understanding values can come 
apart, be communicated, and come back together all in the same person. In fact it seems rather 
likely that we all go through this process with certain values at one time or another. 
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4. Conceptualisability & Schematism 
There is no black and white division between those parts of our experience and cognition that 
are conceptual and non-conceptual and those that are qualitative and non-qualitative. Both 
sensory intuition and cognition, and emotional, ethical intuition and cognition involve all these 
elements to greater or lesser extents. The information given by our senses is not even 
necessarily theoretical or practical (in the sense of being involved either with what is or what 
ought to be). For example, our visual information is often agreed to be solidly theoretical in 
nature.  Our sense of touch is also largely theoretical, but it is very close to our sensation of 
pain, which still has theoretical relevance, but is also of practical significance, it bears an 
intrinsic disvalue, and its very sensation is similar to those sensations of emotional pain or 
pleasure, or other emotions, whose significance to our cognition is overwhelmingly practical: 
they identify values in goods. But this passage from the one group of information to the other is 
clearly a continuum.      
Traditional philosophical vocabulary, with its strict distinction between intuition/concept, and 
between reason/experience, is not necessarily best suited to expressing this continuum, which is 
important to understanding Scheler’s core idea of a ‘lawful’ intuition of value and how ethical 
ideas reflect rational, conceptual, but also emotional, material content. In this view we are 
capable of applying a rational concept to intuition precisely because intuition already contains 
an ordered structure. This is key to the possibility of ethical knowledge.  John McDowell, in his 
book Mind and World suggests a new way of thinking about the rationality of experience that 
helps to break down the distinction between the conceptual (i.e. rational) and non-conceptual 
(i.e. irrational) by describing a different, weaker sense in which we can discuss a conceptual, 
and hence ordered or ‘lawful’ structure in qualitative experience itself.  Firstly, he denies that 
intuitive experience is generally non-conceptual because he believes the traditional, strong form 
of concepts: denotative, linguistic concepts, are not the only form of concepts. McDowell 
argues for a second weaker category of concepts that he calls 'demonstrative' concepts.  A 
traditional denotative concept is one that can have a general name, such as 'horse', 'orange', it 
represents a class of objects, and it can hence be discussed with context-independent language.  
But if one wishes to refer to a particular shade of the brown of my desk, I perhaps cannot simply 
describe it, but I can demonstrate it to another person in the room, by simply pointing at it. 
From that I can store that particular brown in memory and it can be referred to, communicated 
and compared with other such colours without requiring both to be present at the time.  Or, to be 
more succinct: I have a concept of it.
235
  
There is a notable difference though between the stronger, traditional denotative form of 
concepts and the new, weaker demonstrative sort, described by McDowell. Denotative concepts 
are publicly, linguistically communicable to anyone, anywhere; they are detachable from their 
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origin.  Demonstrative concepts are not. They are communicable in the sense that if someone 
else is in the room I can point him to my desk and specify 'that brown!', and then we can 
continue without reference to the object, but if I am outside the room speaking to someone who 
has never seen it I am stuck. This is particularly an issue in dealing with the practical concepts 
and intuitions that make up the cognitive content of ethics, though here the problem is even 
greater. Theoretical objects can always be externally specified in one way or another.  One may 
point at an object to specify a particular shade of colour, but if in a situation I intuit a new value 
that I have never experienced before, maybe I see a unique form of beauty, or I am 
overwhelmed by a depth of personal nobility I have never felt before, then in that situation I 
cannot point someone else to it in any simple way. In a weak sense this experience is still 
conceptual because I can take that unique moment of value and take it, detach it from that 
instance, and compare it to other situations and thus make people understand in a similar 
manner to that McDowell describes, but communication is harder. This is not to say 
communication is impossible, but just that it is not done by just pointing to objects, it requires 
something more imaginative and expressive to hope to communicate those particular ethical 
concepts. Great literature or drama would be the obvious example of something that has the 
power to morally convince us of situations we have never beheld through its great expressive 
power. 
This problem is reinforced by the fact that our language has not developed primarily to deal 
with ethical concepts or experiences. Our language is basically for the purpose of discussing 
external physical objects as from our long past up to the present day that has overwhelmingly 
been the focus of human life for almost all people, almost all of the time. Its application to more 
complex, abstract issues is still largely a bolt-on to that basic structure, and that includes our 
ethical life.  Particular theoretical technical areas can define their own vocabulary (and do in 
vast numbers) to get round this problem, but they still borrow hugely from the vocabulary of 
ordinary, external physical life. Of course we do have many easily understandable words for 
very general ethical concepts, particularly the emotions, but for more fine-grained distinctions 
our language is much less well resourced and this contributes to the difficulty in 
communication. In discussion of the near-impossibility of linguistically describing values, 
values of the Holy are often referred to as particularly hard to nail down, and this is true.  Even 
our common language terms for these values e.g. 'Holy', etc, are effectively ideograms for 
concepts of things that must be experienced, and otherwise defy easy communication.
236
  But I 
believe this is also true of the unique shades of ethical value of all types and modalities that fall 
between the broad ethical and emotional terms we have. 
These ideas are useful for clarifying the different ways that rational orderliness can enter into 
our cognition.  It is key to Scheler’s phenomenological affective intuitionism that in both the 
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theoretical and practical spheres of our cognition rational order is given in the intuition itself.  It 
is this that makes the application of denotative concepts justifiable and allows the formation of 
linguistically expressible knowledge. There are various possible ways of expressing this truth 
about our affective life, it would be legitimate in McDowell’s sense to refer to the intuition itself 
as demonstratively conceptual. Historically, though, concept and intuition have been contrasted 
with one another by definition.  If we stick to this historic distinction then we must say that it is 
precisely that the intuition is ‘rational’ despite being non-conceptual that is the remarkable 
feature of Scheler’s theory. But we can apply McDowell’s use of ‘conceptual’ to describe the 
intuition while maintaining the difference between this ‘weak’, demonstrative form of 
conceptual and the stronger idea of detachable, linguistically encoded, denotative concepts.   
This discussion is further confused by the fact that I am talking about the logical and 
phenomenological priority of the intuition in our ethical knowledge. In practice, however, by 
the time we are modern, adult humans almost every thought we have and every object we relate 
to is over-laid, to the point of saturation, with strong concepts that we can only separate out 
from our intuitions with noticeable effort. This overlays every feeling or conation based value 
experience we have with information based on the conceptual connections we already have 
relating to similar values. In this state we can both access the value of something through 
immediate feeling or recognise it rationally through previous experience, or even 
communication from others. To a certain degree then, just as with our theoretical senses, we 
experience what we expect to experience, we see what we expect to see, as much as what is 
actually there to be seen or felt.        
Our affective states recognise objects intentionally as goods instantiating certain values. These 
values are never mere feeling-states, they are, properly, ideal objects.  But concepts without 
intuitions are empty and even ideal objects are not necessarily cognised clearly and distinctly at 
first. At first these are only unclearly recognised and their description owes far more to the 
physical objects we associate with them than to their clear concept and rank.  It is only with 
reflection, experience and social expansion that, over time, values, originally the groping objects 
of feeling in animals and infant children, become developed, schematised with concepts and 
rational attributes and turn into the elevated and distinguished ideas of the various human 
ethical realms: aesthetics, morality, religion, and the agreeable arts of taste.  But these values, 
although properly ideal objects, are still fundamentally, at the basic level, cognised through, and 
hence also materially represented through, unique acts of intentional-feeling and conative 
striving.  
This is itself a two way process.  The core feeling state that provides the material of a value is 
connected to various sensory images and concepts, either analogies e.g. Justice brings to mind a 
woman blindfolded, a pair of balanced scales, an eye for an eye, fairness, etc; or concrete 
instances where the value, e.g. Justice, has been given and defined for a person through a 
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particular instance of it.  But each of these subordinate images and concepts, these instances of, 
or analogies for, the original value, Justice, has essential interconnections and its own connected 
feeling content.  These in turn feedback and help define and limit the precise nature of that 
particular value, distinguishing it from other similar values. Socrates gives the first example of 
deliberate investigation into the precise nature of values, with his dialectical investigations into 
the Good and the Pious. But throughout the history of society, philosophy and religion we have 
examples of people developing and refining their view of values and thus picking out new, more 
precise values and discarding old analogies and conceptions, if without the deliberate analysis 
of Socrates. This is how ethical progress (or just change) occurs. The phenomenological 
investigation championed by Scheler is just a new, more rigorous method of looking into the 
material and concepts that define values.   
It must be reiterated that the affective, conative content of values and goods is not irrational: it is 
non-rational in the sense of not being based on concepts (in the denotative use) that are imposed 
by the rationally active mind. It is rational in the sense of being given as containing an ordering 
or lawfulness (in Scheler’s words); or alternatively in McDowell’s language a weak 
conceptuality, which can be (and is) the basis of rational knowledge.  This original intuitive 
content is intimately joined with the conceptual, both in human surface experience and also at 
the essential a priori level, as intuition and concept are intimately joined in almost all human 
cognition "like the inter-weaving of warp and woof in a fabric", to use Otto's striking 
metaphor
237
. The extreme closeness of this is demonstrated by the fact they cannot be prised 
apart in practice, however much one may try, but can only be correctly and separately identified 
in retrospect abstract thought. This intuitive content has its own ordering and objectivity that is 
distinct from that of theoretical reason just as the material it applies to is distinct.  This 
conjoined process of development does not just develop the rationally imposed representations 
of the value but also the very intuitive material of it, refining and variegating this intuition, 
analogously to the way one may develop one’s taste for food or drink. Improvement in the 
fineness of our given intuition in turn allows us to sharpen the accuracy and suitability of the 
concepts and rational ideas with which we express and schematise this material, but without this 
material our ethical ideas are like birds trying to fly in empty space, as Kant said of theoretical 
concepts, and will certainly go astray
238
. As Otto identifies in terms of the Holy, any approach 
that excludes this intuitive affective and conative content ends up vitiating it, so it is with any 
other theory of some realm of ethics e.g. aesthetics, morality, agreeable taste, eroticism by 
removing the material that connects it to our deep-rooted practical motivations
239
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5. Dogmatism and Infallibilism 
Intuitionism has traditionally been criticised for advocating dogmatism or infallibilism: the 
belief that ethical questions can be infallibly and simply answered by direct appeal to intuition. 
As I discussed in my second chapter, while historical intuitionism may have deserved this 
charge to some degree, contemporary analytic intuitionism has stressed the defeasible nature of 
the justification given by intuitions, and that this justification can be strengthened or refuted by 
rational argument and consideration of other evidence and intuitions. This is generally an 
advance on previous theories but I argue that actually, taken dogmatically, it introduces an 
important weakness into any intuitionism. Or, to put it another way, there must be an infallible 
element in any true intuition.  
According to intuitionism, knowledge is originally based on a direct link between the knowing 
subject and the facts of that particular matter (though once established it may be communicated 
on the basis of well-founded trust). The obvious example is immediate sensory intuition, which 
is taken to lie at the basis of all our empirical knowledge of the external world. In the Kantian 
definition of the term that is just what an intuition is: cognition immediately, non-inferentially 
relating to its objects. If intuitions are strictly provisional, at least in principle, and can be 
refuted by non-intuitive evidence and alternative intuitions, then surely they are not establishing 
this direct link to facts that must be the basis of knowledge?  Take the analogy to sensory 
intuition: although inferences and propositional beliefs and statements based on sensory 
perception are intrinsically defeasible, the phenomenological experience of the perception itself 
is not. One can doubt what object one sees, but not the phenomenology of the experience itself. 
And it is to this indubitable phenomenological residuum that the fallible inferences must then be 
traced in some sense. It is because sensory perception gives us immediate access to the external 
world that it can justify some mediate knowledge of that external world, even if the 
propositional statements of that mediate knowledge themselves can never be entirely perfect. 
Ethical intuition needs to have this connection as well otherwise it cannot properly be 
considered an intuition: a direct, immediate access.  But, just as certainly this cannot apply to 
the mediate statements about various objects that are derived from the phenomenological 
content of the intuition. These must always be fallible and incomplete.   What this means is that 
there was a degree of wisdom in the early assumption that an intuitionist theory must contain 
some sort of indefeasible connection to ethical facts, but also wisdom in the modern thought 
that the idea of a generally infallible ethical intuition claims too much, and certainly more than 
it needs to.    
I suggest then that ethical intuition must have a similar immediate phenomenological content 
that enables it to ground mediate knowledge. If we pursue the analogy with sense perception it 
would suggest that the residuum ought to be the phenomenological content of the intuition. In 
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Scheler's theory this content is clear: values are directly "feelable"
240
, but in analytic, rationalist 
intuitionisms this is not the case. Their intuitions have no material accessible to mental 
inspection, consisting solely of the fact that certain propositions come with the tag of true-ness. 
There is no phenomenological what-it-is-like-ness to these intuitions below the level of formed 
propositions that can serve as the immediate, intuitive basis for those mediate propositions. As 
such, as Scheler argued in relation to Kantianism, they find themselves unconnected to the 
ethical facts and hence unable to properly ground their claims to 'knowledge'. The overall 
intuition is like hearing a tone of sound. This does not infallibly tell us what made the sound, 
but it does put in immediate contact with the content of the tone itself. This does not allow us 
infallible knowledge of statements made about goods, or even guarantee that we rank the value 
correctly but it does provide immediate access, more or less clearly, to the content of the value 
itself. 
In his criticism of seemings-theory, Michael Bedke distinguishes between content-based 
seemings, like sensory perception, and the weaker propositional attitude seemings, such as the 
ethical ones described by Michael Huemer and other advocates
241
. This is because their 
‘intuitions’ are the defeasible, propositional concepts or statements that are built on, but are not 
identical to, the affective-rational content of intuition that Scheler correctly identifies as the 
material of intuition. Scheleran intuitions, unlike Huemer's seemings, have a content through the 
intentional feeling that provides the ethical concepts later figuring in propositions. The sense of 
value or disvalue is in the intuition itself seen through the intentional feeling and conation, but 
not just a 'thin', generic intuition of value and disvalue but as part of a 'thick' intuition of a full-
fledged specific value. All these values have a ‘height’ or ‘valence’, which gives the degree of 
‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ they are but they also have an entire rich texture of emotional content and 
associated analogies.  The valence or height is like the volume of a piece of music: important, 
but a relatively small piece of information about the over-all music. This means Scheleran 
intuitionism is back in the category of content-based intuitionism, and significantly improves 
the analogy with physical sensory experience, improving the ‘innocence by association’ of 
ethical intuition of values. As Bedke states, and I briefly discussed in my second chapter, being 
a content-based intuition makes it a much better candidate for basing objective knowledge. This 
is because rather than merely relying on a phenomenological tag of true-ness, which one could 
imagine toggled on or off without otherwise affecting the experience, the goodness or badness 
of the intuition is in the content of what is experienced itself, and hence cannot be removed 
without thoroughly distorting the whole experience.  
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6. The Elements of Ethical Knowledge 
It is not in terms of pure values themselves though that most particular ethical statements or 
propositions can be made, in terms of either individual action or general social rules. For a start, 
particulars are always goods, things that instantiate value complexes, rather than pure values. 
Statements describing the essential interconnections and ranks between values are important, 
but they are often not the ethical statements we need in practical life. Those come from 
describing the relations between goods, what goods are more valuable and should be prioritised 
over others, in general, and when considering them in a particular perspective. When discussing 
the possibility of ethical knowledge it is statements at this level that are usually meant. This 
raises an interesting question as to what exactly can be ethical knowledge. Ordinary moral 
statements can be traced, according to Scheleran theory, to insight into the nature of the values 
instantiated in goods through feeling and conation. This brings knowledge, firstly, of the value-
nature of those goods, secondly, of the values themselves, and thirdly, of moral Good and Evil 
in the preference of goods over lesser goods in the myriad ways we encounter them. Knowledge 
is possible about all of these levels. 
The elements of our ordinary ethical knowledge can then be broken down in the following way.  
Firstly, this knowledge is based on indefeasible acts of value insight through intentional-feeling 
and conation that directly connect one to values themselves, the ultimate 'facts' of ethics. These 
acts are not indefeasible in the sense that the particular object in question necessarily does 
instantiate that value to that degree, but in the phenomenological sense that the experience of the 
value itself cannot be doubted.  If we take ourselves to be seeing a dog, that does necessarily 
mean a dog is there, but it does mean we experienced a dog-like appearance; when I feel 
someone to be brave, this does not necessarily mean they are brave, but it does necessarily mean 
I am directly acquainted with the value 'bravery' and this can provide the basis of knowledge of 
this value, its interconnections and its rank regardless of the status of this particular incident. 
Our basic feeling and conation of values is indefeasible but this is only true as far as they are 
immediate, ceasing as they become schematised or expressed in propositional form. These acts 
connect us directly with a wide range of ethical values, ideal objects, which are distinguishable 
from that feeling and conative content. This independence is demonstrated by the fact that we 
can access the same values through different acts of feeling or conation.        
The second stage of ethical knowledge comes in the schematism of this basic intuitive, affective 
experience of values in feeling and conation with rational concepts and ideas. As I discussed 
previously the basic affective or conative experience is the material that becomes saturated with 
rational concepts, images, examples and analogies that allow the values to be discussed, 
analysed and applied in denotative propositions and social discussion. All such predication of 
the original experience of value is, by definition, mediate and defeasible however, including the 
empirical statement of whether that particular entity actually instantiated that value. Through 
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this process "belief [is] possible in contrast to mere feeling"
242
 but because it adds to the 
immediate content of intuition it always undergoes a process of development as ethics itself 
advances. Only through these schematised values can we account for all the features we 
naturally expect from ethical knowledge.  Firstly, values are intrinsically motivational due to the 
conative and affective means by which we access them (though this motivation can be 
overridden by other factors).  Secondly, we can also discern a rational ordering in their 
structural features and the interrelations between them that mean ethical debates are rationally 
amenable to reasons and argument. Thirdly, they are distinctively ethical and practical, meaning 
they avoid the problems, clearly identified since at least Hume, that attend all forms of 
naturalism; but, finally, they are closely related to natural properties and can do justice to the 
wide-range of possible states that can be ethically relevant due to the great diversity of feel-able 
values. Alternative theories inevitably cannot reproduce all four of these features, sacrificing 
one or more for the others.       
Thirdly, the complex categories of values are analysed into ethical propositions that rank and 
compare different values and goods in both specific and general forms e.g. "murder is always 
unjustifiable", "That was a good thing you did", "Allied terror bombing of Germany in WW2 
was wrong", etc. All such propositions are originally based on preference between values and 
values complexes, but expressed through the rational concepts and concrete examples that they 
have been schematised and instantiated through. Also, at this stage philosophical analysis of 
ethics can occur: both of the nature of ethical facts and cognition itself (meta-ethics) and also 
the laws and ordering that occurs among values (theoretical ethics). It is in this third and final 
stage that most ethical discussion occurs and at which most people would think of ethical 
knowledge.  But knowledge is possible and real at all the stages of ethical knowledge. The 
intimate, immediate connection to value given in insight in the first stage is justified as 
knowledge by virtue of the immediate connection with values, even if, in some cases, this 
cannot be fully expressed in sentences. This is particularly, paradigmatically true of experience 
of values of the Holy, but I believe also applies commonly to instances of experience of other 
values that do not fit neatly into ethical categories we are already familiar with.  The 
schematised content experienced at the second stage will also be knowledge or not depending 
on the appropriateness of the concepts and examples involved. Appropriateness can only be 
tested by improvements of insight, phenomenological (or Socratic) reflection and close 
consideration of the rational side of a value. In terms of insight this can mean clarifying a value 
from another related value, or cleansing it of negative elements in a manner that produces a 
‘higher’ value, a purer notion of love, courage, justice, etc.243 On the rational, schematic side the 
questions are: Does it lead to contradictions or does it accurately describe the exact phenomenon 
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under attention? Or is some nuance being overlooked or mistaken? This will generally be an 
example of better and worse, rather than right and wrong though, in the same sense that a 
scientific theory will represent a process of ever more accurate modelling of a complex 
phenomenon. 
Ethical knowledge is also social and communicable through these mechanisms. Values 
themselves, as ideal meaning-objects, can be communicated and discussed through their rational 
conceptual side. Of course, I cannot truly understand a value that someone is communicating to 
me without the affective and conative material that forms its substantive content. Even if I have 
not had the experience myself, or had it communicated to me, I can gain this affective 
understanding through my acts of sympathy directed at others, in which I can experience 
feelings I’ve never felt by reading them in their face. This can occur passively or, as 
Collingwood discussed, the affective content can be directly and deliberately communicated to 
me, something that occurs most strongly and clearly through art and literature, but also through 
ordinary conversation. This process continues as a contingent matter of understanding each 
other, just like in ordinary conversation of ordinary objects and matters.
244
 I can also gain some 
understanding of it from related values I have experienced, and from common, socially 
widespread feelings. Finally, there are fundamentally solidary feelings that intrinsically relate to 
our social community and reveal to us values of community that immediately base our social 
obligations without the need for any rationalist ‘social contract’. This direct “solidarity of all 
persons”245 itself can take various forms and produce different connections and values in 
different communities.  Taken all together these mechanisms produce a shared ethos and 
milieu
246
 (to use Scheler’s terms) through which ethical discussion and communication is 
possible. 
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7. The Objectivity of Ethical Knowledge       
On what basis is this not just a purely subjective process, or at best a process of attempting to 
come to an agreed harmonisation of man's different ethical intuitions? The objectivity of value 
ethics particularly (compared to other ethical theories) can be supported on three connected 
bases. Firstly, the rank of values can be recognised through immediate insight and verified by 
comparing qualitative features of values and their interconnections. Secondly, the objectivity of 
values is less vulnerable to accusations of subjectivity than any ethics based on personal, 
rational intuition or personal emotions. Thirdly, we can have confidence about the height and 
rank of values through intersubjective agreement. 
Firstly, the recognition of qualitative variation among values themselves means it is possible to 
describe a rational ordering among values based on their structural features, as clarified in 
phenomenological analysis. This mirrors one of the key means by which we recognise external 
physical reality as objective despite the subjectivity of individual perceptive experience.  That 
is, the ability to make rational statements about physical reality that are independently 
assessable by their relation to other elements of physical reality, as well as on an intersubjective 
personal basis. We measure a length with a wooden ruler as one metre, walk out of the room, 
come back in and then measure the object on a totally separate basis with a tape measure and it 
is still one metre; its length is consistently verifiable as the same, it is objective. The emphasis 
here is on the consistency between different measures rather than absolute mind-independence.     
Statements about the qualitative relation of values, what Scheler refers to as their a priori 
ordering, can play the same role in demonstrating the objectivity of values and hence their use 
as the foundation of an objective ethics. By filling out the space of possible values in as great a 
detail as possible, and considering their interrelations on the same basis, we can fix the 'location' 
of values within that space as higher and lower and thus reduce the scope for disagreement 
about those values as disagreement would then affect a range of other value statements. For 
example, the height of mental values is both defined by direct intuitive insight of those values 
themselves and by their being experienced as meriting being 'preferred' to vital values, but 
'placed after' values of Holiness. This fixes the position of mental values, because to disagree 
about their value-position also requires one to question the value position of values of holiness 
and vitality, but these are themselves fixed by independent acts of feeling and conation. These 
judgements of the height of the values can also be separately based on direct insight of the 
specific value itself, or by considering it in terms of the defining, qualitative features of ‘height’ 
in values in general, which we discuss in the next chapter. They can thus be cross-checked by 
other ethical acts and hence are consistently verifiable. There is a consistent structure i.e. parts 
relating to one another in a fixed way. More intricate relations can then be used to fix individual 
values and complexes of values and thus help define ethics. It must be noted though this does 
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not fix the height of values in terms of a quantitative measure, but in terms of qualitative 
relation and position relative to other values.  
Secondly, there is certainly greater agreement about what values are, for example, the positive 
natures of justice, peace, life; than there is, for example, about the empirical question of who is 
being just. A significant share of ethical disagreement is not about what these values are but 
empirical disagreement about what the facts on the ground actually are: who has done what 
actions and for what reasons. Also, the very phenomenological experience of values is that they 
are separate from our subjective feelings and emotions. They are different entities and are 
distinguishable from these subjective feelings. They also are independent of the specific feelings 
that accompany their perception. Someone who is terrified of danger, and someone who is 
thrilled by danger can have different current feelings towards a dangerous height, but they still 
feel the same value of the danger of the height (though among other values that will differ).  The 
thrill-seeker and the timid man both feel the value as negative, even, it is merely that this 
produces a different feeling response in the one to the other. The value is not defined by the 
feeling that currently is accessing it. Although they are regularly experienced through feeling 
they can and do vary independently to them in a manner that is both directly sensed itself and 
that varies between levels of values. Through an analysis of the differing modes of values and 
their levels of intentionality we can distinguish differing levels of objectivity among 
experiences of values in a consistent manner. As discussed in the section ‘Dogmatism and 
Infallibilism’, the nature of material intuition is structurally different to ‘rational’ ethical 
intuitions in the sense that the value or disvalue (in its infinite complexity) is the content of the 
intuition itself.
247
 This means the intuition, whose experience itself is indisputable, cannot be 
separated from the valuation that is the experience. None of this guarantees the correct empirical 
application to goods but it does provide a basis for objective ethics among values themselves.                               
Thirdly, objectivity must also be considered in terms of intersubjectivity. Dan Zahavi, building 
on Husserl, argues that within the phenomenological reduction transcendental intersubjectivity 
is the key to the constitution of objective reality, in terms of both simple real physical objects 
and the category of objectivity in general. In the first case, we perceive whole objects, even 
though only one aspect is primordially given to us at any time. Zahavi argues this presupposes 
other views of the object in that present moment, but this could only be given to other subjects. 
But we must account for an entire objective cosmos not just one object. Thus, the complete 
reality of all external objects necessitates a potential, open intersubjectivity that co-constitutes 
the world of real objects beyond my perspective of it. On this view the distinction between the 
categories of objectivity and subjectivity, reality and appearance, only obtain meaning in a 
situation where our individual world has been challenged by interaction with other 
subjectivities. This radically de-privileges our view of the world, starting with the person of the 
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other, then their body as a field of their sensation, then all the external space they can see, feel, 
touch, and finally the entire world as a neutral realm of shared experience, and hence not 
defined by any one subjectivity.
248
 
Zahavi means this to refer to our theoretical experience, but it can be applied to our practical 
experience as well.
249
 In reference to our ethical life the concept of objectivity as based in inter-
subjectivity has particular relevance because, notwithstanding what I have said above, the 
ability to verify objectivity through a type of 'measurement' of height by different methods is 
obviously a lot harder for ideal entities. As such the sense of the objectivity or subjectivity about 
values must be understood primarily in terms of its intersubjective validity (or otherwise). This 
does not refer to the empirical fact of being experienced as the same, but the ideal 
phenomenological category of the objectivity. Zahavi properly does not consider a case where 
objectivity refers to mind-independence beyond any possibility of experience, because by 
definition outside all possibility of experience something could not be a phenomenological 
object at all. It would fall among Kant’s noumena about which we can legitimately claim 
nothing. Zahavi particularly differentiates between two levels of intersubjectivity: that of an 
experience being perceived equally by all members of a particular lived community (of 
whatever description), and the deeper level of objectivity of content that would be identically 
perceived by all possible subjects. Zahavi describes this last level of objectivity as where the 
only relativity of the object is that which is “ultimately necessary – namely, being relative to a 
subjectivity, of whatever sort” i.e. potentially experienceable at all.250 The question is then to 
what extent is ethical knowledge objective or subjective on these bases?  
Value-facts are not relative to any particular individuals or forms of life, but different 
individuals do have different capacities to access certain values. There are differences in feeling 
and striving and hence value perception that account for the differences in historical ethics, but 
these do not reflect changes in the nature of values, merely changes in our knowledge of values. 
As a phenomenologist Scheler's fundamental assumption is that no object can exist outside of 
the possibility of it being experienced by consciousness, but this consciousness certainly does 
not have to be human.  Animals and theoretical space aliens would have access to the same 
realm of possible values as we do. And there would be the possibility of recognising and sharing 
ethical truth with them, just as much as mathematical or scientific truth. Of course certain goods 
are relative, different animals will recognise different environments as ‘comfortable’, but the 
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value ‘comfort’ is consistent across all animals able to be aware of it. This is because the space 
of possible values is constrained in some manner. The value ‘health’, for example, necessarily is 
accessible for all possible animals that have a sense of their own psychological and physical 
state, at least as far as they have sufficient mental and affective complexity to experience it.  
This does not mean that values exist as real objects separately to any possible experience, 
though Scheler's language does sometimes seem to suggest this idea.  Values are objective but 
ideal, in the same way that mathematical objects are. They are not Platonic forms, though they 
doubtlessly bear certain similarity to them. In fact it may be wise to avoid thinking about values 
as objects at all. I argue that they are objective, but to consider them as objects risks 
ontologising them to an inappropriate degree.  Scheler talks repeatedly about ethical facts, but 
not objects (except in the sense that they are objective and the grammatical sense that they are 
the objects of acts of feeling), and this approach may be thought superior due to its slightly 
more modest ontological requirements.  There is, however, a legitimate sense in which these 
ethical facts can be considered more relative than physical objects. In as far as they are 
valuations and ideal entities then their nature as facts is relative to the possibility, firstly, of 
beings capable of valuation, and secondly, of entities that could possibly act as their bearers. For 
example, vital values have no meaning in the absence of the possibility of any form of life. On 
the other hand, real, physical objects would exist without any possibility of experiencing them, 
though it is impossible to consider them in terms of knowledge without the assumption of a 
being able to know them. However, this veers into fundamental ontology.  In as far as we 
consider the issue epistemologically, and thus presume the possibility of experience, values and 
the knowledge of values substantially share the means of objectivity that grounds our sense of 
'knowledge' of the physical world. 
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8. A Note on Ontology 
The first thing to consider when discussing the ontology implied by Scheler's ethics is that he 
always spoke as a phenomenologist.  Husserl in his earlier work argued that the 
phenomenologist must begin his investigations by bracketing all metaphysical hypotheses about 
the nature of what is experienced and only possibly work back up to such theories at the very 
end of his work.
251
 This is because all metaphysical theories must make efforts of considerable 
inference to reach their conclusion, whereas the phenomenal experience of the world is certain 
and given immediately in intuition. Traditional philosophy had been too quick to jump to 
metaphysical conclusions before it had analysed the nature of what is experienced and because 
of that it had regularly gone astray. Phenomenology does not reject the possibility of 
metaphysical knowledge, like some currents of 20th Century empiricism, but places it decidedly 
secondary to and dependent upon the analysis of phenomenal experience.  
This approach to metaphysics can be traced back to Kant who argued that the pursuit of 
unconditioned, transcendent metaphysical knowledge would always end in antimonies of 
reason, insoluble paradoxes, and that the only solution was to abandon both empiricist and 
rationalist attempts to derive absolute metaphysical truths.
252
 Against these traditional 
transcendent metaphysics he opposed his transcendental theory that supports very limited 
metaphysical knowledge by looking at the grounds of possible experience. Kant's transcendental 
idealism advocated empirical realism but transcendental idealism i.e. realism as far as objects 
entered into experience, but idealism as far as they transcended experience. This was due to his 
belief that definite knowledge required experience to support it, though not to entirely constitute 
it, and without experience to support the understanding our minds are like birds trying to fly in 
space without the air to support them. This metaphysical agnosticism is reflected in the doctrine 
of Husserl who was much inspired by Kant, and even labelled his later metaphysical 
interpretation of phenomenology as transcendental-phenomenological idealism. 
In his theory of theoretical universals and essences Husserl stated that he wished to defend the 
objectivity but not the realism of these entities. He argues that universals are objective but ideal, 
in the same way a geometric triangle is, they are not dependent on any one or groups of 
subjectivities but without being separate, real entities.  Scheler's original statements about 
values reflect these ideas. The whole thrust of the Formalismus is a defence of the objectivity of 
values and the ethics based upon them but without committing to the extent of their 
metaphysical realism.  They are not Platonic ideals or psychological entities, though like 
everything in human experience they are identified psychologically. There are objective ethical 
facts, and there are objective ethical norms that can be derived from these, and that is what 
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matters.  The question of the metaphysical nature of values necessarily remains a side-issue. But 
it is important to remember that, on this view, this does not peculiarly disadvantage ethics. For 
phenomenologists and Kantians the phenomenal facts will always be more certain than 
determinant metaphysical hypotheses due to the general epistemological limits on knowledge. 
However, Scheler does not always restrict his statements to these limits, at least rhetorically.  
On repeated occasions the thrust of his statements in defence of the objectivity of values does 
seem to suggest the type of strong independence of values from possible human experience of 
them that is characteristic of Platonic-style metaphysical realism. Particularly, Scheler strongly 
suggests that values are only discovered by persons and that they exist regardless of any 
particular form of life or its experience in the same manner as the material world. For example, 
in his discussion of the role of love, he says that "values cannot be destroyed or created. They 
exist independently of the organisation of all beings endowed with spirit."
253
 He only ever 
speaks in terms of persons gaining access to values that must have presumably previously 
existed in some sense. This terminology reminds one of the debate in philosophy of 
mathematics, between those who want to speak about mathematics being discovered and those 
who wish to speak about it being created.  Of course in the philosophy of mathematics the first 
group are commonly just referred to as Platonists,
254
 which demonstrates the problematic nature 
of the balance Scheler is walking. But there is no need for Scheler's theory to be associated with 
this strong metaphysical realism, despite the tone of some of his statements. Scheler's stated 
position allows the construction of metaphysically weaker interpretations that retain a basis for 
Scheler's core aim of an objective, scientific ethics without requiring a Plato-esque 
interpretation of the data and refutes the criticism of an inappropriate ontologising of ethics. 
This is especially worthwhile because the Platonic model (in ethics, unlike maths) is generally 
considered sufficiently ridiculous that it is basically used as a term of abuse. The accusation that 
objective ethics in general requires something equivalent is used to criticise the whole field by 
association: for example, in Mackie's original 1973 description of the 'queerness' objection.
255
 
In accordance with the significant metaphysical agnosticism of phenomenology it is also worth 
considering the possibility that Scheler's phenomenological description of ethics could be 
consistent with a metaphysically irrealist quasi-objective view of ethics based on a shared moral 
phenomenology. It would be possible to reject the arguments offered by Scheler and this thesis 
as to the objectivity of ethical facts while accepting the detailed description of the 
phenomenology of ethical experience as accurate. One could accept the idea that human 
morality reflects a shared, species-wide evolved moral sense, a heuristic sense developed to 
support various instrumentally beneficial behaviours, but that it fails to reach beyond that to 
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grasp any genuine independent ethical facts or objects. Depending on its form this could be 
either a sort of non-cognitivist or error theory.
256
 Given that even moral irrealists rarely suggest 
abandoning the practice of morality in society then Scheler's ethics would still retain its value as 
an accurate phenomenological description of the mechanics and nature of moral experience. 
Under this approach morality would be objective in the sense that it would be dependent on 
facts about achieving contingent social goals and our evolved moral sense, and hence not 
subjectively chosen on an individual basis. But it would be subjective in the sense that it would 
not connect to any non-instrumental rational reality, and thus beyond what is necessary for 
achieving specific contingent goals, such as the maintenance of a well-ordered society, one 
would not be 'irrational' to ignore it. Even in this case, as living beings we are inescapably 
practical agents who must make choices, and the phenomenology of ethics, which, if Scheler is 
correct, is largely 'realist', is, by definition, the basis on which we do experience and have the 
ability to make choices and as such is still of vital importance to better understand our practical 
ethical life. 
I argue that the best interpretation of the phenomenological evidence and arguments lies 
somewhere between the strong 'Platonic' and weak 'quasi-realist' interpretations. We should 
stick with Scheler's original commitment to objective ethical facts, but not ethical objects, i.e. a 
form of weaker ethical realism that avoids ontologising values into external Platonic objects but 
retains objective ethical facts as the basis of an independent ethics. Values are feelable essences 
into which we can penetrate through our intentional affective and conative faculties. The realm 
of values has a logical structure and order to it in terms of the depth of the values, the qualitative 
comparisons between values, the accompanying bearers, and the sense of obligation that defines 
the values. But these are not the relations between metaphysical objects; they are more like the 
variations and relations between shades of colour or between groups of mathematical objects. 
The extent of these facts that we are able to access will be limited by our physical and 
psychological constitution and the manner in which we develop them, especially in terms of the 
value bearing goods on which ethical choices must actually be taken. This necessarily 
introduces an element of subjectivity and variation into lived ethics but this does not contradict 
the basic objectivity of ethical knowledge. We do not need a simplistic dichotomy between 
'Platonic' realist and purely 'subjective' or 'non-cognitive' theories.  The ordered nature of ethical 
experience allows us a confidence in the objectivity of ethical knowledge in the human context 
within our grasp when it is approached with the proper phenomenological rigour. But we cannot 
make any statements about the nature of the universal realm of values, nor do we need to, 
because these enter into transcendent ontological territory to which we do not have experiential 
access, as phenomenological and Kantian doctrine has traditionally advocated. 
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Chapter 5 - Preferment and Hierarchy among Values 
 
1. Introduction 
The fundamental purpose of any ethical theory is to answer the questions: What is good and 
evil? What should we do? What should we not do? ‘Preferment’ among values is the means of 
answering these questions in Scheler's theory in both the sense of intuitive value preferment and 
conscious choice. Value preference is not just subjective though, it aims to rank values 
according to their intrinsic and objective ‘height’. The connection between height and 
preference is equivalent to that between the external objects in physical reality and the vision 
that sees them. To understand ethical choice in Scheleran ethics, then, and, fundamentally, what 
choices or preferences should be judged good and bad, it is necessary to delve deeply into the 
issues raised by Scheler's theory of value preference and the hierarchy of values.   
Although the meta-ethical and epistemic arguments are of great importance, the richness of 
Scheler’s theory also lies in its fruitful applicability to the actual questions of moral choice. One 
of the best proofs of the worth of any ethical philosophy must be that it guides cases of ethical 
reasoning and produces practical results in a manner that does justice to the complexity of 
ethical issues. This is pretty much what all but meta-ethical philosophers will want from an 
ethical theory. Even when philosophers do argue against ethical realism, cognitivism or 
objectivity on a meta-ethical level they still rarely suggest actually abandoning the practice of 
morality, or the continuing discussion of applied moral issues in society. As such these 
questions are as important to demonstrating the worth of Scheler’s approach as the explicitly 
meta-ethical and epistemic questions I consider elsewhere in this thesis.  
In chapter three in the section on value preferment I outlined the principles of value preferment 
and hierarchy but could not at that point go into the issues raised by this in any detail. I now do 
this in two chapters. The first, this fifth chapter, considers some of the main complexities that 
arise in applying Scheler’s relatively simple explanation of the mechanics of value preference 
and hierarchy to the messiness of actual ethical choice. I follow a broad scheme that starts with 
the pure values, moves through the question of their experience in goods, to the ethical 
judgement that stems from that, the ethical obligation experienced, and ends with considering 
‘persons’ as a category itself. On pure values, I discuss the idea of the ‘height’ of values and 
how we can assess and define this ‘height’. I move onto how values are instantiated in goods 
through bearers and how the relationship between these complicates the scheme of value ranks 
Scheler gives. Then on the ethical judgement itself, I discuss to what extent ethical judgement 
must combine qualitative and quantitative considerations.  Moving from the ‘external’ 
perspective of values I consider the ‘internal’ ethical obligation produced by the ethical 
judgement and whether we can look for qualitative, a priori differences in the levels of 
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obligation that reflect the qualitative difference in the ‘external’ values. Finally, for this chapter, 
I look at the importance of the intensely personal role of ‘love’ in Scheler’s ethical theory in the 
discovery of values.       
Even so I can only go into somewhat more specific theoretical issues that begin to flesh out the 
principles on which ethical choice must be made. Considerable further work would be required 
to provide complete answers, and it is a different level of discussion again to answer particular 
practical questions. This would require at least yet one further stage, taking into account the 
specific values that emerge in each applied area of ethics and hence the laws of value preference 
that are most crucial to each specific area, and which will differ between areas, as is in fact seen 
in applied ethics. The following chapter six is devoted to the ethical role and significance of 
individual ‘persons’ themselves, the most important bearer of values. This is done through a 
dialogue with the ideas of Emmanuel Levinas, another ethical phenomenologist who put the 
individual person at the very core of his ethics. The subtleties of both Scheler and Levinas’ 
theory of the person and the relationship between them, as well as the emphasis Scheler places 
on ‘persons’ within his theory, certainly requires this longer treatment. 
Value preference is aimed at correctly mapping values through preference in relation to the 
objective hierarchy among values that exists due to their interconnections and their essential 
‘height’257. This ranking exists among pure values, but in our ordinary moral life we do not deal 
exclusively with pure values; we are, and we deal with, goods: objects in as far as they are taken 
as valuable in a myriad of different ways. Goods do not just instantiate one simple value either, 
they are regularly a complex of differing values. While values themselves are objective and 
independent of individual cognition, which values are recognised in which individual objects is 
subjective to a degree depending on the aspect they are viewed in at that moment.
258
 In order to 
understand ethics it is, thus, first necessary to understand value hierarchy among both pure 
values and goods. This is because there are identifiable genera of values of differing ranks, as 
well as specific values, and in addition there are different levels of rank among values 
depending on their bearers i.e. the goods they are instantiated in. This truth is intuitable, as 
much as statements about pure values; one can construct arguments in favour of them or against 
them to clarify and complement those insights but inevitably agreements or disagreements must 
come back to statements about intuitive insights
259
.    
When it comes to acts of real world moral choice Scheler argues that what occurs is a 
judgement based on a complex multi-dimensional series of value preferences.  These do not 
occur in the act necessarily, as the acts of intuitive preferment that 'ranks' the values will have 
largely occurred before any particular choice  or act, so the actual current choice can happen 
almost without further intuition, thought or judgement, while still being fundamentally based on 
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value cognition. So many ethical acts or choices happen ‘instinctively’ because we have already 
made our preference among the values in the past. There is, hence, almost nothing left for the 
mind explicitly to need to choose or do in that moment: the action then flows naturally.
 260
  Of 
course these choices can require massive thought and effort at the time because they involve 
value-complexes between which there is no clear previously established preference. But this can 
also happen due to tensions between the orderings of modalities and bearers and confusion 
about the intensity of each value present. Although higher modalities of values are correlated 
with certain bearers there are agreeable values connected to persons, and spiritual values of 
things e.g. cultural goods such as music and art.
261
 These situations lead to obvious tensions in 
acts of preference that I now consider. By analysing these tensions in value choices we can 
better understand the relation between values and goods of different categories, and hence what 
would be the correct ethical choice in different circumstances.   
There is some extent to which philosophical ethics can help with these situations by clarifying 
the nature of values and by closely analysing the individual situations in which these value-
complexes occur. Ultimately, though, the moral choice cannot be made through philosophical 
reflection that is separate from the situation, but only through the felt-intuition of the values 
given in the individual situation. The task of philosophical ethics and the task of actual moral 
choice are different and nothing can fully bridge that gap. Scheler argues that ethical choice 
must always come back to value insight in intuition rather than rationalist theories about what 
must be right and wrong.
262
 This is because of the sheer complexity of individual persons and 
situations, and the role of feeling-insight in ethical motivation. Understanding of philosophical 
ethics cannot make one good if one does not have value awareness, and without already 
possessing that insight one is extremely unlikely to achieve correct understanding even in 
theoretical matters. But this does not mean that there is no task for philosophical ethics, but that 
neither ethics nor moral practice is served by confusing that distinction. Precisely this confusion 
is what occurs in utilitarian and Kantian theories, among others, that fail to keep these arenas 
sufficiently distinct and suggest actual moral decisions should be made by the same method as 
is used in the task of philosophical ethics. 
As discussed in my third chapter Scheler introduces the concept of modalities of values: 
families or genera of values that are the most basic building blocks of the hierarchy among 
values. The complete list consists of the values of the useful, the agreeable, the vital, the mental 
and the holy. (Scheler sometimes omits the Useful, presumably because these are all dependent 
on their role as means to the end of realising intrinsic values.)
263
  All these modalities contain 
many specific values that essentially bear similar features: for example, the agreeable are all 
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immediate values of sensations, the vital are all values related to life such as health and 
nourishment.  These families establish a ranking among pure values, however this ranking is a 
crude tool, and does not provide a simple guide among real world situations, which are choices 
among the complicated value-complexes that are instantiated in goods. It requires a great deal of 
further investigation into the manner in which values appear in goods, and the complexities that 
emerge in goods and therefore acts of ethical choice.   
Why, then, bother with the modalities at all?  Why not just focus on acts of choice among goods 
as many (particularly applied) ethical theories effectively do.  The answer is that the modalities 
do pick out clear families of values, and the relations Scheler describes do clearly hold among 
pure values. This is useful because it acts like a palette of clear colours that then paints the 
complex reality of ethical goods, but to accurately distinguish the nature of the goods we have 
to be able to distinguish the original colours from which the picture has been painted. The 
modalities are a key and if we don’t have that key then we risk making errors among goods 
because we cannot pick out the structural features and relations of the pure values that lie behind 
them. But, as I said, these modalities are only the beginning of the process of establishing a 
hierarchy among individual values and guiding ethical choice among goods. It requires a great 
deal of further investigation to pick apart the details of how values apply to goods and bearers 
and thus precisely how ethical choice should proceed. In the following sections I look at five of 
the key issues that arise when applying values to goods: the qualitative or quantitative nature of 
judgement, the relation of values to bearers, the definition of height among values, the levels of 
ethical obligation, and the unique role of love in ethical judgement.   
  
2. Height amongst Values 
In chapter three I introduced the idea of ‘height’ among values, Scheler’s term for the 
qualitative intensity of how valuable a specific value actually is. Correct ethical judgement 
fundamentally consists of preferring higher values over lower values (though this is of course 
also affected by the degree to which the value is instantiated in the goods of any particular case). 
As was discussed in chapter three the height of values is in fact given first immediately in the 
intuition of them, as well as the preferring them to, or placing them after, other values.
264
 Much 
ethical judgement then merely reflects pre-existing value commitments and hinges on whether 
these involved accurate intuition and correct preferment or not.  
This concept of height is not necessarily clear at first impression though. Of what does it 
consist, and how are we to determine it? Scheler claims that in the intuitive insight into a value 
its height is always given as well. The intuition is not necessarily accurate though because we 
may be confused or deluded and so see the value inaccurately in individual cases. But, by 
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stepping back and considering the hierarchy of values identified by ethical experience in general 
we can begin to recognise certain structural features of values that define their height, separately 
from direct acts of intuitive insight that ‘give’ their height, and their height relative to other 
values, directly.  Importantly, once we have recognised these patterns within groups of values 
we are already familiar with, this raises the possibility of then applying them to other values to 
measure or verify their height as a sort of ‘metric’. As I discussed in chapters three and four, 
such independent means to measure the height of values are important for philosophical ethics 
because they offer the possibility of alternative lines of evidence for ethical statements of value 
heights beyond the consensus of individual assertions. Scheler identifies five different but 
connected criteria by which the height of pure values can be determined by their intuited 
structural features. I now consider these. 
The discussion about the criteria of height among values in Scheler's Formalismus has the 
peculiar feature of concentrating overwhelmingly on positive values.  But it is a doctrine of 
Scheler's ethics that there are both positive and negative values (or values and disvalues), 
something that is clearly confirmed by our experience and moral discourse. Furthermore, these 
negative values exist for each positive value and each rank or height of positive values. If the 
criteria really are valid then they must apply equally to negative values. There does seem to be 
symmetry between positive and negative pure values. But there is a significant asymmetry in the 
realm of goods. Neo-Platonism (taken up by St Augustine into Christian theology) equated good 
with Being and described evil as the absence of good, without substance of its own
265
. Scheler 
correctly disagrees with this view, at least phenomenologically, because disvalues are as clearly 
felt as positive ones
266
. Pain is a thing of its own, ignorance, ugliness, hate are all things of their 
own, with a character that is felt as clearly as their positive opposites (though this does not 
answer the question of the ontological status of evil, which is different and falls outside the 
sphere of this discussion.)  
The venerable neo-Platonic view did not come out of nothing though. Although values 
themselves do seem phenomenologically experienceable in terms of pairs of positive and 
negative, the symmetry breaks down when they become instantiated in goods.  Among goods 
positive values are entities of their own whereas disvalues are regularly instantiated in the 
absence or destruction of goods. Life, for example, is felt as a positive essence of its own, but 
the corresponding disvalue is the destruction (or cessation) of life, which is felt as a thing of its 
own, but its existence is dependent on the instantiation of the positive value. On the other hand, 
there is no equivalent dependence of the instantiation of the value on its disvalue: life is 
meaningful without death, but death has no meaning without life. Another element of this, 
already fine, quandary is that the disvalue opposing a positive value is not merely the absence of 
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that value; its mere absence is very different in content. Ugliness is not just the absence of 
beauty, in the way darkness is the absence of light, it is a very clear and visible thing of its own. 
In the same way the mere fact that someone never lived is not the same as the disvalue of their 
death. It is true that Scheler gave as one of his 'axioms of value' that "the non-existence of a 
positive value is itself a negative value"
267
 and I believe this is correct but the absence of a value 
i.e. its non-instantiation, is merely a disvalue, not the specific opposing disvalue to the original 
positive value stated, as shown by the examples I have given.  
This is all relatively dense, but it is an important further strand of the difference between goods 
and values that is worth teasing apart. It is important at this point because at first thought the 
idea of height is harder to think through for negative values than positive values.  But I think 
this is because we are so used to thinking about values actually in terms of goods. And when it 
comes to goods the symmetry between goods and values breaks down. Only in terms of pure 
values is there symmetry and hence the possibility to describe one unified concept of the 'height' 
of values that applies to both.  If we are clear about this restriction I think that the criteria 
Scheler suggests do apply to negative values. There are, though, some peculiarities worth 
mentioning in how we experience these features.  
The first criterion Scheler advances is that of endurance: Instances of higher values 'endure' 
over changes in lower values in a particular normative way. It seems proper to the nature of love 
or knowledge that there is a particular normative demand that they ought to endure and 
continue, even if in fact, for empirical reasons, they fade and alter, or are forgotten. There is no 
guarantee that goods of higher values will endure empirically longer than those of lower value, 
but goods of higher values have 'expected' endurance over goods of lower values, otherwise 
something is wrong. If I were to tell you I deeply and truly loved someone, but that tomorrow I 
planned to stop loving them and love someone else, you would think me a fool, or at best just 
innocently confused about what love is. And when we do empirically change in our experience 
of a high value, whether of love, or of the beauty of an object, a very specific explanation is 
required for that change. We must explain that we were mistaken, the value we thought we 
beheld was never really there: either we mistook our own apprehension e.g. love was never 
really present, or we were mistaken about the object itself e.g. the object was never really 
beautiful. 
There is, however, no such equivalent expectation for instances of lower values, such as the 
agreeable.  Here it is entirely suitable to their nature that they will only endure momentarily and 
this is appropriate and requires no explanation: they are intrinsically variable.  Instances of the 
higher values, whether love, moral goodness, beauty or truth are also taken to be particularly 
enduring in significance even if they are directly given or apparent for only a very short period 
of time. The value of blissfulness endures over the value of temporary pleasure or discomfort; 
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instances of spiritual values endure over changes in health or physical vigour; and the highest 
values, those of holiness and particularly of God, himself, are taken to be uniquely and 
completely eternal in significance and endurance. The nature of God is intuited as eternal and 
essentially enduring beyond any phenomenal changes not primarily as a fact of theoretical 
metaphysics, or just because it is written in any particular holy scripture, but because as the 
fundamental summit of holiness, the highest possible value, God is directly intuited as most 
surpassingly enduring over all else that exists or could exist.
268
  
For the negative values it seems odd to use the same terminology. Do great evils have 
'endurance', and less 'variation'? Well, yes, in this same particular way in terms of being 
enduring in significance. For example, if we cease to be aware of some great piece of cruelty, 
the only justification for this can be an explanation that this was never a great piece of cruelty at 
all. Otherwise the significance endures and we are beholden with a responsibility to maintain it 
in our thought. This is something we feel as surely as any feature of the disvalue e.g. the 
responsibility to remember great disasters such as the Holocaust, or the First World War.  This 
drive to remembrance takes on its own ethical force in this occasion (as well as obvious purely 
practical importance as a means to avoiding a repetition of those events). On a much smaller 
scale there is an equivalent drive to the loss of a single individual person. But there is no such 
normative call in the case of shallow disvalues, such as the un-useful or the disagreeable; there 
is no call to justify why they should pass from our consciousness. 
The second means by which Scheler aims to measure value height is by considering the 
divisibility of the objects of value. Lower values are more closely tied to their physical 
extension and their over-all value is linearly proportionate to their physical size e.g. two 
kilograms of sugar is twice as valuable as one kilogram.  Its value is also strictly limited to its 
physical extension. This also has the feature of dividing people because experiencing the value 
is equivalent to physically possessing the bearer, which only a limited number of people can do. 
The higher a value is the less this is true. A piece of art can be divided in two, but whatever 
value the parts have it is not simply half that of the whole.  The same applies to other instances 
of beauty, or values of truth. Because they are independent of physical extension and divisibility 
these higher values can be experienced by an, in theory, unlimited number of people without 
each person exclusively consuming it: they are not restrictive. This means that they can act as a 
powerful force to unite people: they can be immediately accessible to more people without 
difficulty and because of their greater objectivity they can be relevant to a greater proportion of 
people.
269
  
I am forced to say ‘can be’, rather than ‘are’ because sadly beautiful and holy things, 
particularly, can be jealously seized and hoarded because such objects can only be in one place. 
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Firstly, this demonstrates the hierarchy with the modality whereby values of things are lesser 
than values of persons. Secondly, it is essentially possible and fitting for higher values to be 
universally accessible and appreciated, in a way that is not possible for lower values, despite 
contingent restrictions on actual goods. A painting must be in one museum (though of course 
there can be copies of greater or lesser accuracy), but every person who visits it may partake of 
its beauty equally without limit or exhaustion. Also, though even values of personal freedom, 
the collective person of the nation, or God, can famously be a great source of conflict if misused 
this is only because they have already united great groups of people into a force that can then be 
misused, essentially unlike more trivial values.      
The same pattern can be seen with the 'divisibility' of negative values. Low negative values, like 
low positive values, are specifically limited in physical extension either in the body where they 
are felt e.g. physical discomfort, or in the object in which they are recognised e.g. rotten food, 
an uncomfortable shirt, etc. Their value is linearly connected to the quantity of the ‘good’ in 
which they are instantiated: Half as much ‘good’ normally has half as much disvalue. Higher 
negative values display the opposite effect: instances of them are more 'universal', 
experienceable by more people and more generally significant to everyone, rather than only 
those who are bodily experiencing them. This can be seen in the way great evils place a burden 
of responsibility on the whole community, or even when no responsibility can exist, they are 
still felt as relevant to all, and something that all can and should experience. Great instances of 
suffering, ignorance or death are the business of everyone. In the words of John Donne, "no man 
is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; [...] Any 
man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind. And therefore never send to 
know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."
270
 
The similarity between positive and negative values in their height is, however, masked by the 
very different response they demand. When threatened by instances of deep disvalue our 
response is to rush to avoid their instantiation entirely or to destroy, remove, repair, or overwrite 
it immediately. Whereas, through instances of positive values our response to the sense of their 
essential endurance and universality is to do whatever we can to ensure their instances do 
empirically endure, as is fitting to their nature.    
The third means Scheler argues for is that of lower values being founded in higher values.
 271
 As 
has been previously mentioned 'useful' values are consecutive values of the agreeable and are 
hence based in them. Agreeable values in turn are founded in the higher values of the vital. The 
senses of pain and pleasure have meaning and reference because they point to facts about the 
vital values such as health and vigour of a whole living being. Scheler argues that the values of 
the vital, in turn, could not have significance on their own because they presume the existence 
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and value of life itself. But this value of life itself, regardless of the variations in the vital value 
of forms or features of life, cannot be grasped from within this realm of value because it is itself 
the precondition of any positive or negative valuation in this realm.  Rather, the awareness of 
the value of life itself must come from outside this modality through spiritual acts that grasp 
life's place within mental values.  Scheler then argues that these mental values, finally, 
presuppose a unified world of objective value within which they can be experienced and the 
values of reality as an unconditioned whole (à la Kant
272
), and these are the values of holiness. 
This principle also applies to the negative values, and here the correspondence is more obvious, 
as the initial description of the relationships of foundation between the modalities makes less 
reference to particular positive or negative values. Each modality obviously contains both the 
positive and negative values of that type. Negative agreeable values are equally founded on 
negative vital values as the positive ones, etc. 
The fourth criterion closely relates to the second and third: the form of contentment associated 
with a value is deeper the higher the value is. This contentment "is an experience of 
fulfilment"
273
, whereby one reaches towards a value and experiences it in the possessing of a 
good. The pleasure associated with realising agreeable values is strictly transitory and limited to 
the moment of consumption or sensation.  The deeper contentment that comes from the higher 
vital values or spiritual values essentially retains its significance over variations in the pleasure 
from lower agreeable sensations and in fact is required to fully appreciate them. This is clear in 
terms of negative values as well: One who does not have deeper contentment will not even be 
able to enjoy minor sensuous pleasures properly; rather they turn to ash in the mouth. They do 
not vanish, they are felt, but they are fundamentally unsatisfying against the deeper despair of a 
greater disvalue. On the other hand, the deeper contentment that stems from the person being in 
harmony with the highest values they can experience allows "a fully content laughter [to] 
resound about the most trivial joys"
274
.   
This is also an argument against any simple concept of utilitarianism or hedonism. The 
'pleasure' gained from different experiences or states of contentment is most certainly distinct in 
quality, regardless of other considerations. Pushpin is not the same as poetry, as even Mill was 
prepared to admit
275
. Kelley Ross argues that the experience of pleasure acts as the subjective, 
internal correlate of the objective, external value in its different forms. Correspondingly, the 
experience of pleasure is as qualitatively variable as the experience of value itself.
276
  This 
coheres with the phenomenological doctrine that there is always a connection between the 
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object and the manner in which it is phenomenally experienced.  This is not to say that the value 
is identical to the pleasure because one is external and subjective and the other is external and 
objective, but that they are essentially connected to one another. In Scheleran terms, the 
objective positive values are recognised through the subjective, internal feeling-states of 
pleasure (or contentment). We know these are not identical because, as was recognised as early 
as Plato, we can experience bad pleasures,
277
  even in terms of pleasure at things I myself 
consciously know to be wrong and guiltily reproach myself for. In Kant's words, we do not have 
a duty to seek pleasure, but to act so as to make ourselves worthy of pleasure.
278
  A sentiment 
that obviously presupposes the separation of these two things, something that is in addition 
testified to by the phenomenological evidence that Scheler discusses in terms of values and 
feeling-states generally. 
The final and fifth means by which Scheler distinguishes between elements of the value-
hierarchy is that of the different levels of intentionality in the experience of the modalities. The 
feelings aimed at each modality vary in kind depending on the value they are aimed at, and they 
reveal a value that is more or less 'absolute' or 'relative' to the one experiencing.
279
 They are 
least intentional when experiencing agreeable values, such as those relating to the body, of 
sensory pleasure or food and this also reflects the fact that these values are the most 
immediately related to our physical constitution.  The feelings are more intentional when 
dealing with vital values relating to the living being, such as health or comfort, more again in 
mental or spiritual values and most in values of holiness. The taste of sweetness of a fruit is on 
the tongue, but the beauty of a painting is seen in the painting.  More so, as Otto argued, the 
experience of holiness is so separate from oneself that it leaves one as nothing but “dust and 
ashes”280  before the Holy, which it is impossible to conceive except as utterly relativising our 
own existence. In each of these levels the feeling is given more and more as representing a value 
as its object that is independent of the feeling itself that reveals it, and also of the particular 
physical constitution of the being experiencing it, or even of life in general. 
Does it seem that higher negative values, as higher positive values, are experienced as less 
relative to the particular constitution of the one experiencing the value?  I would argue that they 
are (as compared with the lower negative values). The discomforts or pains as much as the 
comforts and pleasures of lower values are experienced as relative to our own body and 
constitution, and those higher mental disvalues, those opposing the good, the true, and the 
beautiful, are similarly absolute in this sense: experiences as unconnected to dependence on 
ourselves and as having absolute significance in relation to the universe as a whole. Indeed, the 
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same arguments I have mentioned above, in relation to the criteria of divisibility and endurance 
also apply here as well.  
Also, the revealing of that value becomes more and more responsive to, and capable of, being 
disrupted by the mental attention being directed at the feeling that reveals the value rather than 
the nature of the value itself. For these higher values any attempt to do this immediately 
detaches the person from the value. If one attends to the feelings that indicate the beauty of a 
sunset, one is dealing with a totally different object to that beauty itself, and hence one loses 
sight of it. The perception is disrupted, whereas, as stated above, whether one attends or not to a 
feeling-state (such as a taste, or a pain) it remains fundamentally as it is because it entirely refers 
to nothing beyond itself.
281
  Scheler argues that these facts show that these values are more 
'absolute' and less 'relative' to particular forms of life and therefore higher in value. 
It is not necessary for a person to refer to any of these criteria in the immediate intuiting of the 
height of a value, or in its placing through preferment. In acts of pure feeling the height of a 
value is also given immediately as an act of intuition.  These criteria are rather those gained by 
studying the order of values in its entirety and looking at the features its structure bears, in the 
hope of being able to return to acts of immediate intuition and assess them for accuracy.    
How convincing are these criteria though? There is clearly considerable similarity and overlap 
between them. Scheler certainly thought that they were sufficiently connected to justify 
reference to one single concept of the height of values.
282
  The first and fourth criteria both refer 
to the "endurance" of a value, the first in reference to the objective value itself and the fourth in 
reference to the subjective pleasure that accompanies the experience of that value. There is also 
a connection between the idea that instances of higher values (and their pleasure) endure over 
changes in lesser goods with the idea that they are more intentionally independent of our 
particular, physical nature and hence less affected by transient changes in ourselves. This unites 
the endurance, contentment and intentionality criteria. The second criterion, of divisibility, 
seems to also connect the idea that values are higher in as far as their instances endure over, or 
are independent of, the immediate physical connection to feeling beings that is expressed in the 
first and fourth criteria. The potential universality or absoluteness of values is connected to this 
independence, which is in turn connected to their height.
283
   
The third, of foundedness, is perhaps the vaguest of the criteria and Scheler himself seems to 
struggle to connect the modalities of value together in the manner he would like. It seems 
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clearer among the lower values, in the steps from useful to agreeable to vital, but then seems to 
move to more abstract and tenuous considerations in trying to move from vital to mental to holy 
values. Certainly, these relations do not seem to be a fact of clear phenomenological givenness. 
It is understandable as an intellectual connection of the ‘metaphysics’ of values, but not as an 
immediately intuitable practical fact. This is also a problem of the second criterion. We are 
meant to be discussing essential a priori connections between the ranks of values.  The 
divisibility argument seems to refer to the properties of the bearers of certain values rather than 
the pure values themselves. Of course, as discussed earlier in relation to the subject of bearers, 
there is a connection between values and the types of bearers they may have,
284
  because of the 
connection between a thing’s possible values and its nature, but it is still difficult to see how this 
criterion may be taken as an essential feature of the height of values themselves.    
It should be remembered though that the criteria do not need to describe the actual metaphysical 
basis on which value height is based. Rather they need to provide some independent, generally 
reliable yardstick to 'measure' the height of values independently of the act of immediate insight 
that primarily defines this fact for us. This is another way of supporting the objectivity of the 
hierarchy in the manner I described in chapter four, even apart from the possibility of 
intersubjective verification. They can also give us a broader insight into the fundamental 
essential features that define value height behind the vision of it in which the height of each 
value is initially and immediately given to us. It certainly does not seem that all Scheler’s 
criteria do this, however.  Two groups can be distinguished, the first that merely provide 
heuristics to help verify the height of values, and the second that more seems to reach the 
essential features of height among values: the 2nd (divisibility) and the 3rd (foundedness) seem 
to belong in the former category, the 1st (endurance), the 4th (contentment) and the 5th 
(intentionality) in the latter one.  
There is also an interesting possibility to connect the foundedness criterion to the problems in 
value-preference that emerge in relation to the embodiment of the person. The values of the 
person are the highest spiritual and holy values, but the person is embodied and thus reliant on 
lower physical functions that relate to vital and agreeable values e.g. nourishment is a vital 
value, instantiated in food, and it founds various agreeable values of taste. Due to the 
embodiment of the person, this highest form of value is dependent on lower values of 
nourishment, etc. This puts an importance on the lower values due to their necessary relation to 
the instantiation of the higher values. According to the third criteria lower values are founded on 
higher values, which mean the position of the lower values is defined by their relation to the 
higher values. In this case the lower good is more important because of the manner in which it 
opens the possibility for the higher values. The corresponding goods of food or life for animals 
that are not persons and cannot access the higher values is correspondingly lower. The higher 
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spiritual values of persons ennoble the lower goods and values upon which they rely. This has 
particular relevance in the next chapter discussing Levinas' view of persons. He closely links the 
importance of recognising the basic material needs of the Other with his portrayal of the person 
in extremely elevated, almost theological language of the ungraspable infinity, thus linking 
what, in Scheleran terms, are the highest and lowest values in the person. 
 
3. Relations of Values to Bearers 
Values can be brought to givenness on their own in thought but first they must be experienced 
in bearers. Bearers are those objects in which values are instantiated, i.e. those objects that 
‘bear’ values. In as far as they are recognised and considered as valuable they are called 
‘goods’.  For example, my plate of mushrooms is a thing that instantiates the agreeable values 
of certain tastes and textures, and the vital value of ‘Food’. In fact it is directly experienced as a 
good, just as directly and naturally as it is experienced as a thing.
285286
 A lot of the complexity in 
moral decision making in Scheler’s system comes from the sometimes confusing manner in 
which values are instantiated as goods. Certain bearers carry higher values than other bearers. 
This is something directly intuitively discovered in the same manner that the heights of values 
themselves are. We discover in examination a mingled structure of height among both bearers 
and values. This new dimension complicates ethical decision making, especially if it is poorly 
understood. But if it is properly distinguished and considered it is important in avoiding the 
confusion that otherwise emerge in ethics, for example the apparent paradox between the 
objectivity of ethics but the transient nature of goods.  If we are to understand Scheler correctly 
we need to understand these distinctions between values, goods, bearers. It is certainly essential 
for any attempt to use a Scheleran ethic to guide real-life practical decision making.    
In addition to the rankings among values, certain bearers are essentially connected with certain 
higher or lower values as well in a different ways. Firstly, within a modality, the values attached 
to certain bearers are higher than those attached to lesser bearers. Secondly, certain types of 
bearers are particularly related with a specific higher or lower modality. Of the first type is the 
hierarchy of values of persons as the highest values, over the values of acts, over values of 
things. This is the case within each modality e.g. mental values of persons are higher than the 
equivalent mental values instantiated in acts, and higher in turn than the equivalent value 
instantiated in things. 
The most striking and highest example of these categories of bearers is that of persons. As I 
previously mentioned, persons are the unique bearers of the moral values of good and evil, the 
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values of the moral tenor and the objective value-essence of the individual. Collective persons 
bear these values as well, but in all these cases the higher values obtain among individual 
persons specifically. In addition, values of the Holy always refer back to persons and those of 
spirit/mind generally do. This places the person as the central feature of the ethical order.  The 
person as a bearer can be contrasted with the values of acts and the values of things, and is so 
important that I particularly consider the role of persons in its own chapter subsequent to this 
one, particularly contrasting Scheler's concept of the individual person with that of Levinas.   
The second type of hierarchy among bearers, where certain bearers are particularly related to 
certain higher or lower modalities, is described by Scheler as follows: the modality of the 
‘useful’ is connected to events, the ‘agreeable’ to things, the ‘vital’ to living beings, the ‘mental’ 
to the self and the ‘holy’ to persons. These do not exhaust the distinctions among bearers 
though.  More subtle and specific hierarchies can be detected, such as the essential distinctions 
between values of oneself and others, values of acts as compared to functions and reactions, and 
values of intentional-states and feeling-states, among others.
287, 288 
Scheler outlines in each of 
these cases which class of bearers essentially have higher values attached to them than the 
alternatives, such as acts over functions and relations, intentional-states over feeling-states. 
Another significant example is ‘consecutive’ values (see footnote 32), which are generally 
lower in height than self-values, as in the case of the useful compared to the agreeable. In each 
of these cases there are clear patterns which help explain the intuited height of the values of 
certain bearers over others, and which can then be applied more widely to clarify possible value 
confusions. For example, intentional-states and acts hold higher values because they are more 
actively and individually chosen than feeling-states or reactions (related to the intentionality 
criterion discussed before). Self-values are higher than consecutive values because the second 
are founded on the first i.e. consecutive values only have meaning by relation to their self-
values, and because the second will only ever be partial instantiations of the reality that exist 
fully in the first (as in all symbols). In individual ethical cases these classes of bearers can help 
us to categorise the relation of the variety of different nuances of values that will be instantiated 
in various different bearers e.g. feeling-states, acts, moral tenors, functions, things, beings, etc.    
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In understanding the distinctions between types of bearers we must also remember that bearers 
of higher values do not necessarily mean bearers of more good, because there are high positive 
and negative values and hence they bear the possibility of being used in both greater good and 
greater evil. Furthermore, there are instances where one is not required to prefer the value that is 
abstractly higher; the difference arises in the intensity in which it appears in the act, or thing, or 
other bearer. A particularly fine vintage may be rightly preferred over an academic task in the 
moment, though generally one should admit that the value of wisdom is higher than the 
agreeable taste of wine.    
What is the basis for these fundamental differences?  It can only be the constitutive features of 
the bearers themselves. While the Is/Ought divide is a basic pillar of a value ethics this does not 
mean that values are arbitrarily related to physical properties (certainly within any particular 
universe). For example, the fact something is 'food' is defined for any given animal by facts 
about its biology and chemistry and then the biology and chemistry of other objects that may or 
may not be food. This does not essentially define the value of ‘food’ or ‘nourishment’ but it 
does connect it (in this world) essentially with certain bearers. Obviously the same is the case 
for living beings and wider vital values, as well as many other examples.  This does not mean 
that value ethics can be collapsed into any kind of naturalism though. To continue my example, 
it is not from knowledge of  its constitutive natural facts that something is valued as food, rather 
we go from the immediate knowledge of what food is, what nourishment is, and what it means 
to us and from that investigate the physical properties that accompany this reality. The value 
component of a situation can be clear to us without the precise combination of physical 
properties that instantiate that value being clear to us at all
289
. We experience the value directly 
and that motivates us. As was first noted by Hume (or even earlier) practical cognition is just 
very different to theoretical cognition and leads to different types of conclusions.  As such it 
relies on very different objects, although they are of course connected to theoretical facts.  As 
Scheler said, objects are truly both goods and things; or in other words, values are distinct from 
their bearers and both are separately needed to make up the goods that are the stuff of our 
ethical choice in the world. 
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4. Qualitative or Quantitative judgement 
Once values have been experienced in goods those goods can become the object of ethical 
judgement. Scheler's view of ethical judgement is that it is primarily qualitative in nature. This 
can be contrasted with the quantitative approach of a theory such as traditional utilitarianism, 
with its hope of a 'hedonic calculus'
290
, and with various other more complex utilitarianisms and 
theories that share fundamental consequentialist assumptions. Scheler argues that we consider 
the over-all, multi-dimensional value complexes instantiated in certain situations and on the 
basis of these complexes choose one as more valuable over another. The process by which we 
consider the nature of the value complexes will be simple in some cases and very complicated 
involving many different factors, values and goods in others. This is not to say this will be a 
purely qualitative process though, because quantitative features of value will influence the 
overall value instantiated in a situation. This is especially in situations involving either lower 
values, such as the useful and agreeable, in cases where the decision is overwhelmingly between 
different quantities of the same types of good, or in cases where a higher good is reduced to one 
simple aspect of it. 
One example of such a situation of value judgement would be the decision to use nuclear 
weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War. The full details of such a 
situation cannot ever be held directly before the mind, even in imagination. But still the moral 
decision is taken not on any purely quantitative basis but on the basis of the over-all moral 
'colour' of the situation as held before the mind's eye. Like a mathematical equation with many 
variables, there is no way to break down most moral situations into simple units that could be 
counted against one another. Indeed, the moral questions surrounding the use of nuclear 
weapons on Japan illustrate this. This is one case where a strong argument for a numerical 
answer can be made: did the bombing reduce or increase the over-all loss of life in the War? But 
this does not reflect the extent of ethically relevant questions that can be raised about the 
bombing, which includes such issues as the relevant moral status of soldiers and civilians, the 
moral intentions of the Japanese and Allied leaderships, and the relative moral status of 
Japanese lives as the aggressors and Allied lives as those of the non-aggressors in the War. No 
such question can be broken down into purely or largely quantitative considerations but rather 
rest on the qualitative issue of the height of the values and goods involved even in situations 
with a substantial quantitative element.  
It just about makes sense to talk about a quantitative approach to moral judgement with theories 
such as the various forms of utilitarianism, or other theories that attempt to judge ethics on a 
single principle. Of course even here it can only be metaphorical because any literal 
quantitative, ‘additive’ system relies on being able to break down its subject into individual, 
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uniform units, and that is clearly impossible even with something as simple as a single type of 
pleasure.  But the sheer range of ethical values with their intrinsic differences in height, 
confounded by the different degree to which they may be instantiated in the goods of any 
particular situation, makes this quantitative approach nonsensical even in terms of metaphor. 
Pure values themselves cannot even be divided in thought because they are essences and thus 
are not open to quantification when given as pure values. These experiences can only be 
compared in terms of a qualitative over-all choice. This is reflected in the primacy of our binary 
concepts of right and wrong.  If our ethical cognition or phenomenal experience was primarily 
quantitative surely our moral concepts would reflect that. Our primary concepts would not be 
right or wrong; they would be righter or wronger, in the same way we talk about something 
being longer or shorter in length. This is not the case and often people will recoil at any 
suggestion of such talk, deeming it unacceptably pragmatic and grubby rather than moral. The 
binary usage is, on the other hand, undoubtedly our primary usage by a large factor. Though of 
course almost all people do accept that quantitative ‘more or less’ considerations have some role 
to play in morality.    
However, even though I believe Scheler is correct to describe the phenomenology of moral 
decision making as predominantly qualitative, quantitative issues do still exist among actual 
goods and pose a question for a theory of value preference. What about simple moral situations 
where the quantitative element is predominant, for example, where for whatever reason I can 
either help two people or four people in the same way? Or, if I have to choose whether one 
person dies or ten people? Even here, though, the situation is far from 'simple', in terms of being 
easily resolved, as the extensive literature on the 'trolley problem' shows.
 291
  Take the first 
example then. Here it seems apparent that it is preferable to do good to the four rather than the 
two and that is a quantitative decision: One 'amount' of good is simply larger than the other. 
Even here there may be further complications that make it more of a qualitative decision. For 
example, the two people may be my children, and the four complete strangers.  As such many 
people will agree I have the overriding duty towards the two, depending on the circumstances. 
We can ignore that possibility to further simplify the question and return to a simple quantitative 
case, but the fact that these provisos constantly need to be made shows how difficult it is in 
almost all natural scenarios to extract the purely quantitative ethical issue from the qualitative 
differences in the values that surround it. But the simplification can occur in thought and the 
quantitative intuition, of course, remains. Once simplified, it becomes clear that the quantity of 
the good is an irreducible part of the ethical choice. We do have to accept that ethical cognition 
can quantify values instantiated in goods, and include that element alongside the multi-
dimensional, qualitative, ethical choices between the value-complexes of the situation. 
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Scheler does acknowledge this issue to a limited degree, in the assessment of simple goods. In 
his discussion of the ‘divisibility’ of values he accepts that lower, agreeable goods are 
distinguished by the fact “their value corresponds to their material extension” and that a piece of 
cloth is “double the worth of one half of it”292. Indeed, this linear connection between the 
physical quantity and the value of the good is definitive for values of lower height. But for 
higher goods such as art, or persons, this is most definitely not the case. The quantitative, 
additive application is real in terms of some goods but explicitly limited. There is a 
quantification element with higher goods, many lives are worth more than one, if we abstract 
from all else, but it is most decisively non-linear and non-additive. It comes clear in intuition as 
a deepening of the value-complex under consideration in comparison to another. The 
quantitative perspective predominates with higher goods, such as persons, only when we 
abstract from the fullness of their being and consider them from merely one particular 
perspective. Economic man would be one example, a perspective that is legitimate only in as far 
as we remember that it is deliberately simplistic and not a representation of the person as a 
whole. Another would be the use of people in military operations, when a commander may talk 
about having so-many thousand rifles at this disposal, reducing men to their weapons. 
In fact, whether in considering the case of the number of lives lost in a choice of military 
strategy, or the divisibility of material goods, quantification becomes particularly important only 
when making comparisons solely, or overwhelmingly, between the same type of goods, whether 
of the highest type such as persons, or a low type such as material goods. As soon as multiple 
goods or values make up a significant part of the situation then the quantitative aspect shrinks 
rapidly.  And, of course, this idea of a quantitative aspect among choices of specific types of 
goods is very different to the idea, paradigmatically expressed in traditional utilitarianism, that 
regardless of the goods or values involved in a situation it is ethically decided by the ‘amount’ 
of some other, definitively ethical, property e.g. happiness, pleasure, preferences, etc.         
             
5. Levels of Obligation 
We have gone from considering pure values, to bearers of goods, to ethical judgement.  Now I 
move to considering how the ethical judgement is experienced by the agent as producing a form 
of ethical obligation.  Scheler considers a wide range of feelable values and how these appear in 
the experience of the person, and also how the specifically moral values of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ 
appears in the preference between values. Indeed, Scheler argues that values all essentially 
involve an ideal ought that states ‘this ought to be’ or ‘this ought not to be’.  But his philosophy 
does not consider any differences between the ethical ought that different instances of good may 
create. Scheler distinguishes between normative and ideal oughts where the first generates 
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imperatives, and the second does not, but does not distinguish any different deontic levels 
between normative oughts. He extends ethics to be roughly equivalent to the entirety of 
axiology and connects moral good and evil exclusively with judging between, and willing the 
realisation of, non-moral ethical (i.e. all other) values.  
But with ethics extended to values as distinct as the agreeable and the holy, and everything in 
between, how can morality be used to refer to correct judgement over all of them in the same 
way?  Is the immediate, important obligation to save a life equivalent to the lesser ethical 
commitment to make the most of one's God-given talents? If not, how exactly do they vary, 
where are the boundaries between them and why are they there? If we can make some progress 
towards identifying such boundaries we can potentially extend Scheler’s theory into deontic 
categories that will supplement the axiological emphasis of the Formalismus. Not only as a 
useful extension of the overall theory, but through the intrinsic connection between values and 
ideal oughts, as an important further method of distinguishing between families of values, and 
ethical judgement, in a Scheleran theory.  
Both oughts and good, in general, originally relate to acts of preferment of a higher or greater 
set of values over a lower. The simplest and most obvious idea would be to assume that the 
ought generated has a greater strength proportionately to the difference in height between the 
values. There is doubtlessly some truth in this, and it would mirror an equally obvious answer to 
this question in other theories of ethics that recognise the good.  For example, in hedonic 
utilitarianism one may answer that the greater the increase in happiness produced by an action 
the greater the obligation to do that thing, and there is nothing more to it.  But this is a very 
crude mechanism that may be suited to a simplistic quantitative theory such as traditional 
utilitarianism but that seems inappropriate in a Scheleran a priori ethics. Only by identifying 
principles by which we may distinguish differences in kind can we clearly separate differences 
in types of obligation or ought, in the absence of some type of consistent quantitative system of 
‘measuring’ differences in height. Various other philosophers have defended crude versions of 
deontic distinction, generally between moral imperatives or duties and voluntary, or prudential, 
questions of non-moral values like aesthetics, etc. This is particularly a feature of deontological 
theories like Kant or W.D.Ross that focus on the ‘right’ as entirely separate to the good, or 
‘weal’ (or welfare)293. Other theories, more like Scheler, indicate that ‘The Good’ should be 
pursued generally and make no distinction except perhaps a quantitative one between greater 
and lesser goods. Examples are various forms of utilitarianism, but also Aquinas’ natural law 
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theory and others, often theories that emphasise the good as the fundamental moral feature (as 
opposed to the dichotomy of the right and the good).
294
  
Some philosophers do insist on a range of fundamental, qualitative deontic distinctions between 
different classes of oughts. One such that is particularly relevant to Scheler is Kelley Ross, who 
argues that, in fact, a wide range of different ethical areas do display clear qualitative 
distinctions in the nature of the ought that is linked to them.
295
 I use Ross as a starting point not 
because Scheler or I would agree with every detail he suggests, or because he is the only 
philosopher who proposes a pluralist deontic scheme, but as a position to begin considering how 
such categories might be justified and integrated into Scheler’s ethics. Ross seems particularly 
pertinent to Scheler because of his intense focus on the details and range of experience of value. 
He focuses on recognising qualitative distinctions between oughts relating to the entire range of 
values that Scheler discusses as ethically relevant from the agreeable, to values of the mind, the 
unique relations between persons, and the holy; whereas not all philosophers consider a scheme 
of objective values that covers all these categories. He recognises both ‘The Good’, which itself 
covers a wide variety of qualitatively different classes that nonetheless also recognisably share 
the common property of being good; and the separate, specifically moral good of judgements 
and actions, in a manner that mirrors the distinction used by Scheler.  Ross also makes the 
important point, to which Scheler would doubtlessly agree, that different values and deontic 
categories can vary independently: one’s intentions may be good, but one’s actions bad; One 
may do something that is aesthetically beautiful, but morally horrendous. Each of these areas 
must be considered separately and distinctly to fully understand ethics. This agrees strongly 
with Scheler’s extreme pluralism whereby all different elements of our psychology, our action 
and our surrounding may contain and instantiate unique values, and these may vary greatly. 
Their theories also share a direct derivation from Kant’s ethics, through thoroughly rejecting his 
rationalistic formalism in favour of a pluralist, experienced good, though in Ross’ case this is 
via the Friesian tradition rather than the phenomenological one.
296
  
The most general distinction Ross defends is between (what he calls) the imperatives of 
morality and the non-imperative oughts of non-moral ethics. This bears some explanation. We 
have an overriding moral imperative to avoid certain actions and to undertake certain other 
actions (except possibly in truly extreme circumstances) e.g. murder, rape, feeding one's 
children, saving a life when it requires modest effort, etc. Actions of this type are taken to be 
always and severely obligatory in all situations unless there is an astonishingly good explanation 
for why the standard imperative does not apply. This is widely accepted though we may 
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disagree about the where the border of this region lies. Some philosophers argue that morality or 
ethics is only definable in terms of the imperatives that apply. Not all ethical obligations are of 
this type however, while still being objectively, rationally and experientially ethical. 
Ross divides the imperatives of morality into three categories, distinguishing the morality of 
intentions of the will, from the morality of actions, and the morality of public justice. This third 
category relates to the morality of public life and “property, contract, government and public 
order” and its deontic form is a distinguishable nuance of imperatives that Ross terms as 
“jussives”, which represents the morality of laws and legal agreements. 297  This is different to 
personal morality because by entering a contract or a law being passed by a legitimate body a 
moral obligation is generated to follow it. But one that would not exist without this action, and 
which may in fact vary from contract to contract, and jurisdiction to jurisdiction, whereas the 
obligations of personal morality exist generally due merely to the demands of the existence of 
persons. 
Ross argues that outside what would normally be considered morally obligatory as imperatives 
there is a much wider category that he refers to as ‘ideal ethics’, and that bears forms of what he 
calls a ‘hortative’ obligation. Roughly, the goods that fall into this category are those that we 
can be exhorted to do, (hence hortative) but that are not imperatives that we must follow. 
Alternatively put, these are acts and objects of ethical value (that create an ought) but not 
imperative necessity.  This category includes things good-for-us, such as the value of our health, 
of pursuing an education, pursuing happiness, or of developing our talents. In Scheler’s and 
Ross’ view these are certainly real ethical goods, but Ross particularly argues they are ones that 
do not come under a commanding imperative. Ross also includes in this wide category 
relatively humble goods such as "that of a good dinner, or a good pair of shoes"
298
, again items 
that are valuable but are not highly obligatory to pursue.  
We may find someone bizarre, perverse or uncultured who rejected such goods in preference for 
demonstrably inferior articles and may seek to encourage them otherwise, but we would have no 
basis to command them absolutely. We believe them to be wrong in some way, even objectively 
wrong, but not morally wrong. It is perfectly meaningful to say that an artist has an ethical 
obligation to pursue beauty, for example, or that it is good for someone to consider their own 
health, but also to say that we cannot call this an absolute requirement
299
. There are just 
different categories of ethical requirements or obligations. This is not something that many 
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ethical theories (such as, really, Scheler’s,) or indeed commonplace ethical discussion, always 
recognises.   
Ross uses the hortative to refer to a particular category of obligation but also uses it as a general 
term while distinguishing two further sub-types of the hortative form of obligation within ‘ideal 
ethics’. The first of these sub-categories is the ‘optative’ obligation. The use of the term 
‘optative’ derives from the Greek for wishing something to be so. This refers to the obligation 
regarding things that are good in themselves outside human action, such as the value of nature. 
These items cannot generally generate obligations of action because they are (more or less) not 
dependent on human will, but they do generate an optative ought that refers to them ethically 
demanding the correct attitude of respect and recognition of the value inherent in them. This is 
distinct from the general hortative that we can be exhorted to do and falls under human choice, 
as in the examples of the previous paragraph.  
Finally Ross distinguishes the pietative obligation belonging to the area of the Holy as unique in 
character again. His characterisation of the Holy is derived directly from Rudolph Otto rather 
than Scheler.
300
 The pietative obligations of religion refer to the most ontologically profound 
areas of existence (the fundamental meaning and purpose of life and the entirety of existence as 
an unconditioned whole) but can take the most diverse range of forms. In comparison to the 
ability to effect hortative goods, and the disinterested good-in-itself that defines optative goods, 
the pietative is defined by the unique relation of tremendous mystery that defines the Holy, that 
stretches beyond all phenomenal reality and before which the physical world is radically 
relativised. This is true whether it points ultimately to God, as in Judaism, etc, or not, as in 
Buddhism, etc. Pietative obligations are unique in having the strongest degree of significance 
and obligation for believers but can have no ethical obligation on those who are not believers. A 
person who doesn’t recognise any transcendent universal value of this type will often confuse 
the pietative obligation with purely subjective, value-free preference but this is incorrect; it is 
still an entirely real area of values that he himself is cut off from.   
There are some clear overlaps between these categories and Scheler's categories of values, 
though of course they don’t match up exactly. This is to be expected as they originate from 
different considerations.  Ross’ starting point is deontic, the different obligations and statuses of 
different ethical categories: positive law, morality, religious obligation, aesthetics, etc; whereas 
Scheler starts from axiology and then derives the under-developed deontic elements of his 
philosophy from that point. Specific match-ups aside, I argue that Ross is definitely correct in 
arguing that different ethical categories must attach to different levels of obligation. While still 
being clearly ethical, the ought that attaches to aesthetic choices are feelably different to that 
attached to core moral commands; and different again to that relevant to the respect due to 
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natural goods in of themselves, or to religious obligations. Scheleran theory provides a clear 
answer to the question of why ethical values motivate in general: they are grasped through acts 
of intentional feeling and conation that are a core part of our motivational impulses; but it does 
not distinguish between types of motivation. In Scheler’s theory, value choices are an 
intentional act of ethical cognition whereby different values are grasped by different acts of 
intentional feeling and conation. It could be predicted that this difference in natures between the 
levels and types of values grasped would in turn involve qualitative distinctions in the acts of 
preference, and that this itself would produce a difference in the type of the ought motivating 
the agent.  
Ross' theory is motivated by its Kantian origins, where our degree of certainty about an area of 
knowledge is inversely correlated with its degree of ontological depth. As such, we have clear 
knowledge of empirical reality but ontologically this is only the 'appearance' or conditioned 
nature of existence, whereas we have no knowledge of the 'things-in-themselves' or of the 
unconditioned nature that stands at the basis of reality.
301
 He argues that the same is true in 
ethics. The moral law between persons is precisely and rationally definable but is less 
ontologically broad and significant to the value of the universe in general. Whereas the value of 
things as goods-in-themselves is less determinate and more diverse, and the ultimate value of 
reality as an unconditioned whole, while the most ontologically deep, is the least determinate of 
all.
302
  
However, I think that Ross is incorrect to argue that imperative obligations are more precisely 
definable than hortative obligations. I would argue, and I believe Scheler would agree with me, 
that it is impossible to define the limits of the moral law in this way. This is because any such 
limits will always be contingent on acts of actual value insight in particular situations in which 
there is always the possibility of some new act of ethical discovery or nuance that cannot be 
constrained by prior standards. What Ross lacks is a developed concept of the intuitive access to 
values themselves. Although his approach is detailed and very widely aware of a broad and 
diverse range of values he does not have any idea of the phenomenological access to values 
directly. This leads him to over-estimate the degree to which the moral law can be ‘rationally’, 
finitely defined, because he does not consider the possibility of new moral discovery, and 
under-estimates the degree to which non-imperative ethics is definable, because he lacks a clear 
theory of how values can be directly experienced in all the different modalities.  
If we compare Ross’ categories with Scheler’s modalities of values there is one clear, obvious 
overlap in the last category mentioned: pietatives of the Holy. This is unsurprising as Otto and 
Scheler were working at the same time, were aware of each other's work and apparently both 
                                                     
301
 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Marcus Weigelt. London: Penguin Books 
Ltd, 2007 [1781, 1787]. 
302
 Ross, Kelley. "Six Domains of the Polynomic Theory of value." The Proceedings of the Friesian 
School. 1996-2014. http://www.friesian.com/domain.htm (accessed February 2015). 
132 
 
gave guarded approval to elements of the other's theory.
303
 Their descriptions of the Holy, and 
the establishment of it as a separate category of value are, hence, highly similar. The description 
of the distinct pietative nature of obligation, however, belongs solely to Ross, building on Otto.  
Beyond the pietative there is no clear correlation between the categories, at least in terms of 
pure value modalities. The first thing that must be remembered is that Ross’ ‘ideal’ ethics does 
not correspond with Scheler’s ideal oughts. This is because every act of value preference founds 
an ideal ought, and only from these are normative oughts logically derived. Both hortative and 
imperative oughts (to use Ross’ terms) are normative oughts (in Scheler’s terms) that must be 
backed by ideal oughts. Scheler's modality of the agreeable certainly overlaps with Ross' 
category of ideal ethics. The examples of "a good dinner, or a good pair of shoes" could be 
classic examples of the values of the agreeable, and it would seem fitting to connect this weaker, 
more general form of obligation to something that is still a choice between values, but one that 
seems vastly less demanding than core moral obligation.  
Problematically, though, Ross also includes vital and mental values, such as one’s own health, 
and the values of art in this category as hortatives despite their being, in Scheler's scheme, much 
higher values. This, again, seems entirely reasonable. Although the values relating to beauty and 
truth are certainly higher than the merely agreeable values it still seems wrong to say that they 
hold an imperative obligation.  Someone who squanders an artistic or scientific talent to 
exclusively pursue trivial pleasures is making a value error but we would not consider them an 
evil man or woman.  It cannot be the case that the strictest form of obligation attaches to the 
highest values, because the pietative is distinctive of holy values, the highest values, but neither 
can it be the other way round, as Ross’ scheme suggests, as values of higher and lower modality 
are scattered across Ross’ deontic categories. If there is some clear Scheleran principle that 
explains the separation between what Ross identifies as the categories of imperative and 
hortative ethics then it will be something other than certain modalities falling under one or the 
other, and we must face the question that the problem could be with either Scheler or Ross. 
How then will it be possible to relate different forms of obligation to structural features among 
values?
304
 These must be in terms of connecting qualitative structural features of value 
categories with the qualitative differences between types of obligation. This cannot be 
considered just in terms of the modalities, or a difference in the height of modalities of positive 
and negative values. As I have spent much of this chapter discussing, these modalities are 
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crucial starting points, but the reality of experienced values is considerably more complex.  It 
seems some other criterion apart from mere difference between heights in modalities is required.  
However, although at the start of this sub-chapter I rejected the idea that mere difference in 
height between values preferred might just be proportional to the strength of the ought 
generated; still I think the difference in height must have some impact, if the notion of height is 
to have any merit. Possibly the further element required is not just to consider high values but to 
remember the great difference between high positive and high negative values. Certainly even 
some high values of persons do not necessarily generate imperative moral obligations when 
considered on their own. The connection that must exist would be of the difference between the 
values preferred and the values placed after i.e. the alternative to the considered act. The 
difference between high positive personal values and negative personal values, however, is 
vastly greater than even that between high positive personal values and positive agreeable 
values.   
I think the greatest other issue must be the differing heights of values according to their bearers. 
Scheler repeatedly states that the values of the person, and particularly the individual person, are 
the highest values although these will exist across different modalities. Imperative morality is a 
matter primarily involving willing, action and consequences upon other persons, whereas 
hortative ethics, in Ross’ scheme, primarily involves actions towards oneself, and obligation 
involving the beauty of art, of nature, or of religion, rather than other finite persons.  This relates 
to the ability of the person to act. Ross distinguishes the optative obligation towards things such 
as the good-in-itself of nature, from the hortative obligation towards things that are good-for-us 
e.g. our own health, and from those things that we can command as a moral imperative. This 
optative refers to our obligation to the “worth of things independent of human purposes”305 and 
here it is the very fact we cannot affect them that influences the difference between this and the 
hortative. Possibly this also applies to the difference between the hortative and the imperative.  
For something to be an imperative, a duty, then the Kantian “you ought therefore you can” must 
apply, otherwise it is contradictory to demand that action or attitude. It may be an imperative 
obligation to not destroy a beautiful and valued painting, but it cannot be an imperative to create 
such a painting for that process is not meaningfully simple to do; hence it can only bear a 
hortative obligation. Similar considerations apply to paradigmatic hortatives like the value of 
one’s own health, or personal pleasure.  
This is, in turn, connected to the autonomy and unique perspective of the individual person on 
themselves. It is possible that I may know something is imperative for me, because I know I can 
do it, but no-one else can make that judgement on me because they do not. This may also apply 
without the epistemic condition, in that I may feel the pursuit of some high mental value of truth 
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or art, etc renders an imperative on myself that we would not consider actionable by others. This 
may be not because I uniquely have knowledge that I could fulfil it, but because of the value of 
my own autonomy and my own unique subjective personal perspective on myself as the creative 
author of my own potential acts, whereas all others hold a largely external object-based 
perspective on me. The converse also holds. I may consider something to lay on myself as a 
command, but that I can only exhort the other to take it as a command upon themselves. I 
cannot justifiably directly command them morally. 
Scheler would agree with this, to a point, because he argues that when considering the highest 
values direct normative imperatives cease to function precisely because the highest mental and 
spiritual values lie outside our direct control of action or willing.
306
 One cannot just will oneself 
to be virtuous, or to love others. This does not mean it lies entirely outside our long-term 
control, or that an ideal and ethical ought does not apply, but these fundamental features cannot 
be the subject of direct command. Scheler describes that in the Gospels Jesus nowhere 
commands, but rather leads and invites us to follow in his footsteps. We “love God” and “love 
our neighbour as ourselves” only by following in his acts of love for God and for the world.307 
There is substantial congruence here with Ross’ idea that the most metaphysically significant 
areas of value: the optative or pietative value of the universe as an end in itself, come under the 
most attenuated form of ‘obligation’. There are differences in the motivations for this view, but 
both Scheler and Ross share a commitment that this distance from our direct and precise 
influence, and hence the attenuated nature of the normative ought relating, is essentially 
connected to their great intrinsic importance.            
This begins to give an idea of how different levels of normative obligation can be integrated 
into a value ethics. It is clear that the features that Scheler identified as distinguishing the 
modalities do not complete the categorisation of values and uniqueness of bearers has an 
important role. The values of each modality overlap in terms of height in a manner that Scheler 
recognised in his discussion of values differing according to their bearers but certainly never 
clearly explicated, or perhaps sufficiently emphasised.  This is another important issue if a 
Scheleran ethics is ever to provide a comprehensive theory of our ethical experience in all its 
detail. But due to the nature of value cognition there will probably always be a degree of 
indeterminacy to this as well. I think it probable that like the extent of the moral law, the 
qualitative nature of the obligation that arises in individual circumstances is only fully 
accessible through acts of ethical insight in that situation and not to a priori reflection at all, for 
the same reasons. From the philosophical position we can only hope to catalogue and consider 
examples and the kind of criteria that may be relevant in actual examples, but real examples are 
likely to always outstrip such a limited list of considerations.  
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6. Love  
Both within the theory of persons, and in his entire wider ethical theory, Scheler gives love a 
unique place in ethical judgement distinct from value preference or value perception.  Love is 
the act, uniquely connected to persons, through which we discover new, previously unimagined, 
areas of values and hence is also the most supremely intentional and a priori act of emotional 
cognition. Correspondingly hate is a force that progressively blinds us to values.
308
 Love is also 
not an act of value preference, because it is directed at one particular value, not a plurality of 
values. 
For Scheler love is an intentional movement from a lower to a higher value in an object. “Love 
only occurs when, upon the values already acknowledged as ‘real’ there supervenes a 
movement, towards potential values still higher than those already given and presented.”309 
These values are given as ideally present but not empirically so: they are implicit in the values 
already empirically disclosed, and disclosed as the ‘real’ value and ‘true’ nature of the object, 
but not necessarily the ones it currently instantiates. Love reveals new values within each sphere 
it applies to and relates not only to humans but to anything that has value.  We sentimentally 
love non-human objects when we value our feelings towards them; we truly love them when we 
love them for themselves as different objects.
310
 It is important to remember that love is not the 
feelings we feel, rather these are symptoms that appear on the back of the ongoing act of love 
that is intentional and ideal.   
Love involves the movement towards a potential higher value and this value can appear either  
as existing but unperceived until that moment, or be given as something that ‘ought’ to exist (in 
the sense of the ideal ought). In true love this does not mean that we try to improve the person to 
make them better, or that we go seeking for higher values in them. That betrays a pedagogic 
attitude that is not love. The emergence of new values occurs of its own accord through the act 
of love itself. We appreciate the person, in the current moment, for both what they currently are 
and what we have seen that they have the potential to be. The difference lies in that in not-love 
we take the person as an end, an object to be improved, but in love we take the beloved as they 
are, while seeing them always already as containing the best they could possibly be, and thus 
enable and support them to fulfil that potential, without ever taking them as an object to be 
improved by our efforts.   
In love “we do indeed see the faults of these objects as they stand, but love them all the 
same”311. We love the ideal being, neither the empirical, existential one nor that one that ought 
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to be but a third thing. This sense is captured in the phrase: “Become what thou art”312.  Love is 
not the projection of values onto the beloved from the one who loves. Rather, it is the revealing 
of the possible, truly individual person in the one loved rather than their social person that can 
ordinarily be seen (defined by their overlapping social positions). Scheler summarily defines 
love in this manner as "that movement wherein each concrete individual object that possesses 
value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein it 
attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its nature.”313  
It is also clear though that this vision of the values the beloved is potentially capable of also 
presents the beloved as extremely valuable in the current moment. But it is not possible to say 
that we begin to love someone necessarily because we have already perceived them to be of the 
highest value as that could not account for the love of children or of family. Rather it is through 
and in the love that we perceive the value they are capable of being.  We may also value 
someone highly while having no great love for them. However, certainly awareness of someone 
or some object’s great value can trigger great love for them. It seems that our love must be built 
not only on the movement to even higher potential values the beloved may potentially be, but 
also the revealing to us of the values the beloved already instantiates, that thus widens the 
horizon of values we are aware of. The movement to higher values here includes both the 
beloved’s actual value (that is higher than values we were previously aware of) and a movement 
to even greater potential value that supervenes on this. Both reveal greater value to us.     
There exists love for other persons, the most commonly referred to sort of love, but there can 
also be love for other non-persons and the values they instantiate. One can love "Nature or Art 
or Knowledge or God"
314
.  Love is not a strictly human condition but is an intentional act 
directed at objects because they are valuable, and at human beings on that basis, but it is not just 
an empirical recognition of their current value. Love may also be directed at collective persons 
as well as individual persons and this love may vary independently on that basis.  One may love 
one's nation while not loving any particular individual person, and respectively someone may 
love an individual person whilst hating their community as an abstraction e.g. loving a 
particular German woman while hating Germans generally. All we are saying about love applies 
to the collective person as well but in an attenuated form, as the collective person is both a real 
person and dispersed over the member-persons that constitute it in addition to their own 
individual person. Further each individual person knows the heart of the collective person of 
which he is a part, but not in its entirety as he is limited by only being one part of this collective. 
Nevertheless, the collective person can love, can instantiate unique values and value-
opportunities and be loved in return, in a manner that is unique to outsiders but revealed 
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collectively to members, and exists at this collective level distinctly from the individual’s own 
love and value.
315
  
In the terms of evolutionary biology, love can be considered a series of chemical changes 
triggered after we have (largely subconsciously) assessed someone else as the best available 
(and likely) prospective mate or as closely genetically similar to us. These changes produce an 
intense empathic connection with another person designed to prod and reward us into taking 
their needs into account in our decision making, in the same way we are motivated by pleasure 
and pain (or discomfort) towards or away from certain actions for ourselves.  This bonds us 
together with that person for the purpose of working together more efficiently, and thus as a unit 
be a more stable and successful platform for reproduction and the survival of our family i.e. 
those genetically related to us.
316
 Our love for nation or country is the application of this effect 
to our wider community, itself useful to the survival of us, our offspring and our family. Our 
love for nature or knowledge or God, in as far as these things are 'love' in the literal sense, are 
misfirings based on either identification of things as persons that are important to our life, such 
as God, or on the basis of a further misfiring of secondary values such as Beauty (which are also 
originally intended for evaluating prospective mates or building empathic connections with 
genetic kin). 
In Scheleran terms this theory is somewhat better than Kant's because it admits an intentional 
component to love and a connection to certain values, rather than merely assuming love is 
purely a function of feeling states (and though its conception of the nature of those values is 
very different to Scheler's). However, the problem with it is that it limits the view of love purely 
to vital values, first, and relativises it in relation to human beings. Scheler would argue that 
although this may be how love originated in terms of biological history it has long since 
surpassed this stage in the same way other human cognitive acts have broken free from their 
purely instrumental, animal significance.  Love as an emotive cognitive act is both independent 
of specifically human mental composition and free of the vital values of strength and 
reproduction. The unique qualitative nature of spiritual/mental and holy values and the human 
experience of them proves how we have broken free of these purely 'evolutionary' constraints.    
I believe Scheler is entirely correct to reject the 'pedagogical'
317
 notion of love. However, 
although love is not based on a desire to 'improve' the beloved, there is still in love necessarily a 
desire to do something for the beloved. This is not in terms of wanting to improve the value of 
the beloved, but in terms of supporting and caring for them and hence helping them to 
instantiate the unique value they already are and are capable of.  In any act of love the particular 
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ability to care for the beloved is experienced as more valuable than assisting any other person in 
the same way. Even doing some trivial piece of kindness or politeness for the beloved is 
experienced as something intensely important because it is for them. This occurs as a conative 
pull towards acting to help or support the beloved.  This is true even if for good reasons the 
person knows they cannot act in such a manner, e.g. if they are physically separated from the 
person, or if the beloved does not reciprocate and so would not welcome the intervention. The 
internal push to act will still be felt as a deeply held desire and sadly, as it is unfulfilled, a 
source of personal anguish.  
One argument for why this choice is good in terms of value preference is because through the 
act of love higher value shines forth from the person that they are 'ideally' capable of. This 
higher ideal value means that it is good for the lover to prefer the beloved to any other person, 
and supporting them over supporting any other person, although it would be meaningless for 
any other person to do this, because they would not be able to access and hence prefer the 
higher values. The non-lover can only choose over the actual instantiated values of their social 
person and this may be no higher, or even lower than the value of other persons around.  
An alternative explanation relates to the unique value-essence that each person has. This essence 
is absolutely unique and defines that person, and it is precisely the ideal fulfilment of this 
possible essence that is seen in acts of love. This value is always present but exists in the 
individual person and is hence usually invisible as the social person is the only element of the 
person seen in usual acts. Through love, however, the intimate person is seen.
318
 This unique 
value is the highest form of value and, hence, it is always good for a person to act in its 
preference, even if taken externally all other persons contain that same value, albeit currently 
hidden from the lover's view. This would explain the absolute individuality of love, as it relates 
not only to the individual essence of the person, which is entirely unique, but also, through that, 
to the many nuances of values and opportunities to instantiate them that appear only to that 
particular person.  
The lover alone sees these possibilities in their fullness and hence for each unique person 
perceives unique duties and commands relating to unique goods associated with that person 
alone.  Scheler describes values of the person as the highest values and, hence, the ideal values 
the person could instantiate as among the highest of accessible values. It is important though to 
remember that this motivational aspect of love applies to, and is still considered good, even 
when referring to the agreeable and vital values of the beloved. But even here it is good for the 
lover to act to prefer these values of the beloved over spiritual values that lie outside the 
beloved. This relates to the property of foundedness discussed under value hierarchy.  These 
lower values of the person are 'ennobled' through their connection to the higher values of the 
person they are founded on and connected due to the embodiment of the person. This is another 
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example of the complicated manner in which bearers act as a nexus unifying value complexes in 
terms of goods, a feature that must be taken into account when considering practical moral 
choice.      
There must be a limit to this process however when it comes to practical choices. If through 
love we see the best possible in someone then that is a good but if we act according to the 
unrealised ideal value of the person instead of their actual value then we may end up causing 
harm.  For example, if we see through love that a person has the capacity to be brave, but in fact 
they are a coward, and we trust them with an important task that other people are relying on 
because of that, but they then do not complete that task because they are a coward, we have 
done wrong. This situation might still be thought good if the only person relying on this is the 
lover themselves, because they have risked of themselves to give the beloved the opportunity to 
transcend themselves, but certainly not if other people are involved. The difference here perhaps 
lies between the values related to the social and individual person. The lover relates to the 
beloved as an individual person and, hence, can choose in reference to their ideal value. But 
when taking into account the interests of other persons, who do not have the same relationship 
of love with the beloved, and hence only have access to their social person, it is necessary to 
take into account only the actual instantiated values of the person because that intimate 
relationship cannot exist in terms of the values of the whole group. 
 
7. Final Note 
That brings me to the end of this chapter of the thesis having considered issues relating to 
preferment and hierarchy raised by Scheler’s ethics from the pure values that are experienced 
through into the person who does the experiencing. I have only been able to discuss a selection 
of, I believe, the most important questions raised by the outline of Scheler’s ethics I gave in 
chapter three, due to the constraints of space. This has been in order to demonstrate how 
Scheleran ethics could be applied to answering a wide range of detailed questions about our 
ethical judgement, and in a few places how further work might improve and develop on 
Scheler’s own statements. As I stated at the start of this chapter, though, almost certainly the 
most important and complex of these issues beyond the basic theory of pure values is the theory 
of the ethical significance and role of persons. The complicating factor of how ‘persons’ as a 
unique class of bearers of values affects ethics has already been hinted at in some of the 
questions discussed. In order to do justice to this the entire next chapter is devoted, as a 
continuation of this investigation into the normative implications of Scheler’s theory, to the 
ethical significance of persons, using the brilliant and influential ideas of Emmanuel Levinas, 
another phenomenological ethicist, as comparative basis.     
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Chapter 6 – The Ethical Significance of Persons for Scheler and Levinas 
 
1. Introduction 
For Scheler the person is the core unit of ethical significance. Only by understanding what 
persons are phenomenologically, and what their significance and role is ethically, can we hope 
to provide coherent answers to the questions of value preference and hierarchy such as those 
discussed in the previous chapter. Only through this can we hope to eventually produce a 
plausible theory of value hierarchy and, hence, correct value preference. It is easy to see that our 
understanding of persons will be core to any ethical theory. Ethics is, above all else, about 
choices and preferences that can be made by persons, the impact non-person beings and objects 
have on persons, and the impact that the choices made by persons have on them.  Scheler clearly 
recognised this importance and this shows in various ways.  As I said in my first chapter, 
Scheler subtitled his main book and by extension his entire ethical philosophy as a value 
'personalism', as opposed to a value 'collectivism'. He devoted a hundred pages in the latter half 
of the Formalismus to explicating the phenomenological structure of the person,
319
 and he 
repeatedly affirmed that the values of the person are the highest values.  But for all that his 
theory of its ethical role still appears confused. He never clearly connected this idea of the 
values of the person as being the highest values with the modalities and the other issues of value 
preference highlighted in the previous chapter. Although Scheler stresses the importance of 
persons he does not in practice seem to focus his ethics around them in the way his surface 
statements seem to indicate he should.  Yes, persons are affirmed as bearing the highest values, 
but this is just one distinction of height among many. There is no 'different sort of difference' 
that separates out persons as particularly unique. 
To the end of seeking to understand and possibly remedy this confusion and apparent 
shortcoming I turn to the ideas of Emmanuel Levinas, as more than any other philosopher he 
made the ethical significance of the individual person the core of his philosophy. Levinas made 
almost no explicit reference in his works to Scheler
320
  but most likely was relatively familiar 
with his work, as he studied phenomenology in Strasbourg and Freiburg in the 1920's when 
Scheler was one of phenomenology’s leading lights.321 There are undoubtedly considerable 
differences between them in their conclusions, but also doubtless similarities in their methods 
and ideas. Of all the phenomenologists they were the two who made ethics the core of their 
philosophy; of all the ethicists they were the two who were phenomenologists first and 
foremost. In this chapter I will pursue the differences and similarities in their doctrines 
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surrounding persons and their place in ethics. My hope is that in Levinas' work I will find 
resources to stimulate the phenomenological theory of the ethical importance of persons that 
Scheler's ethics needs but never truly produced, in which persons may find a genuinely unique 
place as the basis of a practical ethics.  
Firstly, I give an introduction to the main positions of both Scheler and Levinas on the ethical 
definition and place of ‘persons’ that will form the basis of my analysis in the rest of this 
chapter. Then I interrogate these ideas in detail, particularly to consider whether these 
differences form an insurmountable barrier between them or whether they can be reconciled 
without doing fundamental damage to either. It is my opinion that Scheler and Levinas do 
converge in fascinating ways on a number of core issues that in terms of phenomenological 
ethics define ‘persons’ uniquely from other entities. I take it that readers may start off more 
sceptical than otherwise of this claim of significant congruence between Levinas and Scheler 
because of the claims Levinas made in particular as to the uniqueness of his philosophy. So, I 
devote my main effort to exploring these points of congruence, while still considering where 
and why there may be fundamental differences of principle. Three of the main issues I will 
address in this definition are that of Access, Uniqueness and Objecthood.  That is, how do we 
have access to persons as persons different to things or acts or values? How is each individual 
person unique in themselves and how does this define their ethical importance?  And, how, if at 
all, can persons be cognised and considered as objects? These can be distinguished but are still 
interconnected in a complicated manner that I will attempt to make clear.  I will consider the 
differences in motivation and perspective that may have caused these differences. I consider 
whether Scheler was attempting to do something basically different in his ethics, with his 
complete description of value experience, than Levinas was in his, with his focus on the 
interpersonal relationship as the thing that underlies the very possibility of ethics. I will consider 
the degree to which and where each falls short of giving a full description of this ethical 
significance in their discussion of persons and whether this shortcoming can be answered with 
resources taken from the other. Finally I look back to how this can be integrated into the wider 
phenomenological ethics I have been outlining in this thesis, and consider how this means 
Scheler’s theory can be improved. 
First it needs to be briefly noted that I am referring to ‘persons’ in both Levinas and Scheler 
although this was not a word Levinas characteristically used, and that Scheler some of the time 
used in a very restricted and precise manner.  I use the word in a slightly looser  sense to refer to 
the moral subject generally (but not necessarily) exemplified by the self-aware, mentally 
competent human, considered as bearing moral worth and generally as capable of moral agency.  
With this in mind I cover under the label ‘persons’ Levinas’ self and Other, as well as the 
various distinctions Scheler made between persons, the self, and man. Scheler vacillates 
between using ‘persons’ in a very precise manner: distinguishing it from his view of ‘man’ and 
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the ‘self’, and in other places using it in a more general sense that does not make these 
distinctions clear. Either way, given that we are already trying to bridge the gap between 
Scheler and Levinas’ different conceptions there remains little point in generally retaining these 
fine distinctions within Scheler’s own writing. As such I consider his theory of ‘man’ and the 
‘self’ as referring to what most people would understand as persons as well, though I 
occasionally and explicitly use these more specific distinctions. 
Scheler's theory of persons does have considerable shortcomings. The confusions I have just 
described reflect deeper conflict about the direction, across the Formalismus and The Nature of 
Sympathy, that Scheler wants to take on elements of his theory of the person.  One of the most 
important of these is the question of whether or how people can be objectified, or made the 
objects of thought. Even when Scheler is in conflict with himself rarely is one view just wrong. 
Almost always he is approaching the issue with a different nuance in mind, which has a 
different phenomenology, and hence leads to a different formulation, without properly 
distinguishing these and how they fit together.  That is where further analysis will hopefully 
help dissolve these confusions and release a more coherent picture. These conflicts strengthen 
the case for calling on Levinas' own unique perspective on these issues. Especially as Levinas 
provides a closely related but deeply distinct perspective on the questions that Scheler is also 
worried about, while showing, overall, a greater degree of consistency in pursuing his central 
idea of the nature of persons in relation to ethics.    
 
2. Scheler’s Theory of Persons 
I have already discussed Scheler’s theory of persons in section seven of chapter three. For 
convenience I summarise here again the main elements of Scheler’s theory that will be 
particularly relevant.  Scheler argues that someone cannot be defined as a 'person' by possessing 
a soul, or an Ego, or a rational mind, or by belonging to the human species. Rather the person-
ness of someone is based on being the subject, the author, of intentional acts that are 
understandable as chosen by that person.
322
 Not all humans are necessarily persons for Scheler, 
and not all persons are necessarily human.  The acts of non-persons are causally explainable but 
not understandable as acts informed by both theoretical and practical cognition: insight and 
judgement e.g. a ‘person’ acts because they have weighed up the options and made a choice, the 
‘lunatic’ or an animal acts because his madness or his instincts mechanically compel him. The 
acts of a person are subjectively and creatively marked as his chosen own; he is the "concrete 
unity of all possible acts" and "the immediately co-experienced unity of experiencing". He is the 
subject understood as responsible for those acts and hence can never be an object in the sense of 
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being a ‘thing’ because he "exists solely in the pursuance of his acts".323 Scheler chooses this 
definition to emphasise that person-hood, as opposed to the ‘self’ or the soul is based on being a 
creative and responsible moral agent, and it is that which connects it to the highest values.   
Whereas all objects, and especially all things, can in principle be fully known, the person has "a 
sphere of absolute personal privacy, which can never be given to us".
324
 This does not mean the 
intuition of the person is given as negatively lacking some element. Rather, we positively 
experience that the person has an aspect that is fundamentally and absolutely inaccessible to any 
outside intentional act, like seeing a window with the blinds down, fortressed from any possible 
epistemic invasion. The individual person can therefore be considered from two perspectives. 
Those elements that are defined through his relationships with other persons are his 'social 
person'. This includes all elements defined by his culture, his profession, his nationality, 
religion, class: every means by which he is known or defined by public features. But he also has 
an 'intimate person'. This is his "peculiar self-being" (and self value) "which towers above this 
whole and in which he knows himself alone": the unique perspective we all have on ourselves. 
There is always an absolutely intimate core to a person that is positively beyond all knowing 
except to them and is known and valued (or disvalued) in absolute solitude in a manner they can 
never entirely share.
325
 
The person cannot be understood as a thing, but it is also not known purely empirically or a 
posteriori at all. Each person instantiates a value essence that defines them uniquely: this is a 
value-essence "whose objective essence and value-content contain a reference to an individual 
person" and defines the good that he is and that he is capable of fulfilling. The ideal-ought that 
is based in that insight of the good of that person is thus only precisely for that person and is 
experienced as their "calling" or vocation. Thus there is a unique place within the moral 
universe, a unique 'call' of "actions, deeds, and works"
326
 for each individual person based on 
their unique value essence. Each individual person is important because of the potential they 
have to reveal new values. Each person has historically unique nuances of values given for them 
in each particular time and place that pass away in that historical-moral moment if not grasped, 
‘preferred’ and acted upon. This means there are unique ideal and normative oughts for 
individual persons. Also, not only can unique individual values be given to one person at a 
particular moment, but universal values can also be perceived first by one person at a historical 
moment. Through particular acts of love a certain special person can see values hitherto un-
glimpsed in value insight by any person and thus enlarge the ethical horizon of all humanity. 
Kant was wrong, not only to argue that universality must be the fundamental feature of 
morality, but also to argue that it must be a fundamental feature of morality. There are unique 
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moral oughts that apply only to single individuals that are still objective because they are still 
based in insight of objective value essences. This drives Scheler's value-personalism, the 
doctrine that the value of any society is defined by the extent to which it provides space and 
opportunity for individuals to realise their highest possible values, and which is opposed to 
value-collectivism, where the value of the individual is measured by their contribution to a 
community, however defined. No general community or group can possibly replace the unique 
role of individual persons in realising values.
327
 
For Scheler the person is the centre of all the highest ethical values and acts. Good and Evil are 
values that can only be properly attached to the being of persons, because they alone can prefer 
among values. Persons alone have the higher capacity to reveal infinite further realms of value 
through love, the highest, most ethical act. The highest levels of value modality are also 
connected essentially to persons. Scheler states that holiness is always "directed towards persons 
[...] no matter what content [...] of personhood is implied". Holiness is "by essential necessity, a 
'value of the person'".
328
 By this he means that unlike lower values holiness always refers back 
to some person, however obliquely. A holy book, such as the Qur'an or Guru Granth Sahib, is 
only Holy in as far as it refers back to God, the person of persons.  Scheler also connects the 
next level of values, that of the mental or spirit, with the self. Whereas the ‘agreeable’ applies 
only to things, the ‘useful’ to events, and the ‘vital’ to living beings, these higher moral values 
also attach solely to persons as their bearers.  
While all the highest values a person can realise are values of the person, and particularly those 
revealed in his own value essence, this does not mean that the person's own value should be his 
intentional object, in fact, precisely the opposite. It is in being directed beyond himself at others, 
and those goods and values external to himself, that a person enhances the values that define 
him. The person-ness of someone cannot be understood as an object because it only exists in his 
creative ownership of his actions. This means the person focussing on his own sense that he is 
good or evil must fail, Scheler argues, and lead only to misplaced personal pride or selfishness 
(or alternatively, unproductive despair), which he labels as ‘pharisaism’.329  A person should of 
course hope and aim to improve himself, to be better, but he cannot do so by doing things 
because they will make him good. He can and must judge what things are good and do them for 
that reason.  His attention must be outside his own person. Great saints (religious or secular) are 
characterised by giving no thought to their own goodness and position but great thought to what 
must be done, and hence they achieve goodness. Nor does this preclude loving oneself because, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, love is never the focussing on an object with the purpose of 
improving it, but rather the seeing in the beloved’s current state all the highest value they could 
be and valuing them in their current state for that. 
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3. Levinas’ Theory of Persons  
Levinas’ philosophy primarily does not consider the person in terms of me, myself, but rather 
primarily in terms of the Other and the impact the Other has on me: constituting me, defining 
me, capturing me within the inter-personal relation. This infinitely challenging relation is what 
he called 'ethics'. Levinas’ entire philosophy is built around the over-riding importance of ethics 
to any philosophical or ordinary understanding of human life and reason.  He spoke about 
“ethics as first philosophy”,330 both in the sense of being logically prior to the pursuit of other 
philosophical ideas, but also in the sense of being of the greatest importance. He described this 
ethics primarily in his two main works Totality and Infinity (T&I) and Otherwise than Being 
(OtB).  
In Levinas' first main (and longest) work: Totality and Infinity, he claims that if one truly meets 
another person ethically one encounters the “Face” of the Other that convicts one of an infinite 
responsibility for that Other. Levinas’ ethics is based on the un-subvertable importance of the 
individual. Levinas argues that each individual is radically unique, possessing what he calls 
‘alterity’, meaning being Other in a manner that transcends all categories and concepts. The 
Other transcends ideas of identity or non-identity, affirmation or negation. This alterity is the 
basis for a moral infinity within the Other, where one has responsibility for the Other but this 
responsibility can never be completely fulfilled, but only ever pursued more deeply.
331
  For 
Levinas the individual instantiates the “idea of infinity”332 , meaning that no matter how one 
may try to understand them, one can never know another individual entirely, but only realise 
that the other person will always be partially unknowably Other.   
This ethical relationship one enters through encountering the Face of the Other is characterised 
by an intense asymmetry.  The Other appears as from a commanding height, though also as the 
“widow, and the orphan,”333 and calls one to an ethical relationship without end.  Levinas 
describes this responsibility as fundamentally restricting one’s freedom and requiring one to 
place oneself primarily in a position of service to the Other. One must be a “hostage” to the 
Other.
 334
  This encounter is the source of ethics and also the social and political structures that 
must be built on it.  It is also the basis of religion and must be the first principle of metaphysics.  
This moral duty cannot be rationalised away because it is based on the alterity, the infinite 
depth, of the Other, which means one can never place the Other under any philosophical 
category that could be used to rationalise away the duty. 
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Levinas uses this idea of the alterity of the Other to build a complete critique of philosophy and 
its traditional focus on the rational ‘I’.  Levinas argues that the human ego, and traditional 
philosophy, operates by attempting to cognize, categorise and understand everything that it 
encounters.  In doing this it builds a system whereby all objects are defined and placed in 
relation to everything else it knows within the system, and determines its value and position 
solely relative to other objects the ego has cognized and systemised.  In doing so the person 
brings everything he encounters into part of, what Levinas terms, the ‘Same’:335 those things 
that are understood and categorised through various conceptual relations and thus that become 
the possession of that ego. In philosophy this process is magnified, creating what Levinas terms 
‘Totality’, an attempt to create one complete inter-related description of everything that is and 
place it under one system.  This system then defines everything, and further things are only 
considered as valuable through their place in this system.  Totality is immensely dangerous, 
ethically speaking, because all value is based relatively and determined by the egological 
system. This means it is always possible for the ego to subvert the basic call of morality and 
justify this through that system, because it is the categories and relations that ego has 
constructed and hence can be subverted by that same ego.
336
    
Levinas argues that Totality is deeply insufficient because it has no place for the alterity of the 
Other.  The Other, as instantiation of the idea of infinity, cannot be fully cognized or 
understood.  In attempting to totally understand the Other the rational ego can only ever 
legitimately fail, and realise that it does so.   The Other will always be outside the Same and, 
hence, Totality.  And, because everything in Totality is defined relatively to every other thing 
this falsifies the entire project of Totality to subsume all reality under its system.  Ethically, this 
means no rational system can over-turn the call to infinite responsibility that occurs in 
encountering the Face, which calls on the individual from radically outside him.  The call of the 
Face is radically ‘objective’, and hence insubvertable, because it lies totally outside the self’s 
ability to cognize and relativise.
337
  
Levinas also gives a phenomenological account of the relation of the self to the world that 
underlies these conclusions.  Levinas claims that originally the individual’s relationship with the 
external world is based on sensation.  Through sensation the individual interacts with the 
plenum of “elements” that constitutes the external world.338   Our relation to the world in this 
stage is a basic one of enjoyment.  We don’t cognize the external world as objects, we rather 
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regard it as elements that we need or want for survival and enjoyment, and hence that we seek to 
consume.  Through consumption we become happy, and this leads to the development of the 
‘Home’ within the mind, a refuge and place of safety from the world, which we construct 
mentally. The person, in cognizing objects, makes the distinction between those objects that are 
to be taken possession of and considered mine, and those objects that aren’t.  This leads the 
individual to a state of Separation whereby through the restriction of some objects to the Home 
the self becomes withdrawn from the plenum of elements.
339
    
It is within this environment that the encounter with the Other occurs and the call of infinite 
responsibility appears.  This realm of possession is the realm of the ‘Same’: those things that the 
individual defines through his cognition of it.  Into this world then breaks the revelation of the 
Face.  This is how a person becomes aware of the Other in the ethical sense of infinite 
responsibility, which Levinas considered so fundamental. The Face breaks into the world of the 
possession of the self as a true revelation and illuminates that world, coming as poor and naked 
because everything within that sphere belongs to the self that has defined and cognized it, but 
also because of that as commanding the person to take care of the Other. Through this encounter 
the self perceives the idea of infinity through realising that the face of the other cannot be fully 
cognised and hence can never be ‘possessed’.  Through its unbridgeable alterity the Face forces 
a re-evaluation of the world of the Same because that world, previously orientated solely in 
reference to the self, is now also orientated with reference to the Other.
340
 
In his later main work Otherwise than Being, Levinas continues the themes he began in Totality 
and Infinity but with a definite change of emphasis. While Totality and Infinity pronounced a 
fundamental break with almost all prior categories of philosophy it was still partially criticised 
for using the very language of Totality in the attempt to break with Totality, and hence for being 
complicit in the very violence it so stridently opposed.
341
 In Otherwise than Being Levinas 
responds to this by trying to articulate a totally new vocabulary of ideas to better describe and 
achieve a break with the language of Totality, here referred to as that of 'Being' i.e. the purpose 
of the book is precisely to articulate what is otherwise than Being. The book explicitly asserts its 
desire to de-assemble and torture language and words themselves to achieve this
342
, more than 
in fact it actually then goes on to do. Levinas introduces new concepts of substitution, 
proximity, diachrony, the trace, among others. Proximity, trace, substitution and diachrony are 
all attempts, with different metaphors, to communicate the idea of expressing otherwise than 
Being despite necessarily having to use the pre-existing language that is implicated in Being. 
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In attempting to express this break with Being Levinas uses a theme that can most easily 
described as that of ‘presence within absence’ (though this is not a term Levinas himself uses).  
Proximity is "contact with the other" but a contact that is "neither to annul his alterity, nor to 
suppress myself in the other", a sort of hesitant approach in which the two parties still retain a 
distance.
343
 The Trace is how the Other appears, and how God appears, but "signified outside of 
every intention of signalling". It is the "fingerprints" left by one "who wanted to wipe out his 
traces and commit a perfect crime", "he has passed absolutely".
344
 Temporal metaphors are 
dotted everywhere: God appears in the trace but is "always past", always gone already when we 
get there but disturbs us none the less. The presence is past perfect, in the grammatical sense of 
being always already completed by the time we arrive on the scene. Diachrony is another 
common word in Otherwise than Being that repeats this same theme. It refers to change 
occurring over time, as opposed to synchrony which refers to things at one given moment. This 
fits in with the metaphor of ‘trace’, of an effect felt but which is absent, like the echoing impact 
of some long gone historical event. Always the emphasis is on the effect impacting us without 
any of the usual connotations of actual presence, or being there, or physical contact, because all 
these would too greatly risk sliding back into mere gross Being or Totality.  
In places Levinas combines these terms to express the earlier core idea of the 'Face' in a new 
manner: "the face of the other in proximity, which is more than representation, is an 
unrepresentable trace, the way of the infinite".
345
 The concept of substitution and the one-for-
the-other largely replaces the use of the term ‘Face’, but largely reflects this earlier term. 
‘Substitution’ describes the ethical relation that defines the one-for-the-other. In Substitution 
"the word I means here I am, answering for everything and everyone". "I exist through the other 
and for the other without this being alienation" in a "most passive passivity".
346
 The emphasis 
though is always on being there but holding back. "To substitute oneself does not amount to 
putting oneself in the place of the other in order to feel what he feels" because that would be too 
assertive and presumptive, it is not even an act "it is a passivity inconvertible into an act".
347
 The 
sense is like a servant who waits silently at the edge of a room waiting for his service to be 
needed, but never forcing his presence onto the people there.   
Levinas explains that this stance of ethical relation to the Other is essential to everything we do 
because it is the basis for all sociality, all relationship, which in turn is the basis for all 
knowledge and action. On its own "knowing is idealism"
348
 because it abstracts us from the 
most basic physical, sensual reality, which is our relation to the Other. "The one-for-the-other is 
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not a commitment", nor is it knowledge or any other conscious act of the will, because these 
intrinsically involve an active attempt to assert oneself over the other in whatever way.  Ethics 
starts before that: "the one-for-the-other is the foundation of theory" and it is "the one-for-the-
other [...] which justifies all commitment".
349
 
 
4. The Source of Ethics 
Scheler and Levinas have a great deal in common relative to other ethical theorists, though there 
are still particular important areas of difference between them. They both give stark and 
demanding descriptions of a priori ethical truth and obligation but, uniquely, given through 
intuition. Despite this emphasis on the importance of ordinary experience they both also have 
theories that describe the basis of this objective moral obligation in decidedly (ideal) 
metaphysical terms: whether regarding the theological overtones of the Face or the idea of 
infinity, or, in Scheler, the Platonic overtones of the ranking of value essences. Key Levinasian 
ideas such as the un-knowability of the Other, the idea of infinity and the radical heteronomy of 
ethics, find distinct parallels in Scheler, the first in the un-knowability of the person as an 
object, the second in the increase in revealed values through love's expansion of accessible 
values, and the third in the doctrine of the given a priori nature of ethical obligation. They share 
distinct and relatively rare inspirations such as in Blaise Pascal who looked to an equal 
originality between good and Being. Pascal of course particularly contributed to Scheler the 
crucial idea of the ‘Ordre de Coeur’, and Levinas notably quotes twice from Pascal directly after 
the dedication and before the contents page of Otherwise than Being. 
Firstly, both Scheler and Levinas agree on the essential heteronomy of ethics.  Kant and other 
rationalists place the origin of true ethics in acts of rational thought, and in the case of Kant, 
self-legislation.
350
 The autonomy of ethics is important in the act of will or the rational mind. 
Scheler and Levinas view the problem from the entirely reverse perspective. As long as 
obligation comes from within oneself it can be subverted by that same self. The will that wills 
for itself without already being conditioned by the good is ‘spinning in a vacuum’. Only when 
ethics is something that traps one from outside can it be insubvertable. Because of this both 
Scheler and Levinas place the experience of ethics and the person before the cognitive analysis 
of this. They both look to sensibility to provide the source of ethics: Levinas in the infinity of 
the person before either theoretical reason or commitment of the will, Scheler in the values that 
are given in emotional and sensible feeling.  
The differences between the details they choose to do this are significant though. Scheler's view 
of the person forms merely one part, albeit an important one, of his wider theory about value; 
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whereas Levinas' Other is a uniquely central feature of his theory. To associate the person in 
theory with other objects would be to threaten the ethical relationship itself. In either case the 
recourse to sensibility is required by the rejection of the rational view of ethics as chosen or 
self-legislated. What faculty informs prior to thought? The answer is Sensibility. In Otherwise 
than Being Levinas repeatedly uses images of the skin and the flesh that stress the immediacy of 
the contact.
351
 Levinas goes as far as to claim that sensibility properly considered must precede 
both signification and cognition.
352
 Scheler rather wants to stress the cognitive content in 
sensibility. His whole ethical view is based on the idea that our affective sense is no less rule-
based than our theoretical awareness. But this cognitive content is not one that is supplied 
afterwards by the rational mind to the material of sensibility, as in the traditional Kantian model, 
rather this lawful-ness comes in the material of intuition  itself, which itself is what allows the 
mind to form useful concepts and categories around it.
353
 For both Scheler and Levinas then the 
pertinent element of this experience comes from outside the person, and his choice, to convict 
him, before any ‘cognitive’ action of the theoretical or practical mind. This is how Scheler 
would claim to escape the trap of the ‘Same’ and ‘Totality’. Scheler’s response to the accusation 
of Same-ness in general, must point to the heteronomy of values, the way ethics is imposed 
from outside. The objectivity of ethics for Scheler lies largely in the fact that values are separate 
from us, independent objects we discover.  It grasps and convicts the person from the outside 
through sensibility and only finally is recognised and accepted in cognition. There cannot be 
any sense of being constituted and ‘owned’ by an individual that experiences them, in the 
manner that defines Levinas’ conception of the constitution of the ‘Same’ and ‘Totality’.  
Both Levinas and Scheler would seem to be asserting an a priori truth: in Scheler's sense of an 
intuition that cuts straight through to the essential truth of something. Scheler referred to this as 
being an “a priori empiricism”; 354 and there seems no better term for what Levinas is also doing 
in his theory of persons, where the face may be an arm or leg or head, but at the same time 
cannot be anything conceptual.
355
 Levinas did not use the term ‘intuition’, but his own approach 
of emphasising the pre-cognitive role of sensibility in ethics meshes well with Scheler's own 
view of 'material intuition'.  This is not a rational intuition that somehow supplies information 
directly to cognition separately from the content of experience, but rather refers exclusively to 
physical and emotional sensibility. The similarity between the methods of Scheler and Levinas 
is that as phenomenologists they are concerned more with describing the structures that provide 
the necessary foundations of ethics in material experience, the manner in which the ethical pull 
is experienced before all differentiation in particular objects of this world. Their focus is not on 
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particular ethical conclusions or propositions but on the qualitative nature of the beings who can 
understand and experience ethics, and of what they experience. Having asked these questions 
their answers locate ethics in the basic structure of how man practically experiences others and 
the world before theories. This ‘practical metaphysics’ is the analogue of the kind of ideal 
logical structures that theoretical phenomenologists such as Husserl identified underlying our 
experience of phenomena such as time, number, space, object-hood, etc. This sort of theory 
straddles the divide between the meta-ethical and normatively ethical as the ideas of one shape 
the other but they both avoid specific ethical situations.  Levinas particularly has often been 
criticised for this but so has Scheler as I discussed in the previous chapter.  
This practical metaphysics is influenced and connected to the manner in which both Scheler and 
Levinas attempt to integrate theological metaphysical ideas into their ethical framework of 
persons. Scheler's view of the individual value essence draws heavily on the idea of a ‘call’ or 
‘vocation’, as a process of the person becoming what they ought to be. The process of becoming 
holy has been described in exactly these words as 'becoming truly oneself', becoming the best 
'you' possible. Levinas' ethical theory of the Face in T&I has obvious biblical precedents in the 
mysterious theophanies of the Old Testament, except whereas in the Bible it is God alone who 
appears as utterly other, and convicts in ‘dust and ashes’356 by the holiness of his presence, 
Levinas applies this to the appearance of all Others.  He also makes repeated appeal to God as 
the one who is always “past” and revealed through the trace. 357 This is a purely practical view 
of God, though, one that has no space for merely theoretical proofs or arguments. Of course 
many ethics, even philosophical ethics, draw heavily on religious traditions but in both Scheler 
and Levinas we have phenomenological ethics that use pieces of Judaeo-Christian theology not 
in terms of moral conclusions but in terms of the ‘ethical metaphysics’: the architecture of their 
ethics and view of the nature of persons. There are of course differences: Levinas 
characteristically draws from the Jewish Old Testament, from theophanies and the ethical 
message of the prophets; Scheler leans on Christian theology. But the similarity is unmistakable. 
Levinas despite his conscious disapproval of Christianity has been used heavily by Christian 
theologians in the last 30 years.
358
 It is not hard to see how his description of God appearing in 
the Face of a human being, in an ethics of 'substitution', could be considered to bear parallels to 
Christianity. 
It is not just in reference to the ethical importance of the individual person that they share 
crucial similarities though but also in terms of how the individual’s obligation relates to society.  
In accordance with their belief that moral awareness must be traced to sensibility (in a broad 
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sense), not primarily to reason, they both trace our structure of social morality not to any idea of 
a social contract or shared rational law but immediately to an emotional and sensible moral 
solidarity (though this then reveals rational features i.e. the order of values).
359
 It is empathy and 
sympathy that produces moral community directly, of which contract and law (either political or 
moral) are rationalisations.  It is this basic, felt solidarity with the Others that is the necessary 
precondition of any general ethics of justice or law. It is based on the experience of the 
uniqueness of each one: that we are all uniquely other to one another. Levinas states that the 
third party is what gives me equality with the other, because we are both equally united in 
having a duty of service to the third person who is other to us both.  
For both men humanity is not united by “resemblance” but by “fraternity” 360, a “solidary”361 
shared endeavour of service to one another.  This directly bypasses the risk of subjectivism in 
autonomous social ethics as much as in individual ethics.  Any social contract risks being 
arbitrary, not to mention optional; any social ethic based on joint engagement in some ‘Practical 
Reason’ will inevitably betray the messiness of individual life and leave the status of those who 
fail to align themselves with that Reason in question. It represents the fact that ethical obligation 
often affects us in situations where there can be no general calculation that justifies immediate 
obligation, and the fact that we cannot ‘choose’ our ethical obligation. It also does justice to the 
manner in which social ethical obligation appears in situations both large and small that do not 
fit into any rational formula. Different groups of friends, family, colleagues or partners may 
have distinct felt bonds of obligation between them that fit into no explicitly stated or general 
rule, and I’m sure we can all think of examples. They exist nonetheless. Different social groups 
and identities can establish genuinely ethical and genuinely different levels of obligation and 
solidarity, on the basis of a different lived relationship in empathy and sympathy, which goes 
beyond the blandly ‘moral’.  And it gives a criteria by which all such rational formulae (whether 
social contract or practical reason) can be assessed, lest, like in the individual case, they end up 
spinning in a vacuum.      
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5. Uniqueness and Access 
For both Scheler and Levinas the core claim is that the person is defined as having a part that is 
totally inaccessible to Others, not as a lack of information but positively given as there being a 
space there that we cannot possibly access, like seeing a window with the blinds down.
362
 This 
inner privacy is core to the fact that the individual person constitutes the highest ethical unit. 
The person is inaccessible because they are an active subject in a manner that always subverts 
our ability to comprehend them in terms that must be general and will always inevitably lead to 
stereotype. It is this creative, subjective uniqueness that implies their epistemological 
uniqueness and ethical importance. For both, this is given as a fact of phenomenological 
intuition, rather than a claim that can be deduced by rational arguments. This differs strongly 
with the Kantian idea, where the ethical importance of the person is due to and dependent on 
their capacity as an abstract agent of practical reason, but also from any idea that we can fully 
comprehend the person by empirical means. Scheler emphasises the creative importance of the 
individual: each individual has ethical possibilities that are open to no other person and that 
require each individual to grasp them based on their unique essence.  But there are significant 
ethical overlaps between persons in their social persona and purpose, though even here there 
will be a continuum of nuances even in relatively public social values, whether professional, 
public of familial.  
Scheler’s emphasis that each individual has a unique creative role through access to unique 
personal value nuances raises the question of whether this is a necessary feature of the definition 
of the person, or whether this is a contingent fact based on us each occupying a different place 
in space and time with different experiences and capabilities. Scheler appears to believe this is a 
function of being distinct persons of distinct ethos, personality, experience and position, each of 
which partly informs our ability to perceive and act upon values. He describes this, though, in 
terms that are ambiguous about its necessity to the ‘person’. However, even if another could, as 
a matter of logical possibility, have the same entire value experience, it could only be by being 
me in the same time and space, and in all features: physical, social, psychological.  In other 
words, only by being me in my situation. What this still means is what Scheler positively stated, 
that no 'universal' laws can properly capture the ethical "good-in-itself-for-me" that can appear 
for each individual at each passing moment of time. Only the most basic laws of value 
preference, and empty formalist statements like 'do the right thing' etc will cover these situations 
but these can never define the best action "in the moment".  No universal law, in the sense of a 
law that could apply in another situation, can be composed, because, among other reasons, there 
is interplay between the capabilities and 'individual' value essence of the person and external 
values he encounters and experiences. Unique options arise in "every moment of life". This is 
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then crucially individual as a matter-of-fact and those universal values and laws that can be 
derived from them cannot replace that, without needing to know whether this holds by any 
absolute metaphysical necessity.
363
 
For Levinas, if we are to explicate otherwise than Being there can be no overlap between 
persons, or at least we cannot work on the premise that there is. This also leads to unique ethical 
duties for each individual as they respond to the utterly unique nature of the Other. We cannot 
construct universal laws that would just treat individuals as some anonymous entry into a 
formula. One of the core features of the relation that Levinas describes opening up between me 
and the Other in T&I and OtB is that this relation in no way compromises the alterity, the 
distinctness of me and the Other. I am in a deep relation with the Other but this does not involve 
in any way “annulling his alterity” or “suppress[ing] myself in the other”.364 It is through 
recognising the alterity, the difference of the Other only that we enter into ethical relation and 
thus build a true ethical bond between us. Scheler argues that this is a function of sympathy: an 
intentional spiritual act that requires a higher level of conscious awareness than emotional 
identification (which is how animals relate to other living beings).  For Scheler the act of 
sympathy gives us the Other's thought and emotion distinctly as the thought (or emotion) of a 
being separate to myself, either by analogy, by transference, or as part of some larger 
metaphysical whole.
365
 We directly feel their feelings but in a unique mode that gives us the 
alterity of the Other that feels them. This separating function of sympathy is crucial because it 
breaks with emotional identification that would in various ways fold one into the other and erase 
the boundary between person and person, and hence would make the unique moral relationship 
Levinas discusses, based on alterity, impossible. 
Ethical responsibility in Levinas is connected with the infinite depth of the Other. 
Responsibility for the needs of the other cannot be ‘fulfilled’ like someone settling a bill. Each 
step taken in responding to the needs of the Other merely reveals further the infinite depth of the 
Other and more of my responsibility towards him or her. This element of the infinity of the 
Other is represented in Scheler by the role of love. Love is defined by Scheler not as an 
intuition, but as an intentional movement that reveals the higher values that are possible for the 
Other to instantiate. This process widens the range of values open to one and hence one’s 
possible awareness of ethical responsibility and the nature of the other person. This movement 
to higher values is potentially infinite, there are always more possibilities, and also the manner 
in which the positive infinity of persons is revealed. 
366
 As we become better we become more 
filled with love, we then see the deeper value that was there but hidden and hence new ‘oughts’ 
and obligations appear that we never before glimpsed.  Levinas’ vision is similar but does not 
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speak of love specifically, but rather directly the obligation to fulfil needs, which comes through 
sensibility, and is logically equivalent to seeing the Face. As we fulfil needs we become 
increasingly aware of what more the other calls us to do. The role of love in Scheler’s theory is 
to answer the question how, in Levinas’ theory, it can be that some people miss the Face more 
and less than others. Something must be different about them and for Scheler that difference is 
the depth of their love, for it is love that enables us to see what is in front of us.  
Love cannot be justified by any purely empirical view of the person, no list of material features. 
It is only justified by the higher values that are revealed through the love itself. Love is also not 
arbitrary, though, anymore than values are. They are triggered by empirical features and by 
emotional identification and sympathy but are never reducible to it. We see the same in Levinas. 
The Face is the precondition of dialogue, but whether we become aware of it varies hugely. 
When we look at another human we see the same empirical features but we can fail to see the 
significance of the Face. It is not the materiality of the object, its “front and obverse” in 
Levinas’ words367, but rather its ethical significance. This does not mean it is a matter of 
judgement or justification. The Face is either seen or missed, or as he says elsewhere “ethics is 
an optics”368. This explains the generally declarative tone of Levinas’ main works. One cannot 
be convinced of the Face of the Other by arguments; one must become aware of it. Levinas, 
then, explains what the Face is more clearly so that we have a better chance of recognising what 
has always been before us.  
Both Scheler and Levinas face the question of how the everyday relational element of the 
person coexists with the unique ethical infinity that they both see as fundamental. They 
approach this problem differently: for Scheler the individual person is divided between the 
social and intimate person. The social person is the person as far as he is known by public 
labels. This has no analogue in Levinas’ categories. Of course Levinas was aware of the relative 
part of man's nature but in his ethical work he deemed it unimportant, because we are already so 
familiar with it. All such relations that enmeshed man among others are Totality, and there is 
already enough discussion of Totality. It was Levinas' role (uniquely as he saw it) to articulate a 
philosophy otherwise than Being that provides an utterly distinct perspective on the ever-present 
flow of Totality and thus disrupts it. For Levinas the correct ethical relation is with the Other 
felt as the object of “obsession, a shuddering of the human” and as the all important ethical 
source, precedes all theoretical cognition and practical commitment of the will.
369
 Of course 
material needs whose expression will be based in totality will define that responsibility we hold 
to another, whether for food or drink or shelter, or anything else. So Being is unavoidably 
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implicated in the ethical definition of persons but this is left almost entirely implicit in what 
Levinas actually says.   
For Scheler the social person is not the core of the person but is still experienced ethically as 
well. Scheler would classify Levinas among thinkers like Kant because like Kant he refuses to 
see any active ethical significance of its own in the elements of man's life outside of one 
defining feature: in this case alterity. Scheler was insistent that through intuition we have access 
to real values from many elements of man's life including his social person. A man is father, 
soldier, colleague, citizen, etc, as well as an essentially private being. The person is just not 
whole without both elements: the social and the intimate. And we cannot approach either 
element as an object without losing all sight of the Other as a person. These social elements of 
the person define him in a really positive way that may furthermore help him to understand and 
define his more intimate self. Only to a certain distance are we trapped in the roles life gives us, 
as people like Sartre suggested
370
. If these roles are fruitful we are also released by them, and 
can become more who we could be through them, in a manner that is impossible to ignore in 
any idea of the person.  
The difference seems to be that whereas Scheler seems to believe that one can always approach 
the other purely on an instrumental level and avoid their truly individual personhood entirely, 
Levinas excludes this possibility (in a sense). Levinas argues that even where one acts 
unethically towards another the fundamentally ethical bond is still there necessarily underlying 
all conscious thought, because it is only by recognising the other as a person that we can address 
them in the first place.
371
 It is this fact that we ignore an ethical reality that does necessarily 
underlie all our choices, even our very callousness, that condemns us. For Scheler it would seem 
that it must be possible to approach another purely on the level of the social person, and thus 
miss their true individuality.  But Scheler also says ultimately all sympathy relies on love to 
some degree. Hence, also, where the love by which the intimate person is revealed is entirely 
absent then all awareness of them as a person is also absent, including awareness of their social 
person.  It is possible to perceive them as a social object, but in that case all personhood is gone 
and we are dealing with a very different type of awareness. This is because the ‘person’ is 
defined by their agency over their acts. Our social person is how we actively inhabit and 
positively act and define ourselves through those social roles we have. Without love as 
sympathy we can only consider the roles another has as dead and empty things that brand him, 
and thus approach them and him as a social object not as a social person.   It would seem that 
either way we take either Levinas or Scheler true awareness of personhood requires a balancing 
of intimate and social factors of us but in a manner that always maintains emphasis on us as 
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uniquely unique persons. The argument is in how best to describe this balance without upsetting 
it one way or the other. 
For Levinas the ethical core of the person is always present and unavoidable because it is the 
core of sociality itself.  Scheler seems to think that we can answer directly to the other as an 
object, while bypassing their core as totally other entirely.  In this Scheler seems to reflect the 
commonsense view but Levinas would argue that commonsense is both fatally compromised by 
unreflectively operating in a totalising manner, and too late on the scene because its awareness 
is already predicated on establishing the bond of sociality.  For him “Justice is prior to Truth”372: 
justice requires the Other whereas truth is something I can grasp alone. (Though once we 
become divided against ourselves we can become unjust even to ourselves). If we don’t 
approach the other ethically then we don’t speak at all because we don’t approach him with the 
respect that he will listen and hear and consider; and hence we are effectively talking to 
ourselves (or to the wall for all the good it does us).  
 
6. Objectification 
Both philosophers stress that when approached ethically the person can never be fully or 
properly known as an object. Scheler is clear that objectification loses all sight of the Other or 
me as a person. Clearly Scheler believes that the person can be the object of ethical thought 
because we can perceive and know facts about our and others unique value essence; but, he 
wants to establish 'persons' as a unique category, along with living beings and mere things, as 
well as acts, etc. This is then the use of the very strict sense of person as “one who exists 
entirely in pursuance of their acts”. My body and my ‘self’ can be objectified legitimately but 
not myself as a person and hence not in terms of my most important value.  The person is 
defined solely in pursuit of his acts: it is the creative and subjective core of ourselves in which 
we have ownership and responsibility for our internal and external acts.  We have knowledge 
about our own person or others, but not through taking them as an object in cognition but 
through sympathy, that in turn is necessarily based on a degree of love. We gain understanding 
of them as a person solely through a love in which we join in with their acts of love, thus we 
come alongside them without attempting to cognise them as an object, either “cognitively, by 
‘understanding’ [or in] vicarious ‘re-living’, or morally by ‘following in his footsteps’”. 373 This 
is separate from what ‘facts’ we may know about it. This perspective given solely through 
sympathy is ‘objective’ because love allows us to free ourselves of our ethically subjective, 
selfish concerns.  
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Elsewhere though, when discussing other minds in The Nature of Sympathy Scheler's theory is 
notable for the very strong position he takes on the possibility of human empathy and sympathy. 
He claims that our own minds and those of Others are given originally with equal force as part 
of a continuum of minds. And that far from having to construct the Other in some process of 
empathy, a la Stein or Husserl, actually our first task is to differentiate ourselves from the Other. 
Scheler says we have overestimated the difficulty of knowing Others and underestimated the 
difficulty of knowing ourselves. But basic empathy only tells us that other minds are there, but 
cannot give us any wisdom of the nature of the actual persons. It is through sympathy inspired 
by love that we “think the thoughts of others [and] feel their feelings”374 (but always as theirs, 
not ours), and it is only eventually (developmentally) that we raise our head above this tidal 
wave of other people’s thoughts and ideas to know our own self and think our own thoughts.  
This is all understandable if we stick to very specific definition of persons. As soon we consider 
the ‘person’ more generally then Scheler accepts an object based approach as long as it limited. 
Indeed this becomes essential to answering various questions related to both our social 
definition, our emotional and physical needs. To do justice or love to someone we have to 
consider them as a physical being with quantifiable needs.  I argue that practical care is an 
essential part of the nature of love, something Scheler seems to miss as mentioned in the 
previous chapter. This also affects his definition of persons here. He risks dividing the 
psychophysical moral being into two separate entities in a manner that does not do justice to 
how our physicality and messiness is essential to our ethics and definition as individual persons. 
Arguably we justifiably objectify ourselves in our inner life. Guilt, for example, is a form of 
self-objectification as we judge our own self as having transgressed. We take our own person, 
precisely as the one responsible for actions, as the object of our ethical judgement. Scheler 
could disagree whether we exactly take ourselves as an ‘object’ here, or whether we do in our 
person or our self, but these are distinctions that frankly are not clear even from Scheler’s own 
words and I do not think amount to much more than semantic importance here. So we have a 
view of persons in Scheler that is a complex reflection of differing aspects.
375
 
Levinas’ view of the objectification of persons is clearer in principle. The Other as far as he is 
‘known’ ethically is not an object and cannot be taken as an object. To do so would be to lose 
all track of the Face, and to surrender to Being, to use the idiom of T&I and OtB respectively. 
Only by relentless emphasis on the alterity and absence of any sense of Being in the other can 
we glimpse the Other ethically, in a manner that is otherwise than Being. Levinas never 
compromises on this idea in what he writes but there are important qualifiers.  In both T&I and 
OtB Levinas is explicitly trying to describe the uniquely ethical manner of speaking of the 
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Other. This manner seeks to avoid all sense of cognitive capture of the Other, because any sense 
that we had ‘grasped’ the Other in cognition would be to sink back into Totality or Being 
(effectively synonyms for Levinas).
 376
  Levinas’ view of this is more practical than it sounds 
though. It is not at all that Levinas thinks there should be no practical consequences of his 
philosophy but rather that practical ethical action could never be defined by any finite code. To 
do so would, again, be to fossilise it out of the ethical into Totality. The commonplace ethical 
gestures of courtesy and the rapport of honest discussion both instantiated the ethical for 
Levinas,
377
 as did the material needs of hunger and thirst. Indeed, they were particularly 
important as sensible needs that precede all cognition. It is exactly in recognising our obligation 
to fulfil the needs of the other that cry out to us that we recognise the Face at all.   
But to recognise and then fulfil these concrete needs necessarily involves the kinds of 
compromises that infect Scheler’s view of the person. To understand what a person needs and 
fulfil that need requires a degree of objectification, or at least regarding them as the object of 
thought and cognition, even if only as far as is necessary to think about their needs concretely 
and provide food, shelter and comfort. One could semantically argue that this is only in terms of 
the ‘person’ in the broad sense of the entirety of the human being that it necessarily includes 
cognition and that would be correct. But that means Levinas is doing something similar to what 
Scheler is doing. The ‘person’ taken in its restricted, strictly ethical sense, is un-objectifiable 
without just totally losing contact with that person as a person, but not in the wider sense of 
considering them as including a self, as including a body that has material and hence object 
based needs.   
This all leads us to a possible answer to the question of why is Scheler’s ethics not as person-
centric in its presentation as he seems to indicate it should be. Maybe all other values must be 
categorised from an emphasis on the alterity of persons. The problem with Scheler’s theory may 
be that he analyses the person like any other object despite his concern to express a 
‘personalism’, whereas Levinas starts solely from within the person and its experience of other 
persons, and works outwards. Scheler hence finds that the person is a highly valuable ethical 
object but not that it defines our approach to all other values, and expresses this still as though it 
were one moral object among others. This can be traced right back to the start of Scheler’s 
analysis of values, where his initial analogy is with dead qualities such as colours. Here we are 
about as far from the unique, haunting alterity of the Other as an individual infinite person as 
possible. He gets closest to expressing a person-centric approach when he stresses that the 
defining feature of persons is their subjectivity and creativity as author of their acts and the 
uniqueness of their ‘calling’: the individual ought of the person that defines a possibility to 
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create good that is unique to them.
378
 But this perspective shines through too rarely. Perhaps the 
whole Formalismus (and indeed possibly this thesis) is written backwards, placing persons at 
the end of an analysis defined by objects and qualities rather than the other way round. 
The approach of considering all persons in the same methodological manner as objects also 
misses the difference Levinas finds between the self and the Other. Scheler’s remarks about the 
Other are comparatively anodyne. For example, he states that values of oneself and others are 
equal in height, but realising a value of the other is of greater value than realising a value of 
oneself.
379
  This is an interesting ethical idea. It tries to reconcile the insight that all persons are 
of equal value, whether myself or others, with the insight that it is better to do good for another 
than to do good for myself, thus allowing a compromise in our ethical view of the relationship 
between oneself and other persons. But here we are some distance from the haunting 
relationship that Levinas portrays as so crucial.  Scheler does talk about the importance of being 
outwardly focussed when he talks about pharisaism but does not connect this with his comments 
about realising the value of the other at all. For Levinas the self and the other are portrayed 
totally differently. The self is the engine of the ‘Same’: egological and based in Being, 
concerned with possession of objects. To be concerned ethically with oneself is directly 
counterproductive. Whereas the Other is the very opposite of all that. When we recognise the 
need of the Other we see into the core of the person that in our own case is confused by manifest 
and contradictory controlling desires.  Of course the Other is a self to himself and so has that 
same egological core but that is not and cannot be my concern, for his unique perspective on 
himself is closed to me. What is revealed to me is his physical need and through that the person-
hood that is threatened by that need.
380
 It is then only by concentrating on the Other that we can 
see the nature of all persons clearly as persons, rather than as the self-ish concerns that define 
me. Levinas would, I think, say so. We are already relentlessly fulfilling our responsibilities to 
ourselves in material matters so the clear sight of the Other is so important.  Because of this, it is 
only when ethics is grounded in the Other before anything else that the rest of ethics can really 
be considered a personalism. 
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7. Range  
Levinas would have had the greatest problem with Scheler’s use of values as a mediating force 
between me and the Other. Values, particularly the values of the Social person, risk allowing me 
to avoid the alterity of the Other entirely.  But the Other is not solely defined by the values she 
instantiates. If she does not just have values but she is valuable then there is no mediation. There 
are the values of persons, like qualities of an object, but there is also the immediate contact with 
the person herself and the realisation of how immensely valuable that unique person is. She is 
valuable but in a manner that can and must be approached in a totally different way to every 
other person. There are risks that anonymising the person from actual individuals to a 
philosophical ‘class’ will inevitably cause us to lost track of her alterity. Even if we distinguish 
very strongly different types of values, and try to make the term itself as neutral as possible with 
respect to its specific members, we are left with the fact we are categorising persons with 
objects, even merely in terms of an over-arching genus. Avoiding values alone cannot solve the 
problem though. If Levinas wants the self and the Other to be the only moral entities in our 
universe he loses track of the way ethical life is manifested in different ways both in man’s 
psychological and emotional faculties and virtues, and the objects and acts of this world. 
Levinas recreates the Kantian world where there is one source/object of human value and all 
man’s other faculties and experiences have only secondary and technical usefulness toward our 
only defining moral purpose. This is despite the use of sensibility as the overwhelming moral 
source, as in Scheler. 
The more generously ordered nature of Scheler’s persons can perhaps be explained in part by 
the influence historical motivation had on their philosophical priorities. Both Scheler and 
Levinas rejected rationalistic ethics but for Levinas this was a historical priority built out of the 
failure of western society and ethics in the Second World War.
381
 The overwhelming nature of 
the shock motivates the emphasis on this singular principle. Scheler, despite the effect of WW1, 
was not so affected and so does not see any threat in accepting a more holistic and general view 
of ethical principles. In the face of the experience of War all else but the demand on the 
individual ‘Thou Shalt Not Kill’ fades into irrelevance.  In peacetime other concerns and 
priorities can appear as actually having real relevance. Perhaps this influences their different 
senses of the phenomenology of the experience. This is not to say that Levinas is necessarily 
wrong. War represents an extreme ethical test and can form a crucible that burns off the 
impurities and forces out the truth. Or, otherwise reveal the truth at a more fundamental level 
that may in lesser situations not prove clear.  
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In the individual situation of War there can be decisions that have no universal right or wrong as 
Sartre said of the potential resistance fighter.
382
 No-one can state that any person need sacrifice 
himself against overwhelming odds. But this does not mean simple indeterminacy. This is only 
necessary if we view moral choice as simply binary: right or wrong. But we have different 
values and choices open to each individual through their own value essence and circumstances. 
Someone may ask what the difference is in practice: well, the difference between indeterminacy 
and positively informed choice for that individual.  
Scheler and Levinas would agree on this point: for Levinas it is not clear whether there is any 
better or worse, in the general sense of a gradation of good and evil.  The only distinction he 
seems concerned with is those acts that do justice to alterity and those that do not: the ethical is 
a binary stance that either is or not in this scheme. Scheler argues that the ethical is too diverse 
and holistic for that. It is a diverse metropolis packed with different languages, dresses, food, 
culture and people of every colour and appearance, each bustling in their own direction and 
motivation without any unified plan or direction, but each contributing none the less to the 
success and glory of the whole. 
I argue that the lack of a detailed analysis of the full range of ethical experience, such as is 
found with Scheler, is a major weakness in Levinas' presentation. Now, it would be unfair to 
expect Levinas to answer every ethical question when certainly no other ethical philosopher 
does that. But, he does not even provide any details of how to go about answering such 
questions. By this I mean that having identified the obligation not to harm the Other there is no 
explanation in Levinas' theory about how one should decide how, out of the varying options 
available, that should be done. Does 'not harming' mean helping the other avoid physical pain, 
does it mean helping them gain happiness, promoting their 'eudaimonia' or human flourishing in 
the broad secular sense, does it mean 'the movement to the highest possible value' in that person 
in the Scheleran sense? The answer to those questions depends on further issues of ethical 
epistemology, ethical phenomenology, and even ethical metaphysics, and they are legitimate 
questions to ask, even if they bring in the risk of shifting the focus away from the infinity of the 
individual and back towards Totality.  
Levinas summarises man's relation with the non-personal elements of his world as one of 
'enjoyment' and 'possession’ into which the Other intrudes.383 For Scheler though this 
oversimplifies a whole range of choices that he argues are still made under values, albeit more 
or less unimportant ones. For Levinas these cannot be ethical choices but for Scheler they are 
structurally similar to choices regarding persons, or at least done with the same method and 
purposes. There are numerous values that are values of both the person and values of things. 
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Another set of issues are raised by the connection between moral truth and the religious and 
aesthetic truths that are so closely bound to it in our individual and social experience. Levinas' 
theory is deliberately aimed at the moral layer of our experience of human individuals and, 
despite his deep relation to Judaism, does not recognise the experience of religious value in a 
manner that differs from that of the moral experience of the individual in the Face. He faces a 
similar problem for aesthetic values as well. Beauty has been connected to goodness both in 
classical and modern philosophy and a complete ethical theory surely requires recognition of the 
similar but distinct nature of the value of the aesthetic experience, as compared to the moral 
experience of persons, as well as the religious experience. In the previous chapter I argued not 
only that different areas of ethical life have values that are feelably qualitatively different, but 
that also we can attach qualitatively different types of ethical obligation to these different areas: 
responsibilities to self, to other persons, and in relation to aesthetic and religious value (for a 
start). Levinas, like all ethical theories that have fundamentally one principle, cannot do justice 
to this on his own. This is both in the sense of having a general ethical theory, and in the purely 
personal sense. Prior to and regardless of what encounters with the Other I may have I may still 
ask whether I should pursue beauty through art or just concentrate on enjoying basic pleasures, 
whether I should sacrifice immediate wealth for education or the pursuit of holiness?  
These are ethical questions that cannot be answered purely within the moral interaction 
experienced by one person with the Other. They are still legitimate and unavoidable ethical 
questions, and in fact the personal moral questions that Levinas so acutely raises cannot be 
answered without the wider ethical context and its questions. None of this is a criticism of what 
Levinas does give us in the moral sphere, and in terms of demonstrating the importance of that 
content being the essential foundations of any wider ethics. But, it is certainly an argument that 
his philosophy does not answer important ethical questions, even in terms of individual ethics, 
let alone the wider questions of social policy sometimes referred to (in relation to Levinas' 
work) as 'Politics', the problems with which, however, also further demonstrates the limited, if 
powerful, nature of Levinas' theory.  An ethics also needs Scheler’s breadth of values, both 
within ourselves and external to just human beings.  Even if we are just to do justice to the 
ethical significance of persons themselves. 
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8. Conclusion 
The conflict between Scheler and Levinas can be seen through the prism of the question: To 
what extent is Man the centre of ethics; and, once the answer is reached, how best to express it? 
We have an ethical picture of the person that has emerged from Scheler and Levinas: A person 
of unique ethical importance that affects us from outside our control and commands us. We 
grasp this person through the immediacy of sense but are forcibly aware that they are totally 
different to any mere empirical object or thing. We grasp that we cannot grasp them fully, rather 
the closer we get the more we perceive their depth continuing into the infinite distance. The 
person is in that sense paradoxical, we know positively that they are fully distinct from us, and 
cannot be reduced into our scheme of objects: they have a unique potential that we can 
recognise but not access or replace.  
That much is a shared view of the person between Scheler and Levinas. I have tried to 
demonstrate that they share congruent ideas in some of the details of this picture on the 
importance of sensibility, the possibility of persons being taken as objects, the basis of social 
ethics, and in the nature of our access to other persons and in the uniqueness of persons. There 
are distinct differences though. Levinas emphasises above all that the person (and specifically 
the other person) breaks the whole scheme of Totality and Being, when approached properly. 
The every-day elements of the psyche and of the external environment, even of the other, can 
have an importance as part of her ‘needs’ that call on us to be fulfilled, but do not enter 
concretely  for their own sake at any point as objects of ethical worth and consideration. Levinas 
seems to fear any such admission would be to fatally distract focus from our responsibility 
towards the Other.  
Where philosophy usually attempts to define the person by looking to myself, a perspective 
Scheler shares, Levinas looks to the Other to define the person’s ethical importance through the 
debt of service I owe her. The preference for defining the person by reference to myself has its 
obvious reasons: my awareness of my own self will in many ways always be clearer than my 
awareness of anyone else.  But in the ethical case this may just confuse the question.  My view 
of myself is skewed unavoidably by my own selfish concerns, the volume of my own desires 
compared to those of others’, and my own conflicted, often tortured relationship with myself. 
Levinas is right to concentrate on how I must be in relation to the Other. Scheler’s own 
paradigm for values is qualities, and even when this is qualified by the statements that persons 
cannot be ‘things’ this does not do justice to the direct impact of the relationship. We cannot 
understand persons ethically as a composite of ‘practical qualities’, to do so would be to atomise 
them. Nor can we place persons as merely the highest element of a hierarchy of value without 
relativising our approach to the other and undermining the constant respect she deserves. In as 
far as we can set the correct relationship in propositional terms at all it must be on a totally 
different level. This cannot be done with mere statements that it is so. This is where Levinas’ 
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often abstruse use of language has a use. It is necessary to retain the aspect of ‘fear and 
trembling’ to express this aspect rather than just to state it. 
In practice though the concrete values of our everyday lives and psychology are not just traps 
for totality but bear a fundamental function that is also necessary for us to positively define 
ourselves: truly, ethically. Not just our social person that is part of ourselves, but also the 
elements of our self such as the moral tenor or our own vital feeling, and the elements external 
to ourselves: the acts and the things that we cherish.  As Scheler says, man does not only seek 
pleasure, he seeks those things and acts and persons in whom we can take pleasure; and not just 
surface, agreeable pleasure, also the joy, and deeper still, contentment in our soul that endures. 
As far as we must operate in an ethical world of many choices and opportunities, for acts, for 
things, for ourselves, then the general world of values has relevance. But I do not think this need 
contradict Levinas’ fundamental insight. The alterity of the other individual and the unique non-
objectifying relation this requires must be the foundation of our ethical perspective before any 
objectifying layer can be placed over it, even a positive ethical one. Otherwise, applying this 
objectifying perspective to an individual whose nature is hidden from us, even with the best of 
moral intentions, will only result in doing violence to the reality and needs of that other person. 
This need not be incompatible with the awareness of the objective: either in terms of the 
considering the person in relation to various objects, or in the sense of what is objective and 
universal between different persons, as long as this is a strictly subsidiary perspective. 
If we do accept this relaxing of the uniqueness of Levinas' claims for his philosophy in order to 
let in Scheler’s phenomenological insights how then do we continue to exclude Heidegger and 
Hegel, and other 'Totalising' theories of morality? Because even for Levinas the theorising that 
becomes Totality could never be completely done away with, but only interrupted by the 
constant awareness of the infinity of the Other, and hence through permanent reorientation 
towards the other prevented from becoming Totality. Scheler agrees on the core elements of the 
unknowability of the Other, the ethical supremacy of the individual, subjective person and the 
infinity of the individual ethical response, and in that stands for the realisation of infinity over 
the Totality, while recognising that a certain degree of the egological perspective is inescapable 
and, indeed, necessary. This shared basis represents a totally different tradition to the one that 
abandons these truths in preference for removing primary value from the uniqueness of the 
individual to an external objective totality, whether Hegelian, Aristotelian, Marxist, Kantian or 
utilitarian.  
All of these philosophies radically de-centre the individual from the foundations of ethics, 
relativising the messiness and uniqueness of individuals compared to the Absolute, 'Natural' 
Teleology, Dialectical Materialism, Practical Reason, or the Utility Principle, and all make 
ethics something fundamentally grasped, constructed even, through the action of my cognition 
that then justifies whatever means or ends. For Scheler, in contrast ethics is not constructed in 
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cognition by the ego but given in detail in a priori intuition and is dependent on this giving of 
ethical facts. This permanently restricts the action of the ego and reveals among other things the 
ultimate unknowability of persons and the infinite subjective ethical call, which are structurally 
similar to Levinas’ key principles. This difference is fundamental to the methodology involved. 
Both Levinas and Scheler's aim is to make the phenomenology of the experience of the ethical 
call, and the substance of persons, the core of their ethics rather than basing that on either a 
metaphysics or an empirical theory of human psychology. This then leads them to the uniquely 
ethical facts that alone can provide a proper basis for ethics. I argue that this substantially 
accounts for the significant differences between the phenomenological ethics of figures such as 
Scheler and Levinas and traditional ethics. Of course they cannot be distinguished as a group 
purely on their methodology but also on the basis of their conclusions as well, as described 
previously. But these together provide the basis of a broader ethical theory that remains as true 
as possible to what is radical in each of these philosophers, and distinguishes them sufficiently 
sharply from ethical alternatives that are unsuitable both on their methods and their results. 
What then does our view of Scheler’s theory gain by a rapprochement with Levinas’ theory of 
persons? Firstly, it does benefit by taking stock of Levinas’ insights into the threat of Totality or 
Being being used to sideline the reality revealed by ethics. Levinas powerfully speaks against 
the constant temptation, in both philosophy and individual moral life, to file the individual 
under a category that denies her essential uniqueness, and robs her of the chance to be justified 
by her own actions. Totality can never be constantly avoided but it must be constantly resisted, 
lest ethics ossify into ontology, as Levinas said. I believe Scheler takes a very different, more 
Levinasian, perspective than the traditional philosophies of Totality and Being, but he certainly 
straddles the divide, and so needs Levinas’ consistent warning to avoid merely replicating the 
mistakes that Levinas identifies.   
Secondly, it gains the view of the person based on unshakeable alterity, and the importance of 
this infinity, particularly in founding an ethical view that breaks with all perspectives that treat 
ethical facts like theoretical objects. It hence does more justice to an ethical philosophy that 
seeks to define itself as a personalism. In Scheler’s terms this stresses the importance of the 
category of bearers, the person, over the modality of the values, though this sounds a pedestrian 
manner of phrasing compared to Levinas’ unique language. Levinas gives a more holistic view 
of the person encountered as a unified source that convicts us of her needs; rather than 
appearing too much as a cluster of thing-values e.g. moral tenor, individual value essence, etc. It 
redirects Scheler from me, as a person, to the Other, not just in terms of the mechanics of 
empathy and sympathy, as is already the case in The Nature of Sympathy, but properly in terms 
of what I ought to, indeed, must, do. The contrast to his sole dry comment in the Formalismus: 
“it is certain that the act of realising a value of the other is of higher value than the act of 
realising a value of oneself”; could not be greater. Some may argue that this is as much a matter 
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of Levinas emoting more as much as saying anything concrete that Scheler does not. But in a 
phenomenological theory we need some kind of expressive detail about what a value is, 
especially in a case as core as that of the person, whose importance will condition our approach 
to other values and choices. Scheler needs some of the radical asymmetry of obligation that so 
defines Levinas’ view but is lacking in Scheler’s more universal, objective theory. This 
complements Scheler’s own original statement that to be good one can never intend one’s own 
good, but must always be focussed outward by aiming it at the other person in her wholeness, 
rather than any single values. Scheler goes beyond Levinas in extolling the radical creative 
uniqueness of the individual, in terms of having possible objective ethical opportunities that are 
entirely their own. But in terms of orienting our ethical duty the asymmetry of duty correctly 
orients us outward.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
1. Relative Position to Alternative Theories 
In this thesis I have demonstrated how Scheler's theory of pluralist material intuitionism forms 
the basis of a truly great ethical theory that is the equal of the most well-known schools of 
philosophical ethics on meta-ethical, epistemic and normative issues, while more faithfully 
representing the range and detail of ethical experience. It does this by attending to the reality of 
ethical experience in all its detail with the thoroughness of the phenomenological theory and 
method that originated with Husserl.  
Many well known moral theories only focus on one area of what would be widely recognised as 
our moral experience: rules or consequences, means or ends, emotion or reason. But from 
Scheler's theory we can account for what is essential to ethical experience from all these 
important ideas and areas, without making one fundamental and reducing all others to it. It does 
this without itself being empty of content, rather with a depth of theory that draws on a wide 
range of sources in its architecture, on both the meta-ethical level and in its normative 
inspirations. Many of the connections I have made in this thesis add to the broad background of 
thinkers and connections that Scheler himself explicitly mentions, and they further demonstrate 
the breadth explicitly present and implicitly possible within his ideas. Using Husserl, Huemer, 
Bedke, Moore, Doering, McDowell, Otto, Collingwood, Levinas, and others I have aimed to 
bring Scheler's theory up-to-date with concerns raised in meta-ethics since his death, and with 
more recent phenomenological ethics such as Levinas, and I believe it stands up very strongly in 
light of these more recent arguments.  
Scheler's concept of practical affective values provides a more neutral and flexible ethical 
concept that allows us to better represent the range of ethical experience than traditional 
theories. His material intuitionism offers a unique path through the jungle of theoretical options. 
It weaves between naturalism, rationalist intuitionism, Kantianism, natural law theory, 
traditional sentimentalist theories in a manner that avoids the most commonly recognised major 
inherent weaknesses of each of them. It explains how each of these can have relevance within 
one theoretical structure, as in fact we often feel they do. In doing so it dissolves traditional 
sources of ethical paradox by revealing them as elements of an understandable whole.  
And, contrary to the charge of 'emptiness' that is sometimes levelled at intuitionism and moral 
realism, it is impossible to claim that the theory is so broad that it lacks definition or depth, or 
that it is so narrow that it cannot be applied to enough to be useful. I have responded to this 
objection of emptiness implicitly throughout chapters three, four, five and six of this thesis by 
showing how Scheler's theory produces thorough arguments and explanations about ethical 
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reasoning, the epistemology of ethics, the ethical theory of persons, and the role of reason and 
sentiment in ethical knowledge. 
Considering the current theories of analytic intuitionist thought that I described in my second 
chapter, I argue Scheleran intuitionism improves on these theories in almost every department. 
Elements of these theories, whether adequate understanding, as restated by Audi, seemings 
theory or recent articles on perceptual intuitionism, all overlap substantially with Scheleran 
intuitionism. But Scheler goes beyond them all by providing the detail of the phenomenology of 
actual ethical intuitions in a manner that fits with the range of ethical experience, as I said in 
chapter two. This emotional material provides the content missing from Audi or Huemer's 
intuitionism that explains the origin and effect of intuition, while maintaining their rational 
content and role in cognition.  
This means Scheler is able to ground a much wider range of ethical phenomenon than any of 
these previous theories. There is not the apparent randomness of Ross' seven principles, which 
are just presented, instead of any other ethical principles one could name; or indeed, Audi's 
attempt to merge this with Kant's emphasis on personal autonomy and dignity. Though, neither 
does it reject most of what motivates these theories. Scheler supports the idea of 'perceptual 
intuitionism' and advances this theory by placing the generative source of this perception in the 
affective and conative faculties, but also explaining how the values we experience are distinct 
from these means we perceive them through. Scheler's theory is in a sense an affective 
intuitionism, but its use of phenomenological method and the Husserlian distinction between the 
intending affective sense and the intended meaning-object of the value separates it out from 
other affective intuitionisms, and allows it to develop a totally distinct, and much more 
comprehensive, epistemological approach. It also goes beyond them in demonstrating how such 
a philosophy can demonstrate wide-ranging ethical results. 
Scheler better explains where the experience of values comes from and what they consist of, 
defeating the charges of redundancy and of epistemic or metaphysical queerness. Scheleran 
intuitionism does not need to rely on innocence by association but on what it reveals about the 
substance of ethics and how it accurately describes both human affective and value experience, 
as I have described in chapters three to six. Material intuitions are not the empty propositional 
intuitions, with their accompanying sense of trueness, produced by these purely rationalist 
theories. Rather, as I described, they are built on the undeniable material affective and conative 
experience and the phenomenal content of this experience. This allows us to outline a general 
epistemology of ethics, including a direct indefeasible evidentiary element as is suitable to any 
true intuition.  
Moving beyond analytic intuitionism we can see how Scheler's theory fits between traditional 
ethical categories in its own near unique place, as befits its unique source as a 
phenomenological ethics. At the very beginning of the Formalismus Scheler described his 
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theory as an emotive a priori empiricism, and this idea is closely related to, but crucially 
different to what is usually considered empiricism in ethics. Traditional empiricism hits the 
mark as far as believing ethical value is directly in front of us. We don't need some non-ethical 
source outside experience to separately dictate the experience of ethics to us. But it runs into all 
the traditional problems of naturalism identified from Hume to Moore and into the present day, 
which I outlined in my second chapter. The mistake lies in assuming ethical facts could just be 
reduced to or derived entirely from non-ethical content, which is itself a strong metaphysical 
and epistemological claim that has never been validated. 
Actually it requires specifically ethical facts as Moore correctly said, but Moore failed to give a 
content to ethics in the way Scheler does in spades. Moorean intuitionism also had no 
explanation for how the immediate intuition could be distinguished from a purely personal 
subjective preference, or the mechanism by which it worked. There was none of the structure 
that the theory of values gives to the experience of ethics. This left it wide-open to charges of 
subjectivity and emptiness. This led to the non-cognitivist rejection of both naturalism and non-
naturalist intuition in ethics in the early 20th Century. The non-cognitivists were mistaken in the 
literal non-cognitivist thesis of the purpose of ethical speech itself, as I discussed in my second 
chapter. They were also mistaken to think an ethically objective theory could not have more 
definitive content than Moore's did. They missed the intentional value-object directed nature of 
ethical experience, and stayed restricted to the sentimentalist empiricist view of our affective 
life as consisting purely of object-less feeling-states (or at best that the emotions themselves 
could be their own 'projected' objects). Certainly ethical discourse involves statements of our 
feeling about something, prescriptions for what we think ought to occur, and indeed wishes 
about what state of affairs we believe should be, but it can also contain rational content that goes 
beyond this, as Scheler demonstrates. 
Scheleran intuitionism is closer to naturalism and non-cognitivism than most 'realist', 'non-
naturalist' theories but its phenomenological qualities lack the metaphysical commitment of 
naturalist empiricism. That would be to betray the phenomenological reduction to metaphysical 
neutrality. Nor does it suffer from the metaphysical and epistemological 'queerness' of stronger, 
traditional realist theories that comes from separating ethical experience entirely from our 
otherwise common faculties. Scheler may be accused of dodging the issue under a cover of 
metaphysical agnosticism but over-claiming is no virtue. Metaphysicians may have made the 
same criticism of Kant in theoretical philosophy: history has largely vindicated him though. 
This is not to say that Scheler is entirely metaphysically agnostic, neither was Husserl or Kant, 
but that his metaphysical statements are limited to the structure of phenomenal experience, 
rather than statements about the fundamental ontology of values that goes beyond (or behind) 
what is revealed in the phenomenal content. Arguably naturalism in ethics itself is not well-
defined. Scheler clearly rejects naturalism as the idea that ethical truths are directly derivable 
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from non-ethical physical facts. Ethical truths require uniquely ethical facts and they come from 
the heart's own reasons (to use Pascal’s phrase). But as value-facts come through perfectly 
natural feeling and conation it is arguable that they are as 'natural' as theoretical, physical 
scientific facts. But values are not physical, not exactly understood, and are not what most 
people mean by 'naturalism', nor is it physically verifiable the way naturalist facts are meant to 
be. Indeed, it is arguable the extent to which traditional phenomenology is consistent with 
naturalism in general as it stresses the necessity and importance of ideal essences or universals 
in both theoretical and practical cognition.   
The theory also bears interesting relation to Natural Law theory, a form of rationalist naturalism 
as far as it derives the purpose of an object directly from its natural features. The purpose of 
something is part of the values it has the possibility to successfully instantiate but is not 
necessarily the entirety or the highest of the values it instantiates. Any statement of purpose 
about a thing presumes wider a priori value suppositions about what ought to be. It fails to 
correctly explain the full range of possibilities of all objects in different cases, including the 
values of acts, events, emotions, and particularly of persons who cannot be conceptualised as an 
object with a purpose. Any species-wide purpose will only have secondary importance to the 
individual personal 'calling' that is not the same for all and fundamentally cannot be determined 
in advance. Our ability to grow and discover further values also militates against any attempt to 
presume we've perfectly understood what the purpose of any being or object is. Nevertheless, 
Natural Law theory bears a close relation to Scheleran theory, especially as far as it looks to the 
ideal values an object or person could fulfil, rather than a single restrictive image of something’s 
purpose. This close relation to Scheleran theory on the rational side of value-cognition, exists 
just as sentimentalism does on the affective, and empiricist naturalism does in terms of the idea 
of access to values. 
In terms of other significant naturalist theories, the shortcomings of any simple Hedonism or 
utility theory have already been discussed at various points (for example, chapter five, in the 
section on ‘Height among Values’). In summary, pleasure is not a simple object available for 
calculation, it's not a simple object at all, and regardless, pleasure itself is not necessarily good 
as there are bad pleasures and bad preferences. For it to be accepted as an a priori ethical truth it 
must depend on some general intuition, but if ethical experience can tell us that happiness 
matters as an end (and it does), then it can tell us that many other things are of importance as 
well (and does). Pluralist utilitarian theories can reflect a more complex and meaningful 
conception of the Good but would steadily converge with a pluralist Scheleran ethics of 
qualitative values, without the theoretical background as to how these different values are 
experienced, and how they internally relate to each other that has been described in this thesis. 
The only way to retain a pure utilitarianism that makes sense would be to assume that all the 
things identified by moral experience as good apart from pleasure, e.g. virtues, etc, are only 
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good as far as they are substantive means to some distant end of happiness. The identification of 
other things than happiness as good would merely be a misidentification in which means and 
ends are confused. But any method that identifies pleasure or preference as a good can equally 
identify all these other things as good in of themselves, and in many historical views does. Any 
certainty that happiness alone is good must come as some transcendent revelation in the manner 
Kant so criticised, lying noumenally, invisibly, behind the phenomenal reality that is pluralist.    
Indeed, ethical categories like means, ends, and virtues fail to reflect reality, if taken as 
exclusive categories. For all things are both a means and an end, particularly persons, but also 
anything else. Even the creation of a tool is an end that should reflect values of craftsmanship, 
quality and other useful values: even a person, while always also an end in themselves, is a 
means to many further ends, and will always be so. The only time an end would not itself be a 
means to further ends would be at an apocalyptic 'Last Day' and final judgement at which all 
choices would be weighed and counted without the possibility for further events. Even 
assuming that means and ends could be separated in any strictly consequentialist theory, at what 
point in time are the consequences calculated: tomorrow, next year, forever hence? Any chosen 
point will be arbitrary and the effect of any act in terms of any simple effect like quantity of 
happiness may in that time flip from having a negative to a positive effect multiple times. This 
would create a fundamental indeterminacy about a great many acts to the point where it would 
be impossible to determine their ethical status ever, and certainly make it impossible at the time 
of action. The committed consequentialist may say, all the worse for any hope for a determinate 
ethics. But where is the evidence that certain acts, motives, emotions, etc themselves may not be 
ethically valuable or otherwise? Ethical experience seems rather to represent a continuum of 
objects and moments each of which has significance in itself as well as the significance of the 
consequences it creates at each moment, and in which each one must be balanced against the 
other. 
As I have previously said the neutrality of values as an ethical concept allows us to coherently 
present a flexible but objective system where both acts and outcomes are valuable according to 
their features, as well as the value intrinsic to each person known as virtues. Relatively, in any 
consequentialist system, any virtues can only be valued as a disposition to create certain ends, 
whereas they are widely experienced as realities of the person that do that person credit, or 
otherwise, on that basis alone. The intuition otherwise can certainly only justify itself as an 
alternative intuition as well. Each one of these ethical schools has latched onto and emphasised 
one core element of our ethical experience and attempted to generalise that insight to an 
absolute law about what is an acceptable ethical criterion. But there is no need to do this given 
the plurality (but also structure) of experience. 
Of the objections raised in my second chapter almost all of them have been addressed explicitly 
in the preceding chapters. Two, however, have not been specifically responded to so I 
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summarise the Scheleran argument against them here. The first is the 'Supervenience' problem. 
The Scheleran answer to this problem connects to my comments above about whether Scheler's 
values fit with naturalism. Scheler argues that the world is experienced as a good with the same 
originality that it is experienced as a thing, but goods themselves are instantiations of values, 
they do not metaphysically define ethics in and of themselves. Scheler explicitly denies 
supervenience in Blackburn's original form
384
, writing (decades before the objection was 
formulated) that “things could be quite different from what they are and yet the world of goods 
could remain the same”385. This follows quite naturally because Scheler argues that the 
fundamental ethical facts are not among things at all, or goods, but among values that are 
essential separate from all goods and things. Consequently, things do not fix ethical truths with 
metaphysical necessity but only as a 'matter of fact' given what we separately know about the 
structure within values within this universe. This is why we need to engage in specifically 
ethical investigation to work out what the facts among values are, precisely because this cannot 
be defined or detected directly from the natural facts, and, hence, these facts could logically 
have been different. Values are multiply realisable by many different physical facts that bear 
nothing physically in common but do instantiate the same values, as both Scheler and Moore 
argued, and so they cannot be metaphysically necessarily connected to certain physical facts
386
.   
Part of the basis for this is the degree to which we can bring values to givenness separately to 
goods, and establish a hierarchy of values independently to their instantiation in transient goods, 
as I discussed in some detail in my chapters four and five. Hence, in its original form there just 
is no problem of supervenience for Scheler. In the more general sense supervenience occurs 
because it is fundamental to our existence and experience of reality as both practical agents and 
beings capable of theoretical awareness, with these two perspectives applying very differently to 
the same objects of the world. It is amply evidenced by our phenomenal experience which we 
receive itself through our entirely natural affective and conative faculties. In that sense it is in no 
way mysterious. 
The one other objection I raised in my second chapter that is still remaining is the 'evolutionary' 
objection. This contends that our practical reason can be entirely explained as conditioned by 
evolution to pursue reproduction of our group without any appeal to an objective ethical 
content. A Scheleran response to this has a few parts. Firstly, practical reason and value 
awareness are an intrinsic necessity for any animal capable of choice. Animals and children 
have access to lower values as far as they have the cognitive development to have phenomenal 
                                                     
384
 This argued that ethical non-naturalists are committed to claiming that ethical facts are not entailed by 
natural properties, and that ethical facts are metaphysically necessarily fixed by natural properties, and 
that non-naturalists have no explanation for this extremely odd combination of properties.  
385
 Scheler, M. Formalismus, p22. 
386
 Ibid, p15 
& Moore, George Edward. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903, Ch 1. 
 
174 
 
experience and the capacity to prefer and order them. Our self-awareness and mental 
development as a species gives us access to higher spiritual and mental values through a process 
of specialisation and individual effort. We have no evolutionary purpose for aspects of our 
higher-level theoretical faculties, whether abstract-algebra or quantum mechanics, but we have 
those abilities with training as specialisations of our general capacity for abstract thought that 
does have an evolutionary purpose. What our ethical insight reveals once we make the process 
of abstraction from goods to values is that there is a structure of height among values that 
stretches far beyond the agreeable and vital levels (most relevant to evolution) to many nuances 
of higher values. This structure can be verified by the features intrinsic to values themselves, as 
I outlined in chapter five, regardless of our evolutionarily caused states of feeling. It is this 
structure of values that is given to us in ethical experience, and is separate to the goods we 
encounter, and is separate to the sentiments by which we experience it, that gives us confidence 
in the objectivity of ethics. The rationalist arguments in ethics around a range of individual and 
social issues, while never on their own conclusive, demonstrate that it is possible to conduct 
serious rational arguments in ethics that in no way require reversion or reference to what is 
evolutionary advantageous.  
Also, our highest ethical values are routinely those furthest removed from what would be 
suggested by a purely evolutionary focus, whether artistic, abstractly intellectual, religious, or 
our modern social ethic of embracing contraception, abortion and de-stigmatising childlessness. 
If anything, the most pro-reproductive ethic would, ironically, be something like traditional 
Catholic Natural Law, which itself is highly rationalist in its justification. Furthermore, the fact 
of personal bias in our practical thinking (which is often referred to in discussions of evolution 
and ethics) does not undermine the possibility of practical knowledge, any more than it does in 
the theoretical case. There can be great disagreement and bias in theoretical cases where our 
interests are at stake, and this is a matter of rational and ethical failing, but a Scheleran theory 
describes how the ideal meaning-content that is the intended object of our ethical thought is 
separate to these matters of personal bias driven by rational failures or selfishness. The actual 
meaning-content of ethics is not displaced anymore than a bad drawing of a triangle undermines 
the essence of triangularity. These issues are only the beginning of a Scheleran response to these 
questions that I would hope to develop in further work. Scheleran theory is consistent with or 
ethical awareness having developed evolutionarily or, what more traditionally might have been 
the explanation, that they were granted directly by God.              
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2. Conclusion 
In a single thesis I can only hope to begin the work of explaining and adapting Scheler's theory 
in light of contemporary ethical debate. I was motivated to write on this subject by my belief 
that Scheler's theory, while by no means perfect or complete, represented a view on 
philosophical ethics that deserved to be better known and more discussed. I cannot completely 
comment on the reasons for Scheler's theory being largely forgotten, apart from the determined 
attention of a few figures like Manfred Frings
387
. But having studied it closely I am convinced 
that it is not due to any weakness or absurdity in the theory itself and much more do with the 
vagaries of historical fortune, particularly connected to the 2
nd
 World War, and pre-existing 
prejudice about its phenomenological epistemology. 
I have tried to cover a wide range of issues concerning Scheler's theory as a whole rather than 
focussing bullet-like on one or two very precisely defined questions. This is because I want to 
demonstrate the value of the theory as a broad complete alternative to other schools of ethical 
epistemology and meta-ethics. Obviously in this much space I have left much further work to 
develop a complete Scheleran theory and how it would connect and be applied to related fields 
such as aesthetics and various particular branches of applied ethics. I also believe there is much 
more to be done in exploring the connections between Scheler and complementary 
philosophers. To give just two other examples I have not been able to include as much about 
Kierkegaard and Collingwood as I had hoped: Kierkegaard on the subjective choice of ethics 
and the person, and Collingwood on aesthetics, and art especially. These are perhaps not 
philosophers who would be thought to have much in common but through the structure Scheler 
erected I believe certain of their insights can be integrated into the one theoretical architecture.  
As I have said numerous times the benefit of Scheler's theory is its combined breadth and depth: 
the range of ground covered is only matched by the detail. This in turn is buttressed by the 
thorough use of the phenomenological method, which, as I argued in my second chapter, I 
believe is particularly applicable to ethics, although rarely applied there in a systematic manner. 
I have attempted to do credit to that breadth and depth in this thesis though I make no claim to 
replicate Scheler's remarkable creativity of phenomenological ideas. I believe I have now 
covered all the issues I raised in my first two chapters and have demonstrated the worth and 
versatility of Scheler's theory with relation to ethical alternatives, especially alternative forms of 
intuitionism.   
Among all the ideas I've discussed I think a few are the most important distinguishing features. 
Firstly, the separation of values as ideal objects from the feeling and conation we experience 
them through, and the further independence and structure of values from goods. This separates 
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Scheler's view from most forms of sentimentalism and affective intuitionism, and helps form the 
beginnings of a unique answer to the problem of ethical knowledge. Secondly, the acceptance 
that original ethical values may exist at every stage of the ethical process, from motives through 
acts and laws, and have not been arbitrarily restricted by hypothesis to merely one area. This 
delivers the thorough-going pluralism of the theory and I believe allows it to more fluidly and 
correctly represent our ethical experience than alternative restricted views. Third is the idea of 
active, emotive ethical insight, which overthrows the old insistence that rational ethics involves 
ignoring or going against our intrinsic emotional nature and drives. And, finally, the focus on 
the uniqueness and individuality of the personal experience of the nuances of value, and the 
unique possibilities for creating the Good this gives to each person in every day of their lives. 
This comes also in emphasising the importance of the active, choosing subjectivity in defining 
one as a 'Person'. These four core ideas are crucial to the subjects I have tried to explore through 
my latter chapters: on the epistemology of ethics, how Scheler's ideas impact ethical decision-
making, and the doctrine of 'Persons'.   
Ethics benefits from the phenomenological distinction between the subjective, emotional 
psychological content of the mind and the logical meaning-object, the ideal content of ethics 
itself that is carried through it and intended by it. In Kant's terms this is the difference between 
the synthetic a priori statements that make up ethical truth itself and the empirical a posteriori 
nature of statements of moral opinion and argument, or, alternatively, the difference between the 
object language of ethics itself, and the meta-language of criticism and discussion. This allows 
us to do justice to the sentimental impact and biases that infect actual attempts at moral thinking 
without assuming this necessarily undermines the rational moral thought contained within, or 
needing to totally disconnect the two (as is the case in Kant's theory).  
My aim has been not to just advocate Scheler's theory but to update it in light of developments 
in philosophical ethics since the Formalismus was written in Germany in the 1910's. On the 
analytic side, I have tried to integrate Scheler's writings with a range of arguments related to 
affective intuitionism, rationalist intuitionism and the possibility of an objective ethics, as I 
discussed in chapter two. On the more continental side, I have also thought it important to relate 
Scheler to the ground-breaking ethical work of Emmanuel Levinas, who is probably currently 
the most famous phenomenological ethicist. I hope the work I have done relating Scheler's 
theory to ethics since his death is useful to other philosophers to expand and develop an up-to-
date and uniquely Scheleran approach to both theoretical and applied ethics. This approach 
should be one in which a wide range of different values and elements of ethical cognition are 
considered and closely analysed as experienced, rather than questions being decided in advance 
by consequentialist or deontological principles that do damage to some or other of the values 
experienced. I think these connections both help demonstrate the worth of Scheler's original 
writing, and also help bring in new insights that can certainly add to his ideas.  
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I certainly do not think that everything in Scheler's theory should be taken up exactly as it 
stands. This is more a matter of emphasis than explicit disagreement, but I have deliberately 
taken a different approach from that one would pick up from reading the Formalismus. Indeed, 
Scheler is downright confused in his use of terminology on certain issues between one part of 
the Formalismus and another. Much of the thought that has gone into defending modern 
intuitionism from Audi, Huemer and others can be applied usefully to Scheler's account of the 
epistemology of ethics. Husserl's work on essences and that of other 'realist' philosophers (in the 
medieval sense) is important to explain the nature of values as practical essences, which is 
crucial to Scheler's ethical epistemology. I also think it important to tweak and adapt Scheler's 
ethical epistemology, for example, in reference to the unity of reasons of the heart and mind, as 
suggested by Collingwood, and using ideas from Otto and elsewhere to explicate the 
schematism of values. I also think, as I argued in the last chapter, that on the normative side 
Scheler's ethics needs recalibrating towards the view of Persons as the central unit that makes 
sense of ethical choice. This is more of a matter of a major change of emphasis from that taken 
by Scheler in the Formalismus. Scheler spends significant time talking about various questions 
of moral phenomenology and the theoretical (non-ethical) phenomenology of the person, rather 
than the questions of ethical epistemology and meta-ethical definition that preoccupy 
contemporary philosophical ethical debate. These extra comments amount to hundreds of pages 
in the Formalismus alone but in my view they were not the most important in terms of 
establishing what is really impressive about Scheler's ideas, or where they interact with current 
debate. They are not wrong in my view, though, just additional to the issues I have discussed 
here. 
That brings me to the end of this thesis. The reader will hopefully agree that I have progressed 
the debate and understanding of Max Scheler's ethics by fusing it with complementary ideas, 
and clarifying the position of Scheler's ethics relative to meta-ethical alternatives, particularly 
casting new perspectives on debates in ethical epistemology, ethical decision-making and the 
ethical significance of Persons. I also hope that by increasing understanding of these ideas I 
have opened up further possibilities for study and development in axiology and ethics, and 
increased the awareness and appreciation in general for the remarkable ethical ideas of Max 
Scheler. 
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